General Musharraf’s decision to stop militancy, especially that by religious groups in Kashmir, is very welcome because it has averted an impending war and increased the possibility of peace between India and Pakistan. However, part of the decision pertains to the Islamic seminaries (the madrassas or madaris) which have increased much after Zia ul Haq’s rule and are said to create Islamic militants. It is this part which is the subject of this article.
First, not all out of the 10,000 (or more) madrassas really train militants. Secondly, those which do were probably supported by the state or its agencies. If this support really comes to an end, as General Musharraf promises, this training will also come to an end. Thirdly, it will be far more effective to find out which madrassas are training students for militancy rather than trying to reform all of them. Fourthly, militancy is not really attributable to curricula, though antagonism against other sects, sub-sects and alien worldviews might be. Fifthly, the madrassas are preserved by Indian Muslims as part of their identity and interference in them will give excuse to the Indian right wing to do the same.
It should be remembered that the madrassas have often stood for principled opposition to tyrannical despotism in the Muslim world. In India the large and beautiful ones, running on endowment money, were always quictist and apolitical. They were run by the ulama-e-soo i.e learned divines who were not highly principled. But, tucked away in obscure places, were small madrassas by the Ulama-e-Haq i.e learned divines of high principles and veracity. These dissident ulama and sufis protected Islam against the kings and the feudal lords who used to bend its rules in their own interest (justifying seraglios of beautiful women, lavish expenditure and pomp and show).
When the British conquest took place there were three reactions to it. One was militant. People like Syed Ahmed of Bareilly and later the ulema who supported the 1857 uprising against the East India Company fought and were defeated. The second reaction was not to fight the colonial power but to become its subordinate partners in power. Raja Rammohun Roy among the Bengali Hindus and Nawab Abdul Latif and Sir Syed among the Muslims were advocates of this approach. Basically, they said: ‘learn English as powerful jobs are given to those who know this language. Get these jobs and become masters of your destiny’. The third approach, however, was to retire to a world of your own as far away from the colonial world as possible. This was the madrassa approach. Thus the anti-colonial ulema created madrassas, such as Deoband, in order to preserve the past. The syllabus was meant to create clergymen so it had to focus on Arabic and Islam. But it was deliberately kept traditional. Change was eschewed. And the reasons for this were psychological. After all, the past was seen as being glorious for the Muslims of India. By preserving this past identity the consciousness of this glory was to be kept alive. This was a kind of passive resistance to modernity and conquest. It was like telling the British and their supporters like Sir Syed that you might have the power and the glory in this world (and time) but we despise it---at least on your terms. Thus the madrassas became conservative institutions which gave the appearance of being apolitical though, in reality, they clung to the past as an identity symbol in order to defy the colonial power and the reality it had created. This is exactly what they do in India now. They cling to a core ‘Muslim identity’ which resists the modernity of modern India. That is why Indian Muslims want no interference in them.
The disadvantages of this were obvious. In British times the government did not support the madrassas (except the ones it had created itself). Thus they remained poor and the maulvi’s socio-economic status remained low. Moreover, the products of the madrassas had to remain dependent on the public for jobs and the state absorbed only a few of them. The advantages were not so obvious but they were that the madrassas remained fiereely independent. They reserved the right to teach whatever they deemed fit. They were not dictated to as schools, colleges and even universities always were in British India. These are precisely the advantages the madrassas prize so highly and guard so jealously in both India and Pakistan.
When Pakistan was created the madrassas saw a brown Sahib elite take the place of the outgoing white sahib elite. They were neither amused nor impressed. They did not change their identity nor their curricula though, since the elite did legitimize its rule in the name of Islam, they claimed a share in power. The share in power was, of course, denied and the maddrassas settled down to somewhat resentful accommodation with the status quo. However, Ayub Khan’s attempts at modernizing them by adding new subjects to their curricula made them more active in opposition to him and his regime than they used to be. During Zia ul Haq rule (1977-1988) some of them, for instance the Deobandi ones, were brought into the power game which was going on. Firstly, during this period the Iranian Revolution took place which made the clergy confident that they could exercise power in the modern world. Secondly, Saudi Arabia, the U.S.A and the Pakistani state itself started giving money to the madrassas. The maddrassas were now used to train young men to fight the Russians in Afghanistan. This was the beginning of the Jihadi culture for which all the madrassas are blamed nowadays.
