What Does theTurkish Islamic Vote Mean?
As if the shock of the victory of the Islamist parties (MMA) in Pakistan in two provinces and a strong presence in the Centre was not enough for the United States and the West, Turkey too has seen the victory of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP). The AK has won 34.2 percent of the vote and an overall majority of seats in the parliament. In contract Bulent Ecevit, the present prime minister’s, Democratic Left Party (DSP) took only 1.2 percent of the vote. Ecevit himself was defeated in his home constituency and was stunned at the abysmally low number of votes his three-party coalition could muster.
The AKP’s leader, Tayab Erdogan, has not associated his
party with radical Islam. Indeed, he has gone out of his way to placate the
secular army establishment at home and the West by reiterating that Turkey
would join the European Union and that it will keep supporting the United
States. Its main thrust seems to be to put the economy, brought to a crisis situation
(Turkish lira having lost half its value in one year; economy declined 10
percent and two million more got unemployed in the same year), back to a
sustainable and manageable level. This kind of moderate strategy has also been
adopted by elements of the MMA though, in the latter case, the MMA has started
unraveling---even at this stage there are several voices, and discordant ones
at that, in this unstable coalition.
What needs to be pointed out is that in both cases, that
of Turkey and Pakistan, is that this is as much an Islamic vote as a reaction
to perceived injustice and the political heavy handedness of the establishments
of both countries. Pakistan’s case has been discussed by so many analysts that
it need not be discussed here. Briefly, there was a vacuum in Pakistan politics
because the charismatic vote-gatherers, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, were
absent; the U.S war in Afghanistan had alienated the Pashto-speaking people who
deserted their ethnic parties to vote for the religious parties which alone had
raised their voice against the U.S.A; a pool of young voters had suddenly
become available and it was mostly from the madrassas
so it had voted for the MMA. Above all, voters felt that the secular parties
had been tried and the MMA had not. These, then, were the factors which had
made the religious right powerful in terms of seats (not so much in terms of
the percentage of votes polled) in Pakistan.
In Turkey too the vote is partly a reaction to the
economic chaos of the Bulent Ecevit. It is also a reaction for imposed
Westernization in the guise of modernization for a long time. Arguably, Mustafa
Kemal’s response to the West was to acquire its power by adopting its outward
from but not its inward spirit. Thus all Kemalist principles: republicanism,
nationalism, populism, statism, secularism and revolution boiled down to
manifest opposition to the traditional Turkish identity of which Islam was a
part. As part of this Turkey’s link with the traditional culture were cut off.
For this the script was changed making Ottoman literature a closed back for
most Turks. The Ottoman dress, such as the fez, is also dead since 1925. And
the religious orders are either banned or controlled by the state.
These measure were obtained by coercion not consensus
though it is also true that Mustafa Kamal was widely regarded as a hero and
had, without doubt, contributed in an outstanding manner for Turkish
independence between 1919 and 1923. It is also true that the Ottoman caliphs
were corrupt and degenerate whereas Mustafa was honest and above board where
national interest was concerned. Thus, Kemalist orders were accepted by a large
number of young, modern Turks who were fed up of the corruption and decadence
of the Ancien Regime.
Yet, despite Mustafa’s own popularity, the fact remains
that he did not allow the spirit of Western democracy to take root in Turkey.
Thus, not surprisingly, there were military coups in Turkey in 1960-61; 1971-73
and 1980-83. The military, therefore, established its ascendancy in Turkish
politics which meant that democracy, as understood in the West, could not be
practiced. But when things are imposed from above there is a reaction to them.
There was a reaction to the Westernization of the Shah in Iran just as there is
one now to the Islamization of the Iranian hardline clergy now in the same country.
Thus, not surprisingly, there was a reaction to the authoritarian policies of
the Turkish military which emphasized so much upon cosmetic secularism (e.g.
not wearing the hijab for women) as to alienate and annoy many citizens.
