Dr. Tariq Rahman
The Survival of South Asia
As troops rush to the border both India and Pakistan, the fear of a war looms ominously over South Asia. The ostensible cause of Indian reaction is the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament on 13 December. This reaction deviates from the past pattern of India’s responses in that it is more violent than the response to the recent bombing of the Kashmir Assembly, last year’s attack on the Red Fort and even the intrusion of fighters in 1999 into Kargil. The reason for this violence appears to be that the post-September 11 World appears to allow far greater latitutde to state violence than violence (or counter-violence) by non-state actors. To my mind this is the single most significant and long-reaching consequence of American and Israeli aggressive responses against terrorist attacks in their countries. It has changed the nature of warfare.
From the time of the hunter-gatherer societies till the time of the Napoleonic nationalist total wars the tendency was to increase the destructive potential of states and spreading out the possibility of destruction to more and more civilian non-combatants. Air power, gas, nuclear weapon increased this tendency to the extent that nobody remained safe. Indeed, the world itself is an unsafe place and not only human but all species and the enviroment itself are in danger. But to counter the state’s monopoly of violence, non-state actors started using force to fight back the state because of real or imagined grievances. Thus, the last century saw non-state ‘terrorism’ challenging the state’s monopoly of terror. Initially this development did not seriously challenge efforts to control war which had started after World War I because that war was so destructive as to have alarmed everbody. The League of Nations, the United Nations, treaties to ban the use of gas, treaties to limit the number of nuclear weapons, the Geneva convention etc were all efferts to avoid the consequence of modern warfare. After Nine Eleven these efforts have been subverted in fundamental ways. The principle which appears to be established now is that the state responds to a terrorist attack by non-state actors by all out war on those who hide or abet them. The United Nations, its Security Council, its International Court of Justice, other states etc are not be consulted. The alleged terrorists are to be attacked, hunted down and eliminated without proof or, at least, without a legal trial which should convince the word that proof is credible.
This new principle has, in theory, made all countries unsafe because a war can start without one country having first crossed the international border. In the case of South Asia it risks the very survival of these civilizations of four thousand years. First, it breaks down the fiction of nuclear deterrence. That it was nothing but fiction was proved by Kargil but if India attacks Pakistan now we shall move towards far greater insecurity than we have ever experienced. Every time there is a terrorist attack anywhere we will expect war. This means that the stock market will come crashing down, foreign investors will stay away and both India and Pakistan will sink further into poverty and squalor. Moreover, the danger of impending conventional wars means that both sides will have to enter into a non-ending conventional arms race. This has two problems; first, extra expenditures; second, more threat-perception on both sides. Both factors can contribute to the breakdown of the states governning power in favour of non-state actors.
Another consequence of a war, however limited it may be, is that it will enhance the power of the hawks on both sides. In both states the hawks are divisible into two major groups. The first group consists of Westernized, elitist members of the military, bureaucreacy and the intelligentsia. The second group comprises religious militants. In India there are the splinter groups of the former RSS, Shiv Sena etc. Iin Pakistan there are what are known as the Jihadi groups. The first group is apprehensive of the second but still wants to use it. It was this mutually contradictory policy which led to Pakistan’s fateful support of the Taliban and the Jihadi elements which carried out militant activities in Kashmir. In short, an attack on Pakistan will not serve the long term aims of India. Indeed, such an attack will give a new lease of life to the Islamic militants and bring the moderates under pressure in Pakistan. This would be disastrous for the survival of South Asia.
In the absence of international norms of warfare, as the world seems to have moved towards, only one thing matters --- power. America did have the military power to destroy Iraq and Afghanistan as the suicide-prone leaders of these countries failed to realize. The question now is whether India thinks it has that kind of power in relation to Pakistan? A cursory glance at the armed forces of both countries suggests that India should not assume it can launch an attack across the line of control without being punished. Besides the punishment itself, there could be the danger of escalation. The very worst scenario is the one in which Pakistan is getting the worst of it. Smaller states feel besieged to begin with. If they are cornered further they are precisely the ones to retaliate very aggressively. In the case of nuclear states such escalation can be suicidal for all concerned. No wise leader should think of jeopardising the very survival of South Asia by such escalations.
So, what is to be done? Let me repeat what I have said consistentily in all cases, especially in the case of Nine Eleven, for a very long time. Terrorism must not be responded to by an attack on another country or, as in the case of India and Pakistan, across the line of control. First, India should call back the forces from the border and withdraw its threats. Pakistan should, of course, follow suit. Pakistan has promised to take action against Jihadi outfits but India should give it time because any immediate clampdown merely drives terrorists underground. However, Pakistan should take such action that Jihadi elements should not be able to take militant action across the line of control. If the agencies of the state are still supporting such action then, after Nine Eleven they should be persuaded not to do so. Such policy was always suicidal, as I have said several time before, but now it is courting annhilation. Both India and Pakistan must enter into a treaty that, in case of a terrorist attack, the evidence against the terrorists must be presented for trial to an international body. Its decision must be binding on both states. Further, and above all, India (as also the U.S.A and Israel) must probe deeper into their policies so as to find out why it is that people take terrorist action against them.
Far long term security in South Asia the leaders of India and Pakistan must stop indulging into hate-filled rhetoric. The talk of war is threatening to close the possibilities of altenative action for the Indian leadership just now. The talk of Kashmir being the sole issue has closed options for Pakistani leadership. Indeed, both India and Pakistan have been so adamant about their respective stances on Kashmir that they have never been able to negotiate the terms necessory for a new order. After all, the new order would mean compromise and that is anathema for states which are so intransigent. The worse consequence of this is that the public in both countries has become the guardian of intransigence and the leaders are captives. This will take a long time to change but if the Jihadi groups are phased out --- mostly by creating education and employment for the youths who join them --- and the leaders of Pakistan and India meet and determine to safeguard South Asia, then it is possible.
We in South Asia can opt for some of the more civilized values the twentieth century promised but did not fullfil. We can reverse the trends set forth by Nine Eleven. For us, however, it is not only a question of values and aspirations. For us it is the vital question of survival itself.