POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

By

TARIQ RAHMAN Ph. D

DISTINGUISHED NATIONAL PROFESSOR

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

e.mail= drt_rahman@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

Language policy and education are subordinated to the class interests of the urban, professional, English-using elite in Pakistan. This elite has been using increasingly ideological contents—mainly nationalism sacralized in the name of religion—in textbooks all over the country. This ideologically inspired citizenry is expected to support political policies like creating a privileged and powerful army and pursuing an aggressive policy vis a vis India.

Elitist education, which is a money-making concern, is in the hands of private entrepreneurs and the armed forces. This leads to ‘ghettoization’—polarization of students according to socio-economic class—which is spreading from the school to the university level. These policies create anger and may lead to violence which may be expressed in the idiom of Islam in the country.

POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE: LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

1. INTRODUCTION

Policies about education, as well as the contents of what is taught, are directly or indirectly connected with politics defined as the ‘pursuit of power’. Education provides information, creates values and attitudes and also creates marketable skills. All societies need it to pass on the values of the group to the younger generation. The political interest of the grownups is that their children will have their beliefs, values and attitudes. As one of these values was respect for age, the grownups could be reasonably sure of being looked after in old age. Of course, being indoctrinated like their children in turn, they did not realize that they were using education in their own interest. They simply assumed that it was the natural order of things, or a sacred duty, to pass on the values they did pass on through education.

Modern societies are far more complex. But one of the aims of education is still propagandist i.e. to ensure that certain consensually held values are passed on to posterity. Even the recent imperative to question everything which is emphasized in Western education systems owes its existence to the fact that it is essential, at least for some cutting edge researchers, to keep the scientific culture alive. And, of course, the domination of the West being based upon the scientific way of thinking, it is essential to emphasize questioning rather than acceptance which traditional, agricultural, feudal societies encouraged.

The education system in Pakistan was designed by the British to control their Indian subjects. English was taught to create an Anglicized middle class which looked to England as a moral exemplar and, therefore, a model of civilized behaviour (Viswanathan 1989). English also served to separate the urban, professional elite from the masses as well as the rural elitist groups. The middle and lower middle classes went to vernacular-medium schools and the very poorest people went without education. In some cases religious institutions—madrassas and putshalas—provided free education. In short, the education system was unequal and class-based (Rahman 1996: 39-58).

The objective of this article is to describe the major education policies of Pakistan with a view to understanding how they are connected to politics (elitist and ethnic). This will be done largely by examining the medium of instruction and how it relates to socio-economic class. In the case of Pakistan the most powerful language is English. This article, therefore, also looks at the relationship of English with socio-economic class, world view (especially militancy and intolerance) and the potential for violence in Pakistan.

2. Language Policy in Pakistan

Pakistan is a multilingual state with six major languages--Punjabi (spoken by 44.15 per cent out of a population of 153 million in 2003); Pashto (15.42); Sindhi (14.10); Siraiki (10.53); Urdu (7.57); Balochi (3.57)—and about 57 minor ones. Urdu is the national language and English the official one (Annexure-1). English is spoken spontaneously and fluently only by small elite which is not more than 2 per cent of the population (see Annexure 2). The 1973 constitution of the country, which was suspended in part both during the military rule of Generals Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) and Pervez Musharraf (1999- ), is again in force. It provides the following guidelines on language policy:

(1) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from commencing day.

(2) Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements for its replacement by Urdu.

(3) Without prejudice to the state of the National language, a provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language (Article 251).

This further relates to education policy and practice as well as employment prospects of educated people because the medium of instruction and the language of the domains of power-government, bureaucracy, military, judiciary, education, media, research, the corporate sector, commerce etc—are the languages desiderated by individuals in order to empower themselves and their children.

