Pluralism and Intolerance in
Pakistani Society: Attitudes of Pakistani Students towards the Religious
‘Other’
By
Tariq Rahman Ph. D
Professor and Director, Chair on Quaid-i-Azam
and Freedom Movement
National Institute of Pakistan Studies
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad
Abstract
Pluralism and Intolerance in
Pakistani Society
This paper examines the worldview of students from three major socio-economic classes in Pakistan studying in the religious seminaries (madrassas), the Urdu-medium schools and the elitist English-medium schools. The inequality of the educational system, as represented by these streams of education, is described in some detail. The curricula of the religious seminaries, especially as it relates to the creation of intolerance, is described. The sub-sects of South Asian Islam are also mentioned though not in detail. The results of a questionnaire filled in by the students of these institutions is also presented especially as it refers to the students’ views about giving equal rights to non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. The results show that the students from the English-medium elitist institutions are more tolerant of the religious minorities than students of madrassas. However, they are also more alienated from Pakistani society than other students. Pakistani society is highly polarized without, however, being tolerant. The implications of this for pluralism and peaceful co-existence are briefly mentioned.
Pluralism and Intolerance in
Pakistani Society: Attitudes of Pakistani Students towards the Religious
‘Other’
For
the first time in Pakistan’s Political History, a religious party, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)1, has won power in two provinces and
has a considerable presence in the politics of the country. This is unusual in
many ways but what is significant for us in the context of this paper is that
the different Sunni sub-sects (Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i-Hadith), which were
very antagonistic to each other, now seem to be cooperating with each other.
Moreover, even though Shia-Sunni conflict goes on, the Shias are still part of the MMA (for the emergence of the
Shia Sect see Jafri 1979).
According
to an International Crisis Group report the ‘Shias are 15 to 20 per cent of the
Muslim population’ of Pakistan. The Deobandis and Barelvis are 77 per cent and
the Ahl-i-Hadith about 6 per cent (ICG 2003: 5). While they may be temporarily
in harmony, they agree to recognize the Ahmedis (Qadianis or Mirzais) as
non-Muslims. The other religious minorities, the Christians and the Hindus, are
small minorities but they too are targets of violence at times.
While Pakistan has been experiencing ethnic conflict ever since 1948 when the Bengali Language Movement started (Rahman: 1996; Dil and Dil 2000),‘sectarian’ conflict, usually between the two main sects of Islam the Sunnis and the Shias, started in the eighties and has continued since then. Persecution of the Ahmedis has occurred twice in the form of widespread riots---in 1953 and 1974--- but since they were declared non-Muslims in that year (thus fulfilling a long standing demand of the ulema) they have been persecuted on an individual level but not attacked on a large scale (for small level persecution see Human Rights Reports of all the years including the most recent one of 2003). Sectarian conflict has been blamed on the proliferation of madrassas (Nayyar 1998: 215-250) but has not really been analyzed in a scholarly fashion except by Qasim Zaman(2002). Ethnic conflict has, however, received more scholarly attention (Amin 1988; Ahmed 1998; Rahman 1996). It is time that some empirical facts about the potential for positive pluralism or intolerance in Pakistani society, especially as related to religious identities, are determined.
This
section is theoretical and historical. The first part defines terms and tries
to understand the phenomenon of pluralism. The second looks at the cleavages
between religious sects and sub-sects in Pakistan.
Pluralism and
Intolerance
Pluralism
does not consist in being merely diverse. A diverse society of mutually
antagonistic groups may be a ticking time bomb. Its polarized factions may hate
each other so much that sooner or later the society may break up in a low-intensity
or open civil war. What makes a society
positively pluralistic is the recognition of diversity as a source of richness
not antagonism. In short tolerance, and not merely diversity, is the key to
positive pluralism.
Unfortunately,
human societies are not inherently tolerant. Indeed, small hunter-gatherer and
even early agrarian communities were not even diverse. Thus tolerance was not
always a human reaction to the outsider, the ‘Other’. It was a virtue which
grew as civilization became more complex because of war, trade and migration.
This ‘tolerance’ was contingent upon the acceptance of the predominance of the
politically ascendant group. It was probably an outcome of security rather than
insecurity. A besieged civilization is generally a paranoid civilization
looking for enemies within and without to blame for failures.
Tolerance in
Muslim Societies
Societies
often divide the world into groups. There is the in-group on which love is
concentrated; and the out-group on which hatred is focussed. The Greeks divided
the world into Greeks and barbarians; the Jews into Jews and Gentiles. Likewise
the Muslims too defined the world on the basis of faith: the House of Peace (Dar ul-Islam) and the House of War (Dar al-Harb). There were, of course,
divisions between the Arabs and the non-Arabs and even between the Arabs
themselves but the official criterion of demarcation was religious rather than
ethnic.
The medieval Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal
empires were strong and, therefore, could afford to be tolerant. By all
accounts, so long as the religious ‘Other’, obeyed Muslim rulers and paid
whatever taxes were imposed upon them (including the poll tax, or Jaziya), they were tolerated. However,
they were not considered equal to Muslims. As for non-Muslims not ruled by
Muslims, especially if they were rivals for world power, insulting epithets
were used wherever they were mentioned. These include ‘Kafir’ (infidel), ‘dweller of hell’, ‘mischief-monger’ and so on
in all Persian histories written by Indian Muslims. Similarly, Bernard Lewis
has analyzed a vast archive of literature of the Ottoman empire and reports:
During the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, Ottoman chroniclers devote some though not a great deal
of attention to relations with Europe. The various European nations are still
referred to invariably as “the English infidels”, “the French infidels”, etc,
though the curses and insults customary in earlier historiography become less
frequent and less vehement (Lewis 1982: 161).
It
may be asserted, then, that it was Westernization and secularization which
shifted the focus from religion as the crucial defining feature of the ‘Other’
to such variables as ideology (capitalism, communism etc), political alignment
(member of a pact or not), level of development (rich, poor, modernized), race
etc.
