The Muslim Response to English in South Asia: With Special Reference to Inequality, Intolerance and Militancy in Pakistan

By

Tariq Rahman Ph. D

Professor and Director, Chair on Quaid-i-Azam

and Freedom Movement

National Institute of Pakistan Studies

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

The Muslim Response to English in South Asia: With Special Reference to Inequality, Intolerance and Militancy in Pakistan

Abstract

English came to South Asia as a consequence of British conquest. The Muslims of this part of the world responded to it in three ways: rejection and resistance; acceptance and assimilation; pragmatic utilization. These responses continue in Pakistan and are associated with, respectively, the traditionalist ulema; the Westernized middle and upper classes and the Islamists, including the Islamic militants.

English is also a marker of socio-economic class and the state has created and maintains policies which have distributed it unevenly i.e. the elite has privileged access to it while the poorest people do not. These class cleavages are also related to the polarization of Pakistani society in relation to militancy, religious tolerance and women’s rights. These, in turn, are related to the degree of exposure to English, socio-economic class and identity.

The Muslim Response to English in South Asia: With Special Reference to Inequality, Intolerance and Militancy in Pakistan

Introduction

Pakistan was created out of British India in 1947. The British used English in the domains of power---government, administration, judiciary, military, higher education, higher commerce, media, the corporate sector---which made it the most prestigious and coveted language in this part of the world. The Pakistani rulers have continued with this policy so that it remains the principal language for acquiring power in the country (Rahman 2002).

A number of writers have written on the role of English in education (Abbas 1993; Malik F 1996; Mansoor 1993 and 2002; Rahman 1996 and 2002), but there is no detailed treatment of the response of South Asian Muslims to it; the construction of new identities with reference to it; the social and economic changes brought about in Muslim society in South Asia because of it; its effect on the world view of Pakistani Muslims; the way it is distributed in society by the state and whether the process is unjust and unequal and, therefore, a potential source of creating polarization and resentment in society.

Methodology

The historical reception of English by South Asian Muslims has already been studied by historians and this data is consolidated here to provide new insights and create analytical categories which help us in understanding Pakistani society at present. The part dealing with the distribution of English by the colonial and the Pakistani state likewise comes from documents and other published sources.

The world view of students form different socio-economic classes and corresponding educational institutions, teaching no English to using English almost as a first language, comes from a survey of 488 students who filled in questionnaires in late 2002 and early 2003 on issues such as militancy or peace (in Kashmir); equal rights for Muslims and non-Muslims; and of men and women in Pakistan. The incomes of the families of students are given in Annexure A and their responses are in Annexure B.

Historical Background

One of the arguments advanced by the Anglicists---the British officers who wanted. English rather than the classical languages of Indian Islam (Persian and Arabic) to be promoted in India---was that it would dilute the opposition to British rule. The view had been expressed even by Charles Grant (1746-1823), a director of the East India Company, in his observations (1792). He hoped that English literature would undermine the beliefs of the Indians. However, Grant was also afraid that it would teach them ‘English liberty and the English form of government’ (Grant 1792: 92). It took almost a century to shake off the second fear but by 1924 the Directors of the company complained that the establishment of purely indigenous seminaries was not a good policy. The letter of 18 February 1824 to the General Committee of Public Instruction said clearly that teaching ‘mere Hindoo, or mere Mahomedan literature’ is ‘to teach a great deal of what was frivolous, not a little of what was mischievous’ and only a little lit of what could be called useful (in Basu 1952: 153). A well known Anglicist figure, Charles Trevelyan, pointed out that for the Indian Muslims the British were ‘infidel usurpers of some of the fairest realms of the Faithful’ (Trevelyan 1838: 189). However, those who read literature in English would ‘almost cease to regard us as foreigners’ (ibid 189-90).

Trevelyan was right in his use of the words ‘infidel’ and ‘faithful’ in so far as Muslims all over the world did use religious categories for the demarcation of the boundary between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ as evidenced by medieval books of Indian history in which terms like infidels’, ‘perishing in hell’ (i.e. dying), the ‘benighted ones’ etc are used more often than not for non-Muslims. Bernard Lewis, looking at Turkish history, has this to say about this trend in Ottoman documents:

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman chroniclers devote some though not a great deal of attention to relations with Europe. The various European nations are still referred to invariably as “the English infidels”, “the French infidels”, etc, though the curses and insults customary in earlier historiography become less frequent and less vehement (Lewis 1982: 161).