3. Education Policy in Pakistan

The Pakistani state embarked upon a number of policies ever since the birth of the country. These were: expansion of education and literacy (modernization); dissemination of Urdu (vernacularization); ideological socialization and privatization. Let us take them turn by turn.

a. Modernization

All education policy documents of the state emphasize the link between modernization and an educated work force. Thus achieving hundred per cent literacy was an avowed aim of all governments. This aim has not been achieved even now though literacy increased from 16 per cent in 1951 to 54 per cent of the population in 2004 (GOP 2004). Pakistan lags behind most countries, even South Asia countries, as far as education indications are concerned. After 9/11 the military government of Pakistan as well as the United States Government came to realize that Pakistan’s education system may create potential terrorists. Thus, the U.S House of representations passed an Act cited as the ‘Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriation Act, 2005’ which calls for U.S assistance to Pakistan to reform education and this includes, inter alia, ‘efforts to expand and improve the secular education system in Pakistan and to develop and utilize a moderate curriculum for private religious schools in Pakistan’. Although the Education Sector Reform Action Plan (ESR) was approved by General Musharraf, the president of Pakistan, on 30 April 2001, it was only after 9/11 that the possible link between religious militancy and education was perceived. In 2005 the USAID, the agency which brings U.S money to fund Pakistan’s educational projects, anticipates $67 million up to 2009. in short, modernization is more on the agenda of education planners in Pakistan today than ever before. In short, despite increases in al types of schools the population growth of 2.5 per cent per year combined with an expenditure of about 2.7 per cent of the GDP in 2004 (GDP 2004) and an average of about 2 per cent for many years have prevented the achievement of the aims given above. (NB: As official figures are generally more optimistic than figures from independent sources, both are given).

b. Vernacularization

The Pakistani state embarked upon a state of disseminating Urdu as it was considered an identity symbol, next only in significance to Islam itself, of the Muslims of India during the movement for the creation of Pakistan. Official thinking was that Urdu would be an antidote for language-based ethnic movements which could break up the new state. However, Urdu was opposed in this anti-ethnic role by the Bengali nationalists leading to a crisis in 1952 when police opened fire killing students of Dhaka University. Other ethno-nationalists, seeking identity through their indigenous languages have supported Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi and Brahvi and Siraiki while opposing the perceived hegemony of Urdu (Rahman 1996).

However, despite this opposition people have learned Urdu for pragmatic reasons all over Pakistan as it is the language of wider communication within the country. It is disseminated through the government schools, the government colleges and universities which teach all except technical and scientific subjects in Urdu, the print media, radio and the television. Thus all those who have passed primary school (40 per cent and even illiterates who come in contact with urban people for providing services as well as all city also available for use in the computer. Moreover, it is associated with Islam being the language of examination for all the registered madrassas as well as the medium of instruction and of sermons for most of them. In short, Urdu is officially associated with the nationalist Pakistani identity and unofficially with urbanization and the Islamic identity in Pakistan (for both associations see Abdullah 1976).

‘Urduization’ is not only opposed by the language-based ethno-nationalists. It is also resisted, though covertly and not through declared policy statements, by the Westernized English-using elite. The size of the section of this elite which uses English naturally and spontaneously even in private interaction has always been very small (around 1.5 per cent in the census of 1951 and 1961 after which no figures have been provided). It is estimated by this writer to be between 2 to 3 per cent now because the number of students who appeared in the British school-leaving examinations (GCE Ordinary and Advanced Levels) in 2002 was below 2 per cent of the total number of students who appeared in the Pakistani examinations of the same level (Annexure 2). However, all matriculates (10 years of school) do know the English script and those working in subaltern positions in domains of power and aspiring to make their children enter elitist positions in the same domains are also supporters of English. This increases the size, and even more importantly the power, of the lobby for continued privileging of English.

Vernacularization has affected higher education more than school education which was already in the vernaculars by the time Pakistan was established. Colleges taught the higher secondary classes (11 and 12) as well as the bachelors level (13 and 14) in English as did the universities at the masters level (15 and 16). This started changing as more and more of the non-scientific subjects came to be taught in the vernaculars (Urdu, except in parts of Sindh where Sindhi was used). Nowadays, all subjects excepts the sciences, engineering and medicine are taught in the vernaculars. This has created the perception that the scientific subjects arte more academically demanding, and hence more financially rewarding, than the others. Rather than creating more chances of advancement for a larger number of students than before, this policy has ‘ghettoized’ them as well as the government educational institutions which teach through the vernaculars. Those who want to escape from this ‘ghetto’ either tend to avoid the humanities and the social sciences altogether or buy them at exorbitant rates from the private sector to which we turn now.