However,
there are groups in society---both the traditional ulema and the Islamists---who want religion to be the major and
crucial defining feature of the self and, hence, the boundary marker of the
‘Other’. As Mohammad Qasim Zaman, the Pakistani scholar, has remarked, the
Islamists react to Western imperialism on their own terms (Zaman 2002:170-174).
They draw their inclusionary vision of the Islamic ‘millat’ from the Western project of the nation ‘imagined’ as it is
by symbols such as the flag, a historical traditional (the museum), a print
language etc (Anderson 1983). Thus the aggressive stridency of nationalism is
allied to the certitude of faith in ‘imagining’ a Muslim ‘millat’ in which differences do not appear as diversity or
pluralism but as dissent and even heresy.
Sects and Sub-Sects of Islam in Pakistan
Because of the disintegration of the Mughal empire and colonial rule, Indian Muslims felt threatened, disillusioned and frustrated. Some, like Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareilly (1786-1831), responded militantly but were defeated. Others, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1808-1898) learnt English, entered the British bureaucracy and became junior partners of the British in the exercise of power. Still others, blaming Muslims themselves for their loss of power, tried to purify Islam in various ways. The Wahabis (also called Ahl-i-Hadith), the Deobandis, the Barelvis among the Sunnis as well as the Shias created madrassas to preserve and propagate what, in their view, was the correct interpretation of Islam. As these views are preserved and disseminated by the madrassas, let us look at the different kinds of madrassas in Pakistan.
Deobandis
The madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) of India, was founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905). While earlier seminaries were loosely organized, Deoband had a rector (sarparast), a chancellor (muhtamim) and the chief instructor (sadr mudarris). Its income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based on the Dars-i-Nizami which had been evolved by Mulla Nizam Uddin Sihalvi (d. 1748) at Farangi Mahall, a famous seminary of a family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Lucknow (Robinson 2002). The Dars-i-Nizami emphasized studies based on human reasoning (maqulat) but at Deoband the traditional sciences which were transmitted unchanged to the learner (manqulat) were emphasized. Thus Deoband taught much more hadith than the Dars-i-Nazami had originally prescribed.
The Deobandis opposed the folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a major place, seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation and miracles etc were seen as the crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They did not oppose mysticism altogether but did argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation. They also opposed folk practices like fixing days for distributing food to gain spiritual merit and celebrating the days of religious personages (for details see Metcalf 1982).
The Durul Uloom at Deoband was established in 1867 and after a hundred years it had produced 6,986 graduates and established 8,934 maktabs (schools) and madrassas (seminaries) teaching the Dars-i-Nizami). In 1967 the number of graduates from Pakistan was 3,191 (including those from East Pakistan) (Metcalf 1982: 110-111) while now the number of students in Pakistan exceeds 1, 02, 865 and the number of those who appeared in the Alimia (M.A) examination were 4,676 . The number of registered madrassas in Pakistan is 7000 which shows how fast they have multiplied in recent years in this country (all these figures are from the central office of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris, Multan).
Barelvis
The Barelvi movement was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921) who is highly revered by his followers (Sanyal 1996). The Barelvis justified the ‘mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs of the shrines’ (Metcalf 1982: 296). They believed that prophet Mohammad (Peace be Upon Him) was made of Divine Radiance (Noor) and had knowledge of the unknown (Ilm ul Ghaib). Both these beliefs were challenged by the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema. Relating to this was the debate on the issue of the imkan-i-nazir ---the question whether God could make another person equal to Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). The Barelvis denied the possibility while the others did not. The Barelevi madrassas in Pakistan also teach the Dars-i-Nazami and appeal to the ordinary folk of the country (for the views of the Barelvis see Sanyal 1996).
Ahl-i-Hadith
The movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed was called Wahabi because, like Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed and his associates also wanted to purify and reform Islam. They claimed to follow no particular school of jurisprudence---Hanafi, Shafi, Hambali, Maliki---and were called nonconformists (ghair muqallid = one who does not follow a fixed path) by their opponents. They used the term Jama’at Ahl-i-Hadith for themselves and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahabi should not be used for them. The government ‘ordered in 1886 that the term Wahabi should not be used in official correspondence’ (Ahmed 1994: 203) but it is still used by many people in Pakistan.
The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas also teach the Dars-i-Nazami but they emphasize the Quran and Hadith and oppose folk Islam and common practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on religious occasions and popular mysticism.
Jamat-i-Islami
The Jamat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (also spelled Mawdudi) (1903-1979) whose life and achievements have been ably described by Syyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996).
Maudoodi believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such he favoured more modernist education than any of the orthodox organizers of the traditional madrassas. He did, however, also emphasize upon the refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, therefore, his anti-Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing than that of the traditionalist seminarians (Maudoodi 1974).
In the Jamat’s madrassas the traditional texts are taught but politics, economics and history is also emphasized with a view to preparing the young ulema for confronting the ideas of the West.
Besides the Sunni madrassas, there are Shia madrassas
too as we have seen. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet (PBUH)
was Ali Ibn-e-Abi Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunnis take to be
his successors. They mourn the battle of Karbala, fought between the Prophet’s
grandson Hussain and the Omayyad caliph Yazid bin Muawiya in 680 A.D. This led
to the birth of the supporters of Ali and the rise of Shia Islam which has been
described very competently by S.H.M Jafri (1979).
All the madrassas, including the Shia ones, teach the Dars-i-Nizami though they do not use the same texts. They also teach their particular point of view (madhab or maslak) which clarifies and rationalizes the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith). Moreover, they train their students to refute what in their views are heretical beliefs and some Western ideas. All madrassas teach modern subjects in some measure and with varying degrees of competence. Let us examine the teaching in the madrassas in some detail. This paper will omit the Dars-i-Nizami in order to focus only on that part of the teaching which may promote divisiveness and antagonism for the ‘Other’ in whatever manner it may be perceived.