That the Anglicist officers were equally committed to ‘Othering’---indeed the major theme of Orientalist scholarship was to objectify, caricaturize and hence devalue the Orient (Said 1978)---is doubtlessly true. This ‘Othering’ had many strands: the first was expressed in civilizational, social-Darwinist, terms of superiority and hence the ethical imperative of improving the East (‘the white man’s burden’); the second was purely racist (‘the prestige of the white man’); and the third, rarely expressed and increasingly rare as modernity eroded the power of religion, was religious. Trevelyan did express this last aspect of ethnocentric bias, however, in a private letter of 9 April 1834 to Lord William Bentinck, the Governor General of India, as follows:

The abolition of the exclusive privileges which the Persian language has in the courts and affairs of court will form the crowning stroke which will shake Hinduism and Mohammadanism to their centre and firmly establish our language, our learning and ultimately our religion in Indian (Philips 1977: 1239).

The Anglicist misgivings about Orientalist education as a source of anti-British resistance proved to be borne out by some of the events of 1857. For instance, the senior teacher of the Oriental Department at Bareilly was reputed to be anti-British. The Head Moulvi of the Oriental Department of Agra College actually worked one of the guns at Delhi in 1857 and, in general, those not schooled in English were reputed to be bigoted and narrow minded in their views. Indeed, when British rule was restored, the oriental departments of these colleges were eliminated (GAD-NWP 1868).

The view that English would reduce Islamic anti-British militancy got strengthened till the English educated elite came to be seen as allies and mediators between the British rulers and the Indian masses. It is this view which is attributed to Macaulay:

We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect (Macaulay 1835 in Aggarwal 1984: 12).

But, as we have seen, this view did not come originally from Macaulay. It was present almost from the beginning of British rule and got strengthened till it vanquished the rival view that British rule would be strengthened by non-interference in native education and culture.

Eventually, as Gauri Viswanathan argues, English literature created a socializing force which made English values appear as an ideal moral force and, therefore, legitimized British rule (Viswanathan 1987; 1989). It was just such a moral, as opposed to a purely utilitarian, use which Indian Muslims opposed.

The Muslim Response to English

The Indian Muslims probably could not articulate clearly exactly what it was which made them oppose English to begin with. It is, indeed, very likely that their opposition came simply as a reaction to their political defeat at the hands of the English. It may also have been part of their boundary-marking (‘Othering’) on religious grounds which has already been referred to. But, if one goes deep into the polemical diatribes which the Muslims wrote against English, it becomes clear that they were extremely anxious about its alienating potential. It was obviously seen as a socially disruptive force which would change the thoughts, dilute the religious fervour, and blunt the opposition to British dominance---the very things which the British hoped English, and especially English literature, would do. There were, however, three types of responses to English.

Resistance and Rejection

The first kind of response was that of rejection and resistance to it. This is perceived to be religious in nature but it was not purely theological. After all, Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1823), a very influential Islamic Scholar (alim), had permitted the study of English (Aziz n.d: 571-72. Quoted from Rizvi 1982: 240-41). Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905), one of the pioneers of the Deobandi sub-sect of the Sunnis in South Asia, had also permitted it (Gangohi n.d.: 54. Quoted from Rizvi 1980, Vol 2: 231). So had the pioneer of the Barelvi school of thought in Indian Islam, Ahmed Raza Khan Barelwi (1856-1921) (Fatawa-e-Rizwiyya in Sanyal 1996: 183). And of course, the Nadwat-ul-Ulama, at least in its initial period, aspired to understanding modernity through English while teaching about the faith (Zaman 2002: 69). And, Abd al-Bari of Farangi Mahal, (d. 1925-26), an influential seminary of Lucknow, specifically said that the alim should study English in order to understand the thought of the West (Robinson 2002: 166-167). The problem was one of identity. Despite the fatwas the ulema were wary of including English in the Dars-i-Nazami, the curriculum of the madrassas in South Asia. Ordinary Muslims, no less apprehensive of losing their identity in a welter of alien values brought with English, condemned it outright. Some of them might never have heard of the fatwas of their religious leaders, but they instinctively felt that English would bring in new values and threaten their world view. This resistance and rejection still characterizes the Islamic conservatives.

Acceptance and Assimilation

At the opposite end was the response of acceptance and assimilation. Though it legitimated itself in the name of ‘pragmatism’, it led to assimilation and, hence, to the emergence of modernist or secular, Westernized Muslims. It started because, from the pragmatic point of view, it was foolish to resist English especially when the Hindus and Parsis were getting more than their due share of power in British employment because of it. Hence the modernizing reformers---Abdul Latif ( 1828-93) and Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-99)--- insisted that the Muslims learn English and take their due share in power under the British. This response---the acceptance of English ostensibly for pragmatic reasons---became the defining feature of the new professional middle class which got completely alienated from the English-rejecting ulema (or mullahs as they were contemptuously called) and those who did not know English. Thus, English became the chief marker of modern identity; the major factor separating Muslim society into the English-using elite and the traditionally educated proto-elite or the illiterate masses.