c. Privatization

Though it is only recently that the Ministry of Education has officially recognized the trend towards the privatization of education at all levels, there have been private, expensive, elitist schools in the country ever since its inception. When controlled by the Christian missionaries they were said to be necessary in the name of religious tolerance (though they catered more for the Pakistani Muslim elite’s children than for Christians), while those administered or controlled by the armed forces (Public Schools and Cadet Colleges) were said to be necessary for a modernizing country since they prepared leaders. The armed forces now control or influence—through senior military officers who are on their boards of governors or principals—most of the cadet colleges and elitist public schools in the country. While the education policy documents declare that these institutions are financed by the fees paid by their pupils the present researcher estimated that the average cost per student per year in 2003 was PKR 14,171 whereas that of the Urdu-medium schools was 2,264.5 (see Annexure-4). Besides, these institutions are given land as grants at very subsidized rates as well as gifts and other forms of patronage. The armed forces also control federal government educational institutions in cantonments and garrisons (GHQ 2003), run their own schools and colleges (MOD 2003) and also control a huge educational network through their philanthropic services run mostly by retired officers (the army’s Fauji Foundation, the air force’s Shaheen Foundation and the navy’s Bahria Foundation) (Rahman 2004: 53-54).

Besides the armed forces, elitist schools are owned as business empires with campuses in most big cities of Pakistan. These schools charge exorbitant tuition fees and prepare their students for the British O’ and A’ level examinations. Not all private schools are elitist or very expensive. Leaving aside the madrassas, which are given attention elsewhere, there are a large number of non-elitist English-medium schools in all cities and even small towns of the country. They cater to those who cannot afford the elitist schools but want to give their children better chances in life by teaching them English. Their fees, though far less than those of their elitist counterparts, is still forbidding for their impecunious clientele. Ironically, they do not teach good English as efficiency in that language is a product of exposure to it at home and in the peer group which are available only to the Westernized, urban elite.

Privatization is now taking place in the field of higher education. There were 55 public and 51 recognized private sector universities in 2005 while there were only 7 public and no private ones in 1971 when Bangladesh became a separate country and the area now called Pakistan carried the name of the country (HEC 2005). The first private university, the Aga Khan University in Karachi, was established in 1983. It taught only medicine and created two trends: first, that private entrepreneurs could establish a university; and second, that an institution of that name could teach only one subject. Soon universities teaching lucrative, market-oriented subjects like business studies, computers, and engineering proliferated. They charge very high fees thus making them unaffordable for even the middle classes, which undergo much self-sacrifice to teach their children in these institutions.

The armed forces, despite being organizations of the state, entered the business of higher education as entrepreneurs. There are at present five universities controlled directly or indirectly by the armed forces. While some cater primarily for the needs of the armed forces themselves allowing civilian students to study only if there are places after their own students are accommodated, most function like private institutions catering primarily for civilian students who can afford their high fees. Education, like other undertakings (urban land, insurance, banking, factories etc), is part of the vast business empire of the military. This MILBUS, as Ayesha Siddiqa¹ calls it, derives its strength from the political strength of the army. I would add to this that, because of control over so many civilians and so much money, it contributes to that political strength thus making increasingly difficult for Pakistan to get rid of the military’s interference in politics.

All private sector universities attract students because they use English as a medium of instruction for al subjects and provide the kind of elitist infrastructure and facilities which distinguish the elite from the masses (such as air conditioning).

d. Ideological Socialization

The state uses education to create a cohesive national identity transcending ethnic identities in which Urdu and Islam are used as unifying symbols. Although this has been touched upon in passing earlier, it may be mentioned that textbooks of social studies, history and languages are informed by this theme. The other major theme informing them is that of creating support for the garrison state, which involves glorification of war and the military. Islam, the history of Muslim conquests and rulers as well as the Pakistan movement are pressed into legitimating these concerns. Although General Zia ul Haq’s eleven year rule strengthened Islamization of the curricula, these trends were manifested in the early fifties when the first educational policies were created. The text books of government schools, and especially the subject of Pakistan Studies, carry the major part of the ideological burden as several writers have pointed out (Aziz 1993; Saigol 1995; Nayyar and Salim 2003). Urdu, which is taught to all students, is the main ideology-carrying language (Rahman 2002: 520-522). The armed forces are also indirectly implicated in this because they have been supporting the religious lobby since the early nineteen fifties in their own interest as well as perceived ‘national interest’ (Haqqani 2005).