The Refutation of Other Sects and Sub-Sects
Refutation (Radd in Urdu) has always been part of religious education. However, it is only in recent years that it has been blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan.
According to A.H. Nayyar ‘The madrasahs have, not surprisingly, become a source of hate-filled propaganda against other Sects and the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent’ (Nayyar 1998: 243). However, it appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflict cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs.
The theological debate (munazra) is taught to students in madrassas. Barbara Metcalf describes the munazras between the Christians, Muslims and Arya Samajists (1982: 219-232) in her book. She says:
The debates were, indeed, a form of social event, a public ritual, that took on new form and meaning in the late nineteenth century. In a society largely illiterate and equipped only minimally with modern forms of communication, they came to serve as a new forum for communicating issues at once religious and social (Metcalf 1982: 233).
They were also very bitter as the Deobandi-Barelvi munazras of 1928 collected in Futoohat-e-Nomania (Nomani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs. For instance Ahmed Raza Khan, the pioneer of the Barelvi school, wrote a series of fatawa (plural of fatwa = religious decree) against Sir Sayyid of Aligarh, the Shi’is, the ahl-i-Hadith, the Deobandis and the Nadwat ul-‘Ulama in 1896. These were published as Fatawa al-Haramain bi-Rajf Nadwat al-Main (1900) (Sanyal 1996: 203). The Barelvis, in turn, were refuted by their rivals. The followers of the main debaters sometimes exchanged invectives and even came to blows but never turned to terrorism as witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history.
As the inculcation of sectarian bias is an offence, no madrassa teacher or administrator confessed to teaching any text refuting the beliefs of other sects. Maulana Mohammad Hussain, Nazim-e-Madrassa Jamiat us-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith) (Islamabad) said that comparative religious was taught in the final Almiya (M.A) class and it did contain material refuting heretical beliefs. Moreover, Islam was confirmed as the only true religion, refuting other religions (Interview on 10 December 2002). The library did contain books refuting other sects and sub-sects but they were not prescribed in the syllabus. Maulana Muhammad Ishaq Zafar of the Jamia Rizvia Aiz ul Uloom (Barelvi) in Rawalpindi said that books against other sects were not taught. However, during the interpretation of texts the maslak was passed on to the student (Interview on 15 December 2002). Students of the final year, when questioned specifically about the teaching of the maslak, said that it was taught through questions and answers, interpretation of texts and sometimes some teachers recommended supplementary reading material specifically for the refutation of the doctrines of other sects and sub-sects (several madrassas between December 2002 to April 2003).
In some cases, as in the Jamia Ashrafia, a famous Deobandi seminary of Lahore, an institution for publication, established in 1993, publishes ‘only those articles and journals which are written by the scholars of Deoband school of thought (Hussain 1994: 42). Moreover, in writings, sermons, and conversation, the teachers refer to the pioneers of their own maslak so that the views of the sub-sect are internalized and became the primary way of thinking.
However, despite all denials, the printed syllabi of the following sects do have books to refute the beliefs of other sects. The Report on the Religious Seminaries (GOP 1988) lists several books of Deobandi madrassas to refute Shia beliefs including Maulana Mohammad Qasim’s Hadiyat ul Shia which has been reprinted several times and is still in print. There are also several books on the debates between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and even a book refuting Maudoodi’s views (GOP 1988: 73-74) The Barelvis have given only one book Rashidiya under the heading of ‘preparation for debates on controversial issues’ (Ibid, p.76). The Ahl-i-Hadith have given a choice of opting for any two of the following courses: the political system of Islam, the economic system of Islam, Ibn-e-Khaldun'’ Muqaddamah, the history of ideas and comparative religious systems. The Shia courses list no book on this subject.
Recently published courses list no book on maslak for the Deobandis. The Barelvis mention ‘comparative religions’ but no specific books. The Ahl-i-Hadith retain almost the same optional courses as before. The Shia madrassas list books on beliefs which includes comparative religions in which, of courses, Shia beliefs are taught as the only true ones. Polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available. Incidentally such pamphlets, warning about alleged Shia deviations from the correct interpretations of the faith are also in circulation among Sunni madrassas and religious organizations.
Moreover, some guidebooks for teachers note that Quranic verses about controversial issues should be taught with great attention and students should memorize them. In one Barelvi book it is specified that teachers must make the students note down interpretations of the ulema of their sub-sect concerning beliefs and controversial issues so that students can use them later --- i.e. as preachers and ulema.
The Jamat-i-Islami syllabus (2002) mentions additional books by Maulana Maudoodi and other intellectuals of the Jamat on a number of subjects including the Hadith. They also teach ‘comparative religions’.
The Refutation of Heretical Beliefs
One of the aims of the madrassas, ever since 1057 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad, was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influences which could change or dilute Islam. Other religions are refuted in ‘comparative religions’ but there are specific books for heresies within the Islamic world. In Pakistan the ulema unite in refuting the beliefs of the Ahmedis (or Qaidianis) (for their views see Friedmann 1989). The Deoband course for the Aliya (B.A) degree included five books refuting Ahmedi beliefs (GOP 1988: 71). The Barelvis prescribe no specific books. However, the fatawa of the pioneer, Ahmad Raza Khan, are referred to and they refute the ideas of the other sects and sub-sects. The Ahl-i-Hadith note that in ‘comparative religions’ they refute the Ahmedi beliefs. The Shias too do not prescribe any specific books. The Jamat-i-Islami’s syllabus (2002) prescribes four books for the refutation of ‘Qaidiani religion’. Besides the Ahmedis, other beliefs deemed to be heretical are also refuted. All these books are written in a polemical style and are in Urdu which all madrassa students understand.