Pragmatic Utilization

The third response to modernity was to accept aspects of it selectively, tactically as it were, in order to empower one’s self while maintaining one’s identity as firmly as one could. This, essentially, is the Islamist response to English. The Islamists, educated in modern educational institutions, ‘are drawn to initiatives aimed at radically altering the contours of their societies and states through the public implementation of norms they take as “truly” Islamic’ (Zaman 2002: 8). Abul Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979), the major Islamist figure in Pakistan, emphasized the study of English but only to have access to the knowledge, and hence the power, of the West.

Going back in time, the Ahl-i-Hadith (called Wahabis), the inveterate enemies of British rule in India in the nineteenth century (Ahmad 1994), did not mind acquiring Western knowledge---especially if it pertained to armaments---because resistance was impossible without power. Some of the Wahabis who had been tried by the British in 1863-65 for anti-British resistance, ‘changed their names, took to learning English and achieved an equal degree of eminence in the new field of their activity’ (Ahmad 1994: 224). One of their leaders, Wilayat Ali, advocated ‘the use of guns and cannons in place of catapults used during the time of Prophet Muhammad against the “canon-firing infidels” (the British)’ (Ibid, 283). This attitude towards modernity---selective adoption for tactical reasons---is common to the Islamists all over the world even now. Fanatical groups, inspired by Islamist thought, such as the al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden are always ready to use modern technology and learn English to acquire it though they remain averse to the Western world view.

In short, there was an ambivalence in the nature of the project of English in Muslim society in South Asia. It was suspected because it was associated with alien values and, therefore, threatened indigenous identity. But, along with it, it was desiderated for pragmatic reasons either leading to assimilation in a quasi-Western mould or remaining rigidly and consciously opposed to it. The suspicion led to disempowerment because modern knowledge is, after all, predominantly in English. The acceptance led to varying degrees of Westernization or a constant awareness of antagonism and the creation of a siege mentality such as Islamists, especially those in the Muslim diaspora in the West, often appear to exhibit.

The State’s Role in Distributing English

The British state in India invested English with social ‘capital’---a term used by the French sociologist Bourdieu (1991:15)--- so that it became the means for acquiring power in the modern domains of employment (administration, judiciary, military, media, commerce, education, corporate sector etc). It also became the marker of sophistication, high social status, good breeding and modern outlook. All these factors facilitated entry in the circles of power created by the British, in elitist clubs, families and informal groups. That is why those who accepted English---the modernist reformist stance---wanted to acquire it as competently as possible. For this, however, they would have to spend much more money than others who studied in vernacular-medium schools. They could also study in the English-medium schools if they belonged to the elite of power---the military and the higher bureaucracy.

In short, English, the coveted cultural capital, was rationed out by the state. It was part of the socialization considered necessary for the Indian chiefs in order to Anglicize them and, thus, alienate them from the concerns of ordinary Indians. This, indeed, was the aim of Captain F.K.M Walter whose vision about establishing an ‘Eton in India’ was part of benevolent imperialism at its cleverest (Mangan 1986: 125-131).

Then there were the European or English-teaching schools administered by the armed forces, the missionaries or otherwise under the patronage of the state (PEI 1918: 185). They charged more fees than ordinary vernacular-medium schools (Rs 156 against Rs. 14 in all institutions from a university to a primary school) and the state itself spent more (Rs. 34 per student per year more than the average spent on ordinary Indian students) on subsidizing elitist education than it did on the education of the masses (Rahman 1996: 53).

This state of affairs continued in Pakistan. English-medium schools expanded with the expansion of the middle class. Private English-medium schools appeared in all the major cities of Pakistan displacing the missionary institutions. The state built cadet colleges whose boards of governors were dominated by the military and the bureaucracy. Though most of the huge budgets of these elitists institutions came from tuition fees, the state gave cadet colleges huge subsidies in the form of land and construction costs and helps them financially even now. Indeed, as the following figures indicate, the cost to the state in the cadet colleges is much more than in the Urdu-medium schools and most colleges.

