Any Lessons from 6 September?
Pakistani school children read books claiming that the 6th of September is celebrated because the armed forces of Pakistan resisted a sudden attack on Pakistan. The impression given to them is that the attack was unprovoked, without any reason and, therefore, both cowardly and cunning. Some books even go a step forward to denounce the enemy as ‘cunning’, ‘malicious’ and ‘cowardly’ Hindu. This simplistic version of the events of 6th September 1965 is current because it is wrongly assumed that they are in the national interest of Pakistan. The contention of this article is the opposite that they are not in anybody’s interest and, what is more, they actually harm Pakistan and its citizens and that we should draw different lessons from the 6th of September 1965.
Let us, first, briefly reconstruct what really happened on that crucial date. First, the Indian Army advanced towards Lahore and this news was passed on to Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, by an Air Force officer who was on duty at 4 o’clock in the morning. Ayub held a meeting with the cabinet and made a stirring speech at 12’oclock noon saying that this was a sudden and unprovoked attack and would be met with resistance. It is this speech which created the myths of the unprovoked betrayal by India.
The speech was necessary to boost the morale of the nation at that trying hour. However, Ayub Khan knew very well that the attack was a consequence of events which had been going on for several months. To begin with, the Rann of Katch incident in April 1965 had ended badly for the Indians. The Pakistan army had performed well and this had created undue confidence. It may be with this in mind that a small coterie in Pakistan egged Ayub to implement what came to be called ‘Operation Gibraltar’. The plan was to send in guerrillas into Indian held Kashmir so as to start a revolution against Indian occupation. Indeed, if General Musa, then the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army, is to be believed the plan had been made in December 1964. In My Version (1983), Musa says that he had attended a meeting of the Kashmir Cell in that month and the Foreign Secretary, Aziz Ahmed, had told him that ‘the time had come for GHQ to play a positive part in Kashmir and launch the raids they had proposed and that Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan had approved it’ (p. 5). Musa said that ‘we should not stick our neck too far’ till the armed forces were much stronger. He even discussed the dangers of such an action with Ayub but says that the hawks outmanoeuvered him and there was nothing he could do about it. In short, Ayub knew that such raids or attempts to bring about a revolt of the Kashmiris might bring about retaliatory moves from India.
The retaliatory moves, following the entry of the guerrillas, were Indian attacks in Azad Kashmir. Pakistan then launched ‘Operation Grand Slam’. On 31 August-01 September night the Pakistan Army elements moved from Bhimber in order to capture Chamb and threaten Akhnur. The Pakistani forces crossed the ceasefire line and captured Chamb. Here the command was changed from Major General Akhtar Malik to Major General Yahya Khan. There are many theories about this but they would deviate us from our purpose in this article. The point here is that the Indians saw their territories threatened and it was obvious that they would do something to defend them. Evidence that India felt threatened comes form a variety of sources but let us refer to a secret telegram from the United States embassy in New Delhi on 06 September which says that the Government of India felt that Akhnour would fall and that the Indian forces in Kashmir would be cut off (The American Papers by Roedad Khan, p. 15). In short, in Indian perception, the attack was defensive in nature while the myth-makers call it purely offensive.
The attack was unannounced but, according to Altaf Gauhar, Mian Arshad Hussain, the High Commissioner of Pakistan in New Delhi, had sent a cypher message warning that such an attack was expected. This was received in Islamabad on 4th September but Ayub Khan never learned of it (Altaf Gauhar in Ayub Khan, p. 336). The message was probably squashed by Aziz Ahmed and Bhutto.
Ayub was a soldier and, by all accounts, an intelligent man. Why could he not appreciate that these provocative operations in Kashmir would precipitate a war? The documents give no clear answer. One thing is clear: that Ayub was told in categorical terms that India would not cross the international border by Bhutto and Aziz Ahmed. These two, remarked many a diplomat, were the real hawks. They also lived in a make-believe world in which nothing could happen to Pakistan no matter what it did.
The people had been fed on such propaganda that they would not accept a cease fire. Altaf Gauhor, on the prompting of Z. A. Bukhari (DG Radio Pakistan), used the term ‘fire bandi’ instead of ‘jang bandi’ (i.e. ‘end of firing’ in place of ‘end of war’) on 22 September 1965 and so the colossal gamble of 1965 ended.
Now what are the lessons to be learnt form this? First, that strategies involving the sending of guerrillas across the line of control are dangerous. This lesson was not learnt and Kargil (1999) was the second major blunder in Pakistan’s relationship with India. Even now the major threat to Pakistan comes from the belief that such methods work. But if India responds to a 1965-like situation with the same kind of response, South Asia may be destroyed by a nuclear holocaust. Had we analyzed the 1965 war openly, dispassionately and objectively and concluded that such tactics do not work, we would have been safer today.
The other lesson is that hiding the truth is generally harmful. Had the people of Pakistan not been duped into believing the myths of 1965, they would have been realistic about 1971 and afterwards. They would not have let false jingoism run away with their good sense. As it is, the people created such a hysteria, such a war fever, in 1971 that no government which had chosen a less aggressive policy could have survived. Even now the people believe in such fairy tales about the superiority of Muslim warriors, the help of angels, the excellence of Pakistan’s arms etc that they are likely to push the government to a nuclear war in a crisis. This will be one of the consequences of making them believe in myths of invincibility.
Another belief inculcated by myths about 1965 pertain to ‘Hindu’ perfidy, cunning and betrayal. Such myths create simplistic, one-dimensional, black-and-white caricatures of complex people. They are dehumanizing for those who believe them as well as these who are caricaturized. Above all, they make it difficult to transcend hatreds, to be flexible, to try different, alternative strategies for the solution of problems. Unfortunately, since the BJP has come in power, and especially since Kargil, Pakistanis are also seen in the same manner in North India. This means that both Pakistanis and Indians, being captives of caricatures and myths, will not be able to work out a peaceful solution to Kashmir. But war will annihilate us! Have we then become safer because of myths, the untruth, or more insecure than before?
In a nutshell, then, we may celebrate the 6th of September for the courage shown by the lower and middle ranks of the armed forces. We may call it a day of fortitude. But we should also be truthful enough to confess that the strategy of the hawks was wrong in 1965. We should tell the truth about it even if it means debunking the leaders of that time. To understand the truth will make us more secure for the future than learning no lessons from 6 September 1965.