The Refutation of Alien Philosophies
The earliest madrassas refuted Greek philosophy which was seen as an intellectual invasion of the Muslim ideological space. Since the rise of the West, madrassas, and even more than them, revivalist movements outside the madrassas, refute Western philosophies. Thus there are books given in the reading lists for Aliya (B.A) of 1988 by the Deobandis refuting capitalism, socialism, capitalism and feudalism. These books are no longer listed but they are in print and in the libraries of the madrassas. The Jamat-i-Islami probably goes to great lengths --- judging from its 2002 syllabus --- to make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies. Besides Maudoodi’s own books an all subjects relating to the modern world, a book on the conflict between Islam and Western ideas (Nadvi n.d) is widely available.
These texts, which may be called Radd-texts, may not be formally taught in most of the madrassas as the ulema claim, but they are being printed which means they are in circulation. They may be given as supplementary reading material or used in the arguments by the teachers which are probably internalized by the students. In any case, being in Urdu rather then Arabic, such texts can be comprehended rather than merely memorized. As such, without formally being given the centrality which the Dars-i-Nizami has, the opinions these texts disseminate --- opinions against other sects, sub-sects, views seen as being heretical by the ulema, Western ideas --- may be the major formative influence on the minds of Madrassa students. Thus, while it is true that education in the madrassas produces religious, sectarian, sub-sectarian and anti-Western bias, it may not be true to assume that this bias automatically translates into militancy and violence of the type Pakistan has experienced. For that to happen other factors ---- the arming of religious young men to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir; the state’s clampdown on free expression of political dissent during Zia ul Haq’s martial law; the appalling poverty of rural, peripheral areas and urban slums etc. etc ---must be taken into account.
As for teaching modern subjects, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas have been teaching Pakistan studies, English, Mathematics and General Science a long time (GOP 1988: 85). The Jamat-i-Islami also teaches secular subjects. The larger Deobandi, Barelvi and Shia madrassas too have made arrangements for teaching secular subjects including basic computer skills. However, the teaching is done by teachers approved of by the ulema or some of the ulema themselves. Thus the potential for secularization of these subjects, which is small in any case, is reduced to nothingness.
While it can only be speculated that there is a connection between poverty and religious violence, the proposition does not have much empirical backing. However, Qasim Zaman tells us that in Jhang---the birth place of the militant Sunni organization called the Sipah-i-Sahaba---the proportion of Shias in the affluent urban middle class is higher than other areas of Pakistan. Moreover, the feudal gentry too has many Shia families. Thus the Sipah-i-Sahaba appeals to the interests of the ordinary people who are oppressed by the rich and the influential. Indeed, Maulana Haqq Nawaz, the fiery preacher who raised much animosity against the Shias, was ‘himself a man of humble origin’ and ‘had a reputation for being much concerned with the welfare of the poor and the helpless, and he was known to regularly spend time at government courts helping out poor illiterate litigants (Zaman 2002: 125).
Another leader of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, Maulana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-1991), also preached in Jhang. He too denounced the Shia magnates of the area and the peasants, terrorized by the feudal magnates, responded to him as if he were a messiah. Even shopkeepers rejoiced in the aggressive Sunni identity he helped create. When the Shia feudal lords attacked and burnt some defiant Sunni shops this identity was further radicalized (Zaman 2002: 127).
In the same manner the Muslim radicals in the Philippines too attack social and economic privilege. Indeed, Islamist movements from Turkey to Indonesia talk of the poor and the oppressed and sometimes do take up their cause. This has won them votes in Turkey where they have been suppressed by the secular military. It was also a major factor for mobilization in Iran against the Shah who was seen as being rich, wasteful, corrupt and decadent. So, though difficult to demonstrate, Islamic militancy---whether by radicalized madrassa students or members of Islamist or Jihadi groups in Pakistan---has an element of class conflict. It is, at least in some part, a reaction of the have-nots against the haves. This is a dangerous trend for the country because madrassa students are taught to be intolerant of religious minorities and are hawkish about Kashmir (see Rahman 2002: Appendix 14 and Section 2 of this paper). As they are also from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.
SECTION-2
Objective
The objective of this section of the paper is to measure the level of religious tolerance and, hence, the potential for positive pluralism in Pakistan.
The paper looks at the attitudes of school students in the senior-most class at school (equivalent to 10th in most schools) in Pakistan for their views about the religious ‘Other’---Ahmedis (Qaidianis or Mirzais), Hindus and Christians---in Pakistan. The schools provide convenient clusters of students from the working classes (madrassas and Urdu medium schools), lower middle and middle classes (Urdu-medium schools) and upper-middle and middle classes (English-medium schools). This means that the attitudes manifested in this study also reveal to what extent Pakistani society is polarized along (socio-economic) class lines. The paper also looks at the texts of the madrassas with a view to determining to what extent they support or create divisiveness and intolerance in Pakistani society.
Methodology for the Survey
This part of the paper reports the findings of a survey of the opinions of school students and teachers conducted between December 2002 and January 2003. The mean age of the students in Urdu-medium schools was 14.4 (mode = 16; range 13-20) while in the English-medium schools the mean was 14.1 (mode = 15; range = 13-18). In the Islamic seminaries (madrassas) the students were older for the same level (10th class), the mean being 19 (mode = 20; range = 14-27).
It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones.
Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.
The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools and (3) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:
|
Box 1 |
|||
|
FACULTY |
|||
|
|
M (ale) |
F (emale) |
Total |
|
English-medium |
18 |
47 |
65 |
|
Urdu-medium |
42 |
58 |
100 |
|
Madrassas |
27 |
Nil |
27 |
|
Grand Total |
|
|
192 |
|
Box 2 |
|||
|
STUDENTS |
|||
|
|
M (ale) |
F (emale) |
Total |
|
English-medium |
62 |
52 |
116 |
|
Urdu-medium |
123 |
107 |
230 |
|
Madrassas |
142 |
Nil |
142 |
|
Grand Total |
|
|
488 |
As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan. There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh and Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.