General Musharraf now feels that if he restricts the number of madrassas, he can control militancy. Further, he believes that if he introduces certain modern subjects the madrassa students will become less militant. The first assumption is wrong. The public itself collects donations for most madrassas. It is neither morally nor legally justified to artificially restrict their number while allowing the proliferation of English medium schools. What will happen will be that madrassas will go by other names. Government functionaries will be bribed into giving them registration. Several institutions will function under a blanket No Objection Certificate under one name. In short, the state will have the madrassas turned into tricksters and cheats by this draconian meassure.
As for the second, it is untrue to argue that modern subjects prevent people from becoming militant. Indeed, Islamic radicalism, fundamentalism and revivalism is a middle class intelligentsia phenomenon. The Jamat-i-Islami in Pakistan was (and is) most popular among the students, lawyers, engineers, doctors and teachers. The Mohajirs of Karachi, before becoming politicized by the MQM, were generally influenced by the Jamat-i-Islami. The conservative syllabi of the madrassas are about the medieval age. The new subjects are about the modern world. It is, indeed, the exposure to the new which has politicized the madrassas not the continuation of the old.
The madrassas are politicized by exposure to speakers who claim to be fighting in Chechnya, Afghanistan or Kashmir. These ferocious warriors inspire the young students who want to emulate them. These speakers are not on the staff of the madrassas nor do they teach any subject. If they can be stopped, then at least one source of politicization can be eliminated.
The other sources of radicalization are the presence of texts in Urdu refuting other sects, sub-sects and modern philosophies such as socialism, democracy and capitalism. All madrassas teach these texts to final year students who internalize their arguments. The Barelvis have texts refuting the Deobandis; the Deobandis have texts refuting the Barelvis. The Shia texts refute Sunni beliefs while the Sunni ones refute Shia ones. While some have been around a long time---such as the anti-Shia texts from Shah Waliullah’s days---others are new. Among these are texts refuting democracy, socialism and, most interestingly, the doctrines of Maulana Maudoodi (Radd-i-Maudoodiat is part of the curricula of some madrassas). These texts are essential for transmitting maslak---the beliefs associated with one’s sub-sect (Barelvi, Deobandi or Ahl-i-Hadith). They also give arguments to the ulema against modernity of which socialism, capitalism, democracy etc are manifestations. As such, they will not be abandoned by the ulema. Nor, in my opinion, is it fair to ask the ulema to abandon these texts for refutations (I call them Radd-texts). We all have the right, I believe, to hold whatever world view we prefer. Where the state does came in, of course, is when someone actually attacks, harms or maliciously and provocatively criticizes (in public) those who hold other world views.
What, then, should be done about the madrassas? First, they should be invited to get registered. If they do then they might, in principle, be eligible for government grants. If they do not get registered. Well, that is their choice. Those who do register should be given the choice of introducing really liberalising subjects (world history, political science etc) with financial support from the state. If, however, they do not then no funds should be forthcoming. There should be no restrictions of any kind on the madrassas except that they will not receive foreign money without the knowledge of the government; they will not enrol foreign students without the government’s permission; they will impart no military training and they will not allow any fighter from anywhere to deliver a talk in their institution. If these restrictions are imposed others will not be needed and, considering our record as far as implementalism is concerned, even these are difficult to enforce and maintain.
These restrictions will not, however, reduce the number of students who are attracted to the madrassas. This reduction will come only when the state opens up many schools---so many that even the remotest corner of the country has them. Moreover, parents who teach their children should be given pecuniary incentives and the children themselves should be given milk, fruit and clothes to keep them in the schools. This is the only humane and effective way of attracting children away from the madrassas. However, the state schools themselves teach pro-war, chavinistic, anti-India lessons. So, if reform of curricula is needed it is also needed in the state schools. I end by advocating that the government must control its own support of militancy while leaving the madrassas in relative freedom.