Box 1
DIFFERENCES IN COSTS IN MAJOR TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (in Pakistani rupees)
Institution	Average cost per student per year	Payer (s)	Cost to the state
Madrassas	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	*Rs. 1.55 in 2001-02 an additional sum of Rs. 28.60 for subsidies on computers, books etc in some madrassas in 2003-04.
Urdu-medium Schools	2264.5 (only tuition)	State	2264.5
Elitist English medium schools	96,000---for ‘A’ level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet colleges/public schools	90,061 (tuition and all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)
Public universities	68,000	Parents + state (parents pay an average of Rs. 13,000 per year)	55,000
Public Colleges (provincial)	9,572	State + parents (parents pay Rs. 1,591 per year on the average).	7,981
Public Colleges (federal)	21,281	Parents pay Rs 2,525 for B.A on the average.	18,756
* The cost per student per year in the madrassas is calculated for all 1,065,277 students reported in 2000. In 2001-02 a sum of Rs. 1,654,000 was given by the government to madrassas which accepted financial help. In 2003-04 Rs. 30.45 million will be given in addition for computerization and modernization of textbooks. However, not all students receive this subsidy as their madrassas refuse government help (these figures are from Khalid 2002: tables 1.17 and 1.19). Source: Data obtained from several institutions.

These privileged schools have often been under attack and the Hamood ur Rahman Commission, set up precisely after one such attack in the form of the student riots of the sixties, did concede that these schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are equal before law’ (Paragraph 15 under right No. VI) (GOP 1966: 13). However, the schools only multiplied and people have taken them for granted and do not even wish for their closure. The fact remains that all educational policies of Pakistan expatiate at length about government vernacular-medium schools dismissing elitist schools-- which are, however, never called ‘elitist’-- in a few lines as private concerns touching very few peoples’ lives. That all students from the upper down to the middle classes actually attend private English-medium schools and the vernacular-medium schools are only for the have-nots, is not addressed in educational policies (for educational policies see Bengali 1999).

Meanwhile English is even more deeply entrenched in Pakistan than ever before. Earlier only the upper level domains of the state used it---the officer corps of the civil service and the armed forces, higher judiciary, universities etc---but now it is also the language of employment in the growing corporate sector, NGOs, media and private educational institutions. Even the colleges and universities, where students from the English and vernacular-medium used to meet after having been educated in separate schools are becoming segregated on the basis of socio-economic class and language. The students from English-medium schools tend to go to expensive private universities which pay better and, therefore, attract academics fluent in English. The government colleges and most public universities, on the other hand, have both students and lecturers from the Urdu-medium schools. The language apartheid which ended in schools now continues in the universities and, as the corporate sector takes employees increasingly from the best private universities, vernacular-medium education leads to low paid jobs or no jobs at all. Thus the army of the unemployed keeps increasing and getting more and more frustrated.

The Acceptance and Assimilation Response in Pakistan

As in British India, the pragmatists want to learn English for empowerment. It is because of this that even lower middle class people send their children to non-elitist English-medium schools. These schools are visible in all localities in the urban areas, even in small towns, and charge tuition fees from Rs. 50 to Rs 1000 per month. According to a census of these schools there were 33,893 of them in 2000 and 78 per cent were primary ones (Census Private 2001). Their students and teachers come from the lower-middle and upper-working classes and, although most subjects are said to be taught in English, the students are not competent in that language when they leave school. Considering that one becomes spontaneous and fluent in English by interacting with an English-speaking peer group and grownups, being exposed to English movies, songs, reading material etc, it is not surprising that students from humble backgrounds hardly achieve greater ease if communication in English than their vernacular-speaking counterparts.

However, rather ironically, English which functions to put and keep these unprivileged students down, is what they aspire for; it is what their dreams are made of. Their response to English is as follows:

Box 2
	Madrassas (N=131)	Sindhi medium schools (N=132)	Urdu medium schools (N=520)	English-medium schools
				elitist (N=97)	Cadet college (N=86)	Ordinary (N=119)
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?
Urdu	43.51	9.09	62.50	4.12	23.26	24.37
English	0.76	33.33	13.65	79.38	67.44	47.06
Mother tongue	0.76	15.15	0.38	2.06	Nil	1.68
Arabic	25.19	Nil	0.19	Nil	Nil	0.84
No response	16.79	37.88	16.54	5.15	Nil	8.40
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?
Yes	10.69	30.30	27.69	72.16	70.93	45.38
No	89.31	63.64	71.15	27.84	29.07	53.78
NR	Nil	6.06	1.15	Nil	Nil	0.84
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?
Yes	49.62	13.64	20.19	2.06	12.79	5.88
No	49.62	84.09	79.04	97.94	86.05	93.28
NR	00.76	2.27	0.77	Nil	1.16	0.84
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored. Source: Rahman 2002: Appendix-14.