Results of the Survey:
The following are the results to the questions concerning giving equal rights to the religious minorities. The other questions, which were about militant policies regarding Kashmir, have not been included in this paper.
Questions about giving equal (equal to Pakistani Muslims) rights to Ahmedis (a sect declared as a non-Muslim minority in 1974 in Pakistan), Pakistani Hindus and Christians and women are tabulated as percentages. These students and teachers both come from the lower-middle class as their income indicates. They were reluctant to reveal their families income because of the social stigma of poverty so that 95 (41.30 per cent) did not write their father’s income. As for mothers, most of them did not have paid employment so that 220 (95.65 per cent) did not write their income. Out of those who did, most belonged to the poorer classes (working and lower middle classes) as the figures given in Appendix- A indicate.
The teachers (N=100) too are mostly from the lower middle class income group (see Appendix-A). The responses to questions about giving the same rights as Muslims in employment and other fields to religious minorities are as follows:
|
Box 3 |
||||
|
Tolerance Among
Urdu-medium school students 2002-2003 (N=230) |
||||
|
(In percentages) |
||||
|
What should
be Pakistan’s priorities? |
||||
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
1. |
Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc? |
46.95 |
36.95 |
16.09 |
|
2. |
Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?
|
47.39 |
42.61 |
10 |
|
3. |
Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc? |
65.65 |
26.52 |
7.83 |
Tolerance of Religious Minorities Among
Urdu School Teachers
In the previous survey (Rahman 2002: Appendix 14) the opinions of teachers had not been taken. This survey reports the opinions of the teachers also.
Tolerance of Religious Minorities among
School Teachers
|
Box
4 |
||||
|
Tolerance of Religious Minorities and Women in Urdu-medium Among School Teachers 2002-2003 |
||||
|
(N=100) (In percentages) |
||||
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
(1) |
Ahmedis |
27 |
65 |
08 |
|
(2) |
Hindus |
37 |
58 |
05 |
|
(3) |
Christians |
52 |
42 |
06 |
As we can see, the teachers are less tolerant of religious minorities, at least as far as their participation in the economic life and power distribution system of Pakistan (high state positions), than students. This may be because the teachers were exposed to anti-minority rhetoric at crucial periods of their lives such as the anti-Ahmedi agitation of 1974 and the Zia ul Haq years when there was much religious intolerance in the air.
Elitist English Medium Schools
The present survey is on 116 students, 62 males and 52 females, of the average age of 15 who are in class-10 (O’ level) in schools of Islamabad and Lahore charging a tuition fees of at least Rs 2,500 per month. Most of them belong to the upper-middle and the upper classes as indicated in Appendix –A.
Besides
what the students have written, an indicator of their socio-economic background
is the exorbitant tuition fees their parents pay; their dress (Western and
expensive); their lifestyle (travelling in cars, eating out, going to concerts,
celebrating birthdays with parties and expensive gifts etc), and the houses
they live in (modern, expensive, urban).
The teachers in these institutions are mostly females from middle and, sometimes, higher socio-economic backgrounds. However, they are not from as high socio-economic class as their students being mostly from the middle classes (see Appendix-A).
Another indicator of teachers having climbed up the socio-economic ladder is that whereas 15.38 per cent said they were educated in Urdu-medium schools themselves, only 1.54 per cent have children studying in these schools now (the response to the question about own medium of instruction in school is 27.69 per cent and for children’s medium of instruction is 58.46 per cent (Appendix-A).
The students of English medium schools showed more tolerance for religious minorities than Urdu medium school students as the following figures indicate:
|
Box 5 |
||||
|
Tolerance of
Religious Minorities among Elitist English-medium School Students N=116 |
||||
|
(In
percentages) |
||||
|
What should be Pakistan’s priorities? |
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
|
1. |
Gives equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc? |
65.52 |
9.48 |
25.00 |
|
2. |
Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs? |
78.45 |
13.79 |
7.76 |
|
3. |
Give equal right to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc? |
83.62 |
8.62 |
7.76 |
The opinions of teachers are less tolerant probably because they belong to lower socio-economic classes than their students and were exposed more often to intolerant and anti-minority views when they were younger.
|
Box 6 |
||||
|
Tolerance for
Religious Minorities Among Elitist English School Teachers N=65 (In
percentages) |
||||
|
|
|
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
1. |
Ahmedis |
43.07 |
36.92 |
20 |
|
2. |
Hindus |
61.54 |
26.15 |
12.31 |
|
3. |
Christians |
81.54 |
10.77 |
7.69 |
Madrassas
Madrassas were supported by land grants and wealthy patrons in medieval India. They have always been supporting the poor and the lifestyles of the ulema were spartan and closer to the poorer strata of society than the affluent ones. Maulana Abdul Ali Bahr al-Ulum of Farangi Mahall, for instance, ‘used in their support all but Rs. 40 of the Rs 1000 monthly stipend granted by Nawab Walajah. His wife and family suffered and complained, as did those of his grandson, Jamal al-Din, who suffered in a similar way’ (Robinson 2002: 81). Barbara Metcalf in her study of Deoband tells us that the pioneers of that seminary took no, or very modest salaries, and ‘lived like poor men’ (1982: 167). The average expense of Deoband on each graduate between 1867 to 1967 was Rs 1,314 which is modest from any criterion (Metcalf 1982: 111). The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas, which were patronized by wealthy people in British India, nevertheless lived in the same frugal manner (Ahmed 1994).
Madrassas in Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Some of them are also given financial assistance by foreign governments ---the Saudi government is said to help the Ahl-i-Hadith seminaries and the Iranian government the Shia ones---but there is no proof of this assistance. And even if it does exist, it goes only to a few madrassas whereas the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts etc).