Liberty, the only thing which does not produce a reaction of this kind, was
never allowed in Turkey where a number of leaders were jailed. Even the
aspiring prime minister, Erdogan, was actually jailed for reciting a poem using
Islamic symbols.
Thus, the response to imposition, authoritarianism and
high handedness took an Islamist form. Necmettin Erbakan (1926-) initiated a
movement in 1970 which became a focal point of this kind of response. There was
a strong element of anti-Western feeling in Erbakan’s rhetoric. Thus, those who
felt that Turkish pride was humbled by aping the West (i.e. nationalists) too
supported Erbakan. At this time small businessmen, labourers, young provincial
middle class people looking for careers etc were discontented as such people
are in all countries where rapid modernization is going on. Indeed, these are
exactly the kind of people who opposed the Shah in Iran. Thus Erbakan’s
National Order Party was born. It was banned by the military in 1971 but
emerged as the National Salvation Party (NSP). In 1977 this party won only 8.6
percent of the vote just as Pakistani religious parties used to do. However,
because of the continued authoritarian intolerance by the secularists, the
party gained popularity. As Erbakan was jailed by the military, the sympathy
vote also came to him. Thus his Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), successor to the
banned NSP, emerged stronger than before in 1983.
By 1988-99 the religious schools increased to 4,715
though they were 2,610 in 1979-80. The Islamic groups also started economic
projects which helped the under-privileged. For instance, the educational projects
of the WP built dormitories for students, distributed books and provided
financial aid. Moreover, in continuation with anti-imperialist ideology,
Erbakan criticized capitalism and Zionism. He was anti-NATO and anti-West. This
appealed to the people and in the municipal elections of 1994 the WP got 24.1
percent of the vote a large part of which came from the have-nots. Eventually
in 1995 the WP won 150 seats in parliament and formed the government. This goes
to the credit of Turkey’s military decision-makers because had they done what
happened to the winning Islamic party in Algeria, Turkey would have been much
worse off. Eventually, Erbakan neither pulled Turkey out of NATO nor did he
enforce the veil on women---power has its own restrictions and it mostly makes
people practice pragmatism irrespective of what they might have preached
earlier. The Turkish military, however, could not resist authoritarianism for
long. Thus restrictions on wearing Islamic dress etc were imposed till Erbakan
had to resign on 18 June 1997. The WP was banned and Erbakan too was debarred
form politics for five years. In 1998 the WP members formed the Virtue Party
(VP) (Fozilet). At that time Recai
Kutan rather than Tayyip Erdogan came to lead the VP but now it is Erdogan who
has emerged as the leader of the Islamists.
The point is that the Islamic reaction will be diluted if
real democracy is given to the people to begin with; if the ruling elite does
not possess an unjust and disproportionate amount of the wealth of the country;
if the people are given governance, justice and respect as citizens; and, above
all, if there are no restrictions on dress and private behaviour. Moreover, the
Islamic reaction is against the neo-imperialist policies of the West in general
and the U.S.A in particular. If Muslim perception about deaths in Iraq,
Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir change, there will be less anger. It is this
anger, at least in part, which makes the young vote for the religious parties
because, after all, only the religious parties still oppose the West. Former
leftists are in a disarray or have been co-opted or weakened. Thus, the Islamic
vote is as much an anti-elitist vote; an anti-neo-imperialist vote; an
anti-authoritarian vote as a vote for creating Taliban-style rule as such. And
if the religious parties are to be prevented from becoming militant and inflexible
then they should be given the democratic justice which is the right of those
who win elections. Not to allow them to take power; to ban them; to suppress
them by force will only make the hardliners more powerful. To allow them to
rule will make them seek aid; make them compromise; make them make mistakes and
alienate voters (unless they give excellent governance) and thus make them more
pragmatic than they appear to be to begin with. Militancy is created by perceived
injustice; let us try out justice for a change.