The Resistance and Rejection Response

The conservatives, chiefly led by the Islamic ulema in the madrassas, remained resistant to English in Pakistan as they had been in British India. They felt that the demand for English, though couched in pragmatic terms, was really part of the state’s project to ‘colonialize’ Islam (a term used by Jamal Malik 1966). Ayub Khan’s Commission on National Education (GOP 1959) recommended English as the alternative medium of instruction (the other was Arabic) in the madrassas at the secondary level. The ulema opposed these reforms and they ‘were translated into action in a limited way’ (Malik 1996: 128).

Mawlana Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianwi (d. 2000) wrote a critique of the Government of Pakistan’s report for reforming madrassas (GOP 1979). He argued that the educational system established by the British, of which English was an integral element, was meant to undermine Muslim identity. Summing up his views Qasim Zaman, a Pakistani historian, says:

Ludhianwi’s critique of the Report of 1979 makes explicit an issue that is central to all discussion of madrasa reform: the question of religious authority. Any attempt at reform that is perceived to threaten the identity and the authority of the ‘ulama is by definition suspect (Zaman 2002: 79).

The reason for this resistance to reform was not only English. Indeed, as Qasim Zaman argues, the real issues were those of power and identity. The ulema felt, and rightly so, that the reforms would modernize the madrassas by secularizing them and, hence, change their identity altogether (Zaman 2002: 77-79)

Yet, the ulema do not reject the pragmatic value of English altogether. The Ahl-i-Hadith teach it more consistently than the Deobandis, Barelvis and Shias. The ideological baggage of the West is scrupulously removed in some cases---as by the Deobandis---by writing special textbooks in which most lessons are Islamic (Rahman 2002: 314). The teachers who are hired to teach English are closely scrutinized for their ideological proclivities and the students are not exposed to discourses, both electronic and print, originating from liberal Pakistanis or from foreign sources. In 1988, as calculated by the present author, the percentage of students who learnt English in the madrassas was only 2.2 per cent (Rahman 2002: table 29, p. 313).

In a recent report on the madrassas by the Institute of Policy Studies, a think-tank of the Jamat-i-Islami, it is recommended that English should be taught (Khalid 2002: 328 & 353). An earlier report from the same institution also considered this problem and, in principle, agreed with the necessity of learning English. However, Mufti Syed Saiyyah Uddin Kakakhel was of the opinion that English would distract the students from their study of religious subjects so it should be taught after they have finished their religious studies (Kakakhel 1987: 211).

In short, despite some misgiving among the lower level clerics, senior ulema agree with the teaching of English for empowerment, maintaining contact with the South Asian Muslim diaspora, preaching Islam in foreign countries and opening up opportunities of employment for madrassa graduates. The response of these would-be graduates themselves, though we have encountered it earlier in a comparative context, may be considered again.

Box 3
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools?
Urdu	43.51 percentage (out of 131)
English	0.76
Mother tongue	0.76
Arabic	25.19
No response	16.79
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English?
Yes	10.69 percentage (out of 131)
No	89.31
NR	Nil
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished?
Yes	49.62 percentage (out of 131)
No	49.62
NR	00.76
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored. Source: Rahman 2002: Appendix-14.

This means that the students of religious seminaries still remain resistant to English. Indeed, English schools being expensive, the ordinary maulvi, teaching in a madrassa, is neither a product of them nor does he send his children to be educated in them as the following survey indicates:

Box 4 Medium of instruction of Self and children
Madrassas	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Own Medium of Intruction When in School	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Childrens’ Medium of Instruction in School	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)
Source: Annexure ‘A’ section-2

Pragmatic Utilization

The response of the Islamists to English has been mentioned earlier. In Pakistan Syed Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), is undoubtedly the greatest thinker among the Islamists. His orientation towards Islam is revivalist whereas the ulema were conservative. Mawdudi interpreted Islam (submission to God) to mean active submission to God, by which he meant rigorously implementing the teachings of Islam with the aim of establishing the ideal Islamic order’ (Nasr 1996: 57). From this came his emphasis on power---for without power no order, let alone an ideal one, could be established. And to obtain power in the world as presently constituted, it was necessary to learn modern subjects which were mostly in English. But Mawdudi combined this new emphasis in his book Talimat (1974) with heightened Islamic activism. He dwelt on the moral bankruptcy of the West and was, therefore, much more anti-imperialist and political than the ulema whose concerns were mostly theological.

The Jamat-i-Islami teaches English in its madrassas of the Rabta tul Madaris. In the Sanvia Amma (equivalent to matriculation), the English course of this level (10^th class) is offered. In the intermediate class, Sanvia Khasa, the F.A