According to the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, the annual expenditure on the seminary, which has about 700 students, is 40,00,000 rupees. Another madrassa, this time a Barelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students. This comes to Rs 5,714 per year (or Rs 476 per months) which is an incredibly small amount of money for education, books, board and lodging. As the madrassas generally do not charge a tuition fees---though they do charge a small admission fees which does not exceed Rs 400--- they attract very poor students who would not receive any education otherwise. According to Fayyaz Hussain, a student who competed his ethnographic research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, students joined the madrassa for the following reasons:-
|
Box 7 |
|
|
Causes of Joining Madrassas Given by
Students |
|
|
Economic |
48.95 per cent |
|
Social |
40.63 per cent |
|
Religious |
5.71 per cent |
|
Educational |
3.12 per cent |
|
Political |
2.09 per cent |
|
Source: Hussain 1994 : 84 |
|
The categories have not been explained by the author nor is it known exactly what questions were asked from the students. According to Singer, the ‘Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential Madrassahs (it includes most of the Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni)---has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces’ (Singer 2001). According to a survey conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976 ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The remaining 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural laborers’ (quoted from Ahmad 2000: 185). The present researcher also carried out a survey in which it emerged that madrassa students and teachers came from the lower income group (earning upto Rs 5000 per month. See Appendix-A). It was also observed that many students, upon probing, confessed that their parents had admitted them in the madrassas because they could not afford to feed them and educate them in the government schools. However, even such students, while making this confession, also insist that they are in the madrassas because of their love for Islam.
In short the madrassas are performing the role of the welfare state in the country. This being so, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases. This is a dangerous trend for the country because madrassa students are taught to be intolerant of religious minorities and are hawkish about Kashmir. As they are also from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.
|
Box 8 Tolerance of
Religious Minorities Among Madrassa Students N= 142 (in
Percentages) |
|||
|
Abbreviated Questions |
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
(4) Ahmedis |
12.68 |
82.39 |
4.93 |
|
(5) Hindus |
16.90 |
76.06 |
7.04 |
|
(6) Christians |
18.31 |
73.24 |
8.45 |
The teachers of madrassas were very reluctant to give their views. Thus only 27 questionnaires could be filled in. Moreover, it was not possible to have access to females although there are madrassas for them. The views of the teachers, inadequate as they might be, are as follows:
|
Box 9 Tolerance of
Religious Minorities Among Madrassa Teachers N= 27 (in
Percentages) |
|||
|
Abbreviated Questions |
Yes |
No |
Don’t Know |
|
(4) Ahmedis |
3.70 |
96.23 |
Nil |
|
(5) Hindus |
14.81 |
85.19 |
Nil |
|
(6) Christians |
18.52 |
77.77 |
3.70 |
|
Source: Appendix-B |
|
|
|
As we can see, the madrassa students and teachers do not support equal rights for Muslims and religious minorities. This is called ‘intolerance’ by secular or educated members of the intelligentsia but the religious people have a different interpretation of it. They believe that non-Muslims are zimmis i.e. the responsibility of a Muslim society and the state. As zimmis they are entitled to protection and exempted from military service on the payment of a tax called jaziya. They do not have the right to be employed in powerful decision-making appointments in an Islamic state. However, Pakistan’s founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah did give equal rights to all citizens because of which the liberals insist that it would violate the principles of equality under law if such rights are not given.
Comparison of the Attitudes
Towards Religious Minorities Among Pakistani Students
The responses of students from the three types of institutions we have been discussing are given in a comparative form in Appendix-B.
From this comparison we learn that the madrassa students, for reasons which they consider justified according to their interpretation of religion, are the least tolerant of religious minorities. The Urdu medium students, who happen to be in the majority in the country, are more tolerant but do not come up to the level of tolerance shown by the elitist English medium students. This is not because English medium students are nicer people but because they live in a more secularized atmosphere than their other counterparts. Indeed, English medium students are highly intolerant of people from the villages, people from the lower socio-economic classes, religious people and, especially, the students and teachers of the madrassas. Moreover, the English medium students are alienated from most of the ordinary people and their life in the country. Thus, what appears as tolerance is either Westernization or indifference to the concerns of the rest of their countrymen.
Conclusion
This article presents the results of a survey of three types of educational institutions. This was done so as to get a cross section of the opinions of the major divisions along socio-economic lines in the country. This, in turn, is because Pakistan’s educational system is stratified according to socio-economic class which is expressed roughly in terms of media of instruction or type of educational institution. The madrassas cater for very poor children mostly from rural and urban working class localities. The Urdu-medium schools cater for lower-middle-class and some middle class children while the elitist English-medium schools cater for the upper-medium and upper classes. There are also non-elitist English-medium schools which cater for lower-middle and middle-class children and cadet colleges (Public Schools) which cater for the middle classes, especially professionals and armed forces employees. These institutions have not, however, been considered here. They have been dealt with in some detail in Rahman (2002: Appendix 14). The worldview of the students of all these institutions is so different from each other that they seem to live in different worlds. The most acute polarization is between the madrassa students and the students of elitist English-medium schools. The former are deprived but they express their anger---the rage of the dispossessed---in the idiom of religion. This brings them in conflict with the Westernized elite which looks down upon them in contempt although its most powerful members legitimize their hold on the state apparatus in the name of Islam. The state has strengthened the Islamic lobby itself by Islamizing education and sacralizing the Kashmir dispute so that religious and nationalistic emotion has come to be invested in it. Now that the state feels obliged to reverse these policies, it is already facing resistance from the Islamic lobby. This may increase if the madrassa-educated young men are marginalized even further while remaining both poor and armed. The majority of the students from the Urdu-medium stream are also alienated both from their madrassa as well as English-medium counterparts. In socio-economic terms they belong roughly to the same class as the madrassa students but their training is different from them and hence their views are also different. Moreover, not sharing the Westernization and the wealth of the English-medium students, they too are alienated from them and have a vague sense of having been cheated. These differences in views and dissatisfaction do not augur well for creating a truly pluralistic society. Indeed, they have a divisive potential along class lines which will probably be expressed in the nationalistic and religious idiom in any future crisis. Indeed, if the state keeps investing only in defense and on the elite, it will withdraw further and further away from the social sector. This has already occurred and both religious extremists and the ethnic nationalists have tried to fill in the vacant space. If the armies of the unemployed and the marginalized are not to be increased till they become unmanageable, the state should invest on the poor.