The main target of the ideological impact is the government school and college i.e. working and lower-middle class students. Students of elitist English-medium schools and private colleges do not follow the government curricula except in the subjects of Pakistan Studies, Urdu and Islamic Studies. Thus, both through the government-controlled education and media, the masses are exposed to anti-India, pro-military and militant values which do not appear to be conducive for creating permanent peace in South Asia or the world.

Policy and the perception of Injustice in Pakistan. As we have seen earlier, the Pakistani elite has invested in an elitist system of education through the medium of English while allowing most Pakistanis to remain uneducated, seek madrassa education or remain confined to vernacular-medium schooling and such-standard institutions of higher education. This has created the perception of injustice, and hence anger, in two sections of society: ethno-nationalists (horizontal division) and the under-privileged proto-elite (the vertical division).

The policy of promoting Urdu at the cost of the indigenous languages of the people has increased the ethnic opposition to Urdu on the one hand while creating contempt for the indigenous identity on the other. This is most pronounced in the Punjab where Punjabi is regarded as a sign of rusticity, lack of sophistication and lack of good breeding. The ethnic activists of the other languages-Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi and to some extent Siraiki-have managed to create a sense of pride in their identity and language but they too acknowledge the pragmatic value of Urdu and remain impressed with English. This increases the pressure of English which, being the language of globalization, already threatens most of the world’s languages. As the concept of language rights has not emerged in Pakistan and the demand for indigenous languages is seen only as part of ethnic resistance to the Centre, the languages of the country do not have the chance of being written down, taught even at the elementary level, or promoted in the media. This will make some of the minor languages obsolete and, though the major languages will survive as spoken mother-tongues because of their size, even the larger languages will become so mixed up with words of Urdu and English as to lose their present identity.

The elite’s appropriation of English as cultural capital for themselves and a devise for filtering but the perceived as being unjust by the representatives of the vernacular proto-elite (Abdullah 1976). Students did protest against the English-medium schools in 1963 and again in 2002 when they felt that the private sector would place universities out of their reach. Another consequence of privatization and the elite’s support of and investment in English is to increase the ideological polarization between the different socio-economic classes. In two surveys of school students from the madrassas, the vernacular-medium schools and the elitist English-medium schools one taken in 1999 and the other in 2003, it was found that the madrassa products were most intolerant of religious minorities in Pakistan and most supportive of a militant policy towards India in relation to Kashmir. The first survey is more detailed (Rahman 2002: Annexure 14) but does not cover the views of teachers while the second one is confined only to the urban parts of the Punjab and the N.W.F.P but does reflect the opinions of the faculty which are close, and sometimes less liberal than their students (Rahman 2004: Annexures 1 and 2 of the book and given in summary form in Annexure 3 of this article).

Other problems are linked with increasing computerization and globalization. As the language of both is predominantly English with Urdu being in the experimental stages, most Pakistani students have yet to learn anything from computers which, indeed, are not available to them either at home or in their schools, colleges and even universities. Urban males do, however, encounter computers in internet cafes where they are seen as devices for playing games or gaining access to pornography. Students from English-medium institutions do, however, have access to computers both at home and in their educational institutions. They use them for gaining knowledge but even more so for integrating with the globalized (mostly American) culture which distances them even more than their vernacular-educated and madrassa-educated counterparts than ever before. In short, the English-vernacular divide, which is also the class divide, is now also expressed as the digital divide.

Islamic Militancy and Education is also divided according to socio-economic class and medium of instruction. The madrassas follow a modified form of the traditional, eighteenth century curriculum called the Dars-I-Nizami (Robinson 2002: 53) in which the canonical Arabic texts, which are memorized, are symbolic of valorized cultural memory and continuity. They also have polemical texts in Urdu to refute what they see as heresy and Western ideas. The emphasis on bellum justum (Jihad), which is blamed for terrorism in the press, does not come from the traditional texts but from extra-curricular pamphlets in Urdu and, even more importantly, from warriors back form Afghanistan, Kashmir or other battlefields in the Islamic world (for the views of Madrassa students towards war and religious minorities see Annexure 3). That is why changes in the curricula of the madrassas will not change their attitude towards armed conflict while creating new political realities, such as peaceful settlements in Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya and other flash points in the Muslim world will.

