Dr. Tariq Rahman

The Trap of Public Opinion

The question of recognizing Israel is a perfect example of a government losing its flexibility because of its own earlier policies. For a long time the highest functionaries of the state have whipped up so much fury against Israel that in the public perception it is not a state but a monster of iniquity. Our conspiracy theorists mention the machinations of ‘Yahood o Hunood’ (Jews and Hindus) in one breath for everything from a train accident to inflation in Pakistan to Nine Eleven. They believe the Jews are behind all the evil that has befallen the Muslim world and that befriending them is not just politically wrong but even religiously taboo. Such attitudes have been created over time by the right-wing press, school textbooks and rumour-mongers who see Pakistan in emotional and ideological terms to the exclusion of pragmatic national interest. The irony is that the Pakistani state has made these attitudes part of establishment thought in such a way that it is now trapped by them. Anybody who has doubts about governments, and all governments including Ayub’s, Yahya’s and Bhutto’s at that, should read Hussain Haqqani’s recent book Pakistan: Between the Mosque and the Military (2005).

Flexibility requires that several options may be considered. The losses and gains may be weighed and then a rational calculation is made. If the emotional investment on one side is so great as to preclude its consideration, there is no flexibility, no room to maneuver; no rational weighing of advantages. What happened in Pakistan was that Israel was made into a great myth of evil and Zionism, which is expansionist and imperialistic, was represented as the only face of Israel. Hatred of Israel was made into an ideological matter and a matter of faith rather than evidence. This makes the change in policy towards Israel very difficult—something which ought to teach the functionaries of the state not to invest ideological emotion into the policies of the state.

If the people had been told the truth instead of being indoctrinated into fanatical hatred of Israel, they would still be highly critical of it. It is true, after all, that Israel was established on 15 May 1948 in a land which was not uninhabited. And, because it was an aggressive state, it did throw out its Arab residents and took over their lands. It is also true that Israel gained more Arabs territory in its wars with its neighbours in 1948-49, 1956, 1967 and 1973. But it is also true that some of these wars were fought by Israel as defensive struggles for survival. However, Israel has illegally and violently held on to territories it occupied and the small strip vacated in the last few days--though a good beginning—is really a very small concession to the Arabs. It is also true, as Noam Chomsky and Edward Said have never tired of pointing out, that Israel has resorted to extreme violence to the smallest provocation--even stoning by unarmed children (the intifada). All this is true and the terrorism by the PLO, the Hamas and suicide bombers are a reaction to these excesses. But that this violence on both sides ahs made the lives of generations miserable and threaten the peace of the globe is also true.

So, along with the anti-Israel facts, the people could also have been told that even the Arabs—Anwar Sadat and later Yasser Arafat most notably—have realized that peace with Israel is probably more in the interest of its Arab neighbours than war. Also, Israel does not have only gun-toting Arab killers and fanatical Zionists, it also has a huge majority of peaceful citizens who, like their neighbouring Muslims, just want to lead their private lives in peace. Now, if the cycle of violence is ever to end, it makes sense to create a Palestinian state free from Israeli domination rather than keep fighting a war which will never end and which will harm the Arabs directly and Pakistan indirectly. This is what Yasser Arafat was hoping for and this is what those who genuinely desire peace in the Middle East hope for.

The people of Pakistan should have been educated into this politics of peace rather than an ideological commitment into undying hatred and unending war. They should have been told that peace with as many countries as possible is in the interest of Pakistan and that one need not consider international relations as fixed or as part of our religion—after all, there have been many peace treaties, amicable living together and other cordial relationships between Muslims and Jews in the past. They should have been given to understand that the wrong Israel has done in the past will not become right even if it is recognized but that the advantages of a future period of peace is much better than condemning the Palestinians—the immediate targets of a hostile Israel—to warfare.

If Pakistanis had not had this ideological antipathy to the idea of recognizing Israel, they might have realized that they can put their pressure on any future development towards the creation of a Palestinian state only if they are on talking terms to all partners in future negotiations. They could also appreciate that if Jerusalem—sacred to Jews, Christians and Muslims—can be a common or free city for these three religious groups only if Israel is at peace and not a garrison state. The garrison state mentality in Israel can end, or at least be diluted, if it is at peace. There are liberal groups, silenced by the militant right-wing Zionists ones, in Israel at the moment. An Israel at peace with the Muslims will strengthen the liberals and this will be in the interests of the Palestinians. It will also be in Pakistani’s interest as Pakistan will have one enemy the less. Moreover, mere recognition does not mean that criticism of what is perceived as wrong or unjust should also stop for ever. All states do criticize other states which they consider wrong and this right Pakistan need not ever lose.

These arguments may be debated and refuted but they can only be made in a rational atmosphere. If it is a question of ideology and faith, as Israel tends to become, they cannot be made at all. My point is that we have made so many holy cows that our own best interests are in jeopardy. A military government may have the power to change previous policy but this will be considered one man’s action and others may make political capital and get it reversed when they are in power. Even more ironically, civilian leaders feel that they might be removed by the military if they are found bending on the ideological stance. In short, while all governments of Pakistan have lost flexibility on certain policies—Kashmir and Israel among them—civilian governments have lost them even more than military or military-backed ones. This suggests that the flexibility we need to solve the Kashmir problem too has already been bartered away to ideology – ideology nurtured by all the governments of the country in their perceived, but short term, interests. This is a sorry state of affairs because it means that we cannot correct our faults nor can we strengthen civilian democracy as known in England or the United States.

Even worse is the thought that foreign policy should become so emotive an issue that it may endanger governments, put individuals at risk and polarize public opinion to the point of danger. This would not have happened if we had always shown flexibility and maintained that our survival, peace and prosperity matter more than anything else when we make foreign policy.

The Author is a Linguistic Historian

Dr. Tariq Rahman