Notes
1. The MMA comprises the following parties: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Fazlur Rehman); Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul Haq); Jamaat-i-Islami (Qazi Hussain Ahmed); Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Shah Ahmed Noorani); Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (Sajid Mir) and the Islami Tehrik, Pakistan (Syed Sajid Naqvi). The JUI is Deobandi; the JUP is Barelvi, the JAH is of the Ahl-e-Hadith, and ITP represents the Shias.
Appendix-A
Monthly Income and Social Mobility of Students and Faculty in Different Educational Institutions in Pakistan
The following information has been collected in response to section 1 of the questionnaire which is given in Annexure-2. These questions are about the income of the family and, in the case of teachers, the medium of instruction of the school which they attended and their children attended.
Section-1: Monthly
Income
The
figures below give the monthly income of the families of students and faculty
as reported by them in our sample.
Those who have not written the income, as well as those those who have,
have been tabulated separately. The
correspondence with socio-economic class, however rough, is as follows:
Working (lower) class = Upto Rs 5000 per month.
Lower middle class = 5001 – 10,000
Middle class = 10,001-20,000
Upper middle class = 20,001 – 50,000
Lower upper class = 50,001 – 100,000
Middle upper class = Above 100,000
The
income is for the whole family and not of the individuals earning it. In most cases income of females has not been
written presumably because they are housewives and do not get paid. In case their income is written, the family
income is calculated by adding their income to the income of the male earning
member’s income.
Income of the Families of Madrassa Students
N = 142
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001– 20,000 |
20,001– 50,000 |
50,000- 100,000 |
|
Pay father |
65 of 142 (47.77%) |
59 of 77 (76.62%) |
10 of 77 (14.86%) |
04 of 77 (5.19%) |
04 of 77 (5.19%) |
Nil |
|
Pay mother |
139 of 142 (97.89%) |
02 of 3 (66.66%) |
1 of 3 (33.33%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
Father and Mother |
N.A |
1 of 3 (33.33%) |
01 of 3 (33.33%) |
1 of 3 (33.33%) |
|
|
|
Analysis: Most madrassa students belong to the working classes. |
||||||
N = 27
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001– 20,000 |
20,001– 50,000 |
50,000– 100,000 |
|
Pay self |
09 of 27 (33.33%) |
13 of 18 (72.22%) |
03 of 18 (16.66%) |
02 of 18 (11.11%) |
Nil |
Nil |
|
Pay spouse |
26 of 27 (96.30%) |
01 of 1 (100%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
Husband and wife |
N.A |
Nil |
01 of 1 (100%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
Analysis: Most madrassa teachers belong to the working classes. |
||||||
N = 65
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001– 20,000 |
20,001– 50,000 |
50,000– 100,000 |
Above 100,000 |
|
Pay self |
11 of 65 (16.92%) |
03 of 54 (5.55%) |
22 of 54 (40.74%) |
18 of 54 (33.33%) |
10 of 54 (15.38%) |
01 of 54 (1.85%) |
Nil |
|
Pay spouse |
55 of 65 (84.62%) |
Nil |
1 of 10 (10%) |
6 of 10 (60%) |
02 of 10 (20%) |
01 of 10 (10%) |
Nil |
|
Husband and wife |
N.A |
Nil |
Nil |
3 of 10 (30%) |
04 of 10 (40%) |
02 of 10 (20%) |
01 of 10 (10%) |
|
Analysis: Most teachers have written their own income but not of their spouses. They fall between middle and upper middle class brackets. When husband and wife both earn, the family goes up in income even going into the lower upper class. |
|||||||
N = 116
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001– 20,000 |
20,001– 50,000 |
50,000– 100,000 |
Above 100,000 |
|
|
Pay father |
81 of 116 (69.83%) |
Nil |
01 of 35 (2.86%) |
03 of 35 (8.57%) |
18 of 35 (51.43%) |
08 of 35 (22.86%) |
05 of 35 (14.29%) |
|
|
Pay mother |
101 of 116 (87.07%) |
1 of 15 (6.66%) |
03 of 15 (20%) |
02 of 15 (13.33%) |
08 of 15 (53.33%) |
1 of 15 (6.66%) |
Nil |
|
|
Father and mother |
N.A |
1 of 15 (6.66%) |
02 of 15 (13.33%) |
Nil |
04 of 15 (26.66%) |
05 of 15 (33.33%) |
03 of 15 (20%) |
|
|
Analysis: |
Most of them have not written their parents’ income. Out of those who have most belong to the upper middle class. More than one third belong to the upper classes |
|||||||
Income of Families of Urdu-medium School Students
N = 230
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001– 20,000 |
20,001– 50,000 |
50,000– 100,000 |
Above 100,000 |
|
|
Pay father |
95 of 230 (41.31%) |
83 of 135 (61.48%) |
36 of 135 (26.66%) |
13 of 135 (9.63%) |
03 of 135 (2.22%) |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Pay mother |
220 of 230 (95.65%) |
8 of 10 (80%) |
2 of 10 (20%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Father and mother |
N.A |
2 of 10 (20%) |
4 of 10 (40%) |
4 of 10 (40%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Analysis: |
Most have written their fathers’ income but not their mothers’ who are probably housewives. Out of those of who have written, most belong to working class families. About a quarter, however, also belong to the lower middle classes. Very few are above that in income. |
|||||||
Income of the Families of the Faculty of Urdu-medium Schools
N = 100
|
|
Not written |
Upto 5,000 |
5,001-10,000 |
10,001- 20,000 |
20,001- 50,000 |
50,000- 100,000 |
Above 100,000 |
|
|
Pay self |
6 of 100 (6%) |
17 of 94 (18.09%) |
62 of 94 (65.96%) |
15 of 94 (15.96%) |
Nil |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Pay spouse |
82 of 100 (82%) |
3 of 18 (16.66%) |
06 of 18 (33.33%) |
07 of 18 (38.89%) |
02 of 18 (11.11%) |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Husband and wife |
N.A |
Nil |
Nil |
09 of 18 (50%) |
09 of 18 (50%) |
Nil |
Nil |
|
|
Analysis: |
Most earners have written their income but not that of their spouse. Most belong to the lower middle class. Out of the few spouses whose income is reported, a fairly large proportion tend to have middle class incomes and a very small minority even higher than that. |
|||||||
Appendix-B
SURVEY 2003
Survey of Schools and Madrassas
Schools and Madrassas
This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of two research assistants Imran Farid and Shahid Gondal whom I take this opportunity to thank. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, to which I am very grateful.
Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.
The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools, (3) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:
|
TEACHERS |
|||
|
|
M (ale) |
F (emale) |
Total |
|
English-medium |
18 |
47 |
65 |
|
Urdu-medium |
42 |
58 |
100 |
|
Madrassas |
27 |
Nil |
27 |
|
Grand Total |
|
|
192 |
|
STUDENTS |
|||
|
|
M (ale) |
F (emale) |
Total |
|
English-medium |
62 |
52 |
116 |
|
Urdu-medium |
123 |
107 |
230 |
|
Madrassas |
142 |
Nil |
142 |
|
Grand Total |
|
|
488 |
As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan.
The ages of the students are as follows:
|
Institutions |
Mean |
Mode |
Range |
|
Madrassas |
19 |
20 |
14-27 |
|
English-medium schools |
14.1 |
15 |
13-18 |
|
Urdu-medium school |
14.4 |
16 |
13-20 |
In the case of the madrassas the range is higher because some of the sanvia class groups had older boys who had joined the seminary late. In the O’level groups both 10th and 11th were represented. Urdu-medium schools had only class-10 clusters.
There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.
QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)
DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.
1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female
2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D
3. Which subject (s) do you teach?
What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?
What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.
What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?
What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?
QUESTIONNAIRE
(STUDENTS)
DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.
1. age.
2. Class
3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female
4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?
5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?
PART-II
(for both faculty and
students)
What should be Pakistan’s priorities?
1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?
(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know
Consolidated Data of
Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools
Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)
|
Abbreviated
Questions |
Madrassas |
Urdu-medium |
English-medium |
||
|
1. |
Open War |
Yes |
59.86 |
39.56 |
25.86 |
|
No |
31.69 |
53.04 |
64.66 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
8.45 |
7.39 |
9.48 |
||
|
2. |
Jihadi
groups |
Yes |
52.82 |
33.04 |
22.41 |
|
No |
32.39 |
45.22 |
60.34 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
14.79 |
21.74 |
17.24 |
||
|
3. |
Peaceful means |
Yes |
33.80 |
75.65 |
72.41 |
|
No |
54.93 |
18.26 |
18.97 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
11.27 |
6.09 |
8.62 |
||
|
4. |
Ahmedis |
Yes |
12.68 |
46.95 |
65.52 |
|
No |
82.39 |
36.95 |
9.48 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
4.93 |
16.09 |
25.00 |
||
|
5. |
Hindus |
Yes |
16.90 |
47.39 |
78.45 |
|
No |
76.06 |
42.61 |
13.79 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
7.04 |
10.00 |
7.76 |
||
|
6. |
Christians |
Yes |
18.31 |
65.65 |
83.62 |
|
No |
73.24 |
26.52 |
8.62 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
8.45 |
7.83 |
7.76 |
||
|
7. |
Women |
Yes |
16.90 |
75.22 |
90.52 |
|
No |
77.46 |
17.39 |
6.03 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
5.63 |
7.39 |
3.45 |
||
NB: Figures for (3)
are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2)
while also ticking (3).
Comparative Chart for Opinions of
Faculty Members of Different
Educational
Institutions
|
|
Madrassas (27) |
Urdu-medium
schools (100) |
English-medium
schools (65) |
||
|
1. |
Open War |
Yes |
70.37 |
20 |
26.15 |
|
No |
22.22 |
70 |
64.62 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
7.41 |
10 |
9.23 |
||
|
2. |
Jihadi
groups |
Yes |
59.26 |
19 |
38.46 |
|
No |
26.63 |
68 |
50.77 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
11.11 |
13 |
10.77 |
||
|
3. |
Peaceful means |
Yes |
29.63 |
85 |
60.00 |
|
No |
66.67 |
10 |
33.85 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
3.70 |
5 |
6.15 |
||
|
4. |
Ahmedis |
Yes |
3.70 |
27 |
43.07 |
|
No |
96.23 |
65 |
36.92 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
NIL |
8 |
20.00 |
||
|
5. |
Hindus |
Yes |
14.81 |
37 |
61.54 |
|
No |
85.19 |
58 |
26.15 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
NIL |
5 |
12.31 |
||
|
6. |
Christians |
Yes |
18.52 |
52 |
81.54 |
|
No |
77.77 |
42 |
10.77 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
3.70 |
6 |
7.69 |
||
|
7. |
Women |
Yes |
3.70 |
61 |
78.46 |
|
No |
96.67 |
33 |
13.85 |
||
|
Don’t Know |
NIL |
6 |
7.69 |
||
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