4. Conclusion

Language policy and education, as we have seen, are subordinated to the class interests of the urban, professional, English-using elite in Pakistan. For its political interests this elite has been using the name of Islam, and has strengthened the religious lobby, in the last many years. This policy is said to have been reversed but it may be revived by a future government. The rank and file to carry it on, especially if it takes the form of a low-intensity conflict with India over Kashmir, will come from the madrassas which will increasingly cater for more young males as the state shifts spending from the education sector to others. Given the state’s encouragement of privatization in the recent past, this seems to be a future trend which can have negative consequences for peace in South Asia and the world.

Privatization, with its concomitant strengthening of English as an elitist preserve, will lead to ‘ghettoization’ in Pakistan. This will have several consequences. First, the most educated people will lose faith in the country and give up on it. Second, the ideological polarization between the different socio-economic classes will increase even further. And, above all, the incentive for reforming Pakistan’s educational system and making it more conducive for creating a tolerant and peaceful society will decrease.

Another trend will be to strengthen the power of the military in Pakistan. As more and more elitist schools and universities pass into the hands of the military, the number of teachers, administrators and business concerns under the patronage of the military will increase. More students will also be influenced by them. This will privilege the military’s views about national interest, the future of the country and economic priorities. This may dilute ideas of civilian supremacy which underpin democracies and jeopardize the chances of lasting peace in South Asia.

Most of these possibilities do not bode well for the future of the country but it is only by recognizing them that potentially negative language and educational policies may be reversed.

NOTES

1. I thank Dr Ayesha Siddiqa for having given me her manuscript on military business in October 2005. It will go to the press later this year.

Annexure-1

BOX 1
Language	Percentage of Speakers	Number of Speakers
Punjabi	44.15	66,225,000
Pashto	15.42	23,130,000
Sindhi	14.10	21,150,000
Siraiki	10.53	15,795,000
Urdu	7.57	11,355,000
Balochi	3.57	5,355,000
Others	4.66	6,990,000
Source: Census 2001: Table 2.7. The population is assumed to be 150 million in 2003 as it was 132, 352,000 in 1998 and the growth rate is 2.69 per cent.

Annexure-2

Number of Students who appear in Pakistani Examinations Versus those who appear in British Examinations
Total SSC (Pakistani Matriculation)	1,026,805 (2002 Annual)
Total HSSC (Pakistani F.A/F.Sc)	5,02,209 (2002 Annual)
Total O’ Level (British Ordinary School Leaving Certificate)	10,546 (2002 Annual)
Total A’ Level (British Advanced School Leaving Certificate)	5,680 (2002 Annual)

Ratio of Pakistani School Examinees to British Ones

Pakistani Matriculation (SSC)	1,026,805	98.95%
British GCE O’ Level	10,546	1.05%
Pakistani Intermediate (HSSC)	5,02,209	98.88%
British GCE ‘A’ Level	5,680	1.12%
Sources: For SSC/HSSC 24 BISE’s of Pakistan. Data Base of Inter-Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Islamabad. For O’ and A’ Level, British Council, Examination Section, Islamabad, May 2004.

Annexure-3

SURVEY 2003

Survey of Schools and Madrassas,

The details of this survey are given as annexure-2 in Rahman (2004: 163-176). Part of the questionnaire and replies are reproduced below.

QUESTIONNAIRE

PART-II

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to * Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

* Ahmedis, Mirzais or Quaidianis are declare a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and have less political rights than Muslims (see Friedmann, Y. 1989).

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools
1.	Open War	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00
		Don’t Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92
		Don’t Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54
5.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85
6.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62
7.	Women	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38
		Don’t Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).

Annexure-4

DIFFERENCES IN COSTS IN MAJOR TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (in Pakistani rupees)
Institution	Average cost per student per year	Payer (s)	Cost to the state
Madrassas	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	*Rs. 1.55 in 2001-02 an additional sum of Rs. 28.60 for subsidies on computers, books etc in some madrassas in 2003-04.
Urdu-medium Schools	2264.5 (only tuition)	State	2264.5
Elitist English medium schools	96,000---for ‘A’ level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet colleges/public schools	90,061 (tuition and all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)
* The cost per student per year in the madrassas is calculated for all 1,065,277 students reported in 2000. In 2001-02 a sum of Rs. 1,654,000 was given by the government to those madrassas which accepted financial help. In 2003-04 Rs. 30.45 million will be given in addition for computerization and modernization of textbooks. However, not all students receive this subsidy as their madrassas refuse government help (these figures are from IPS 2002: tables 1.17 and 1.19). Source: Data obtained from several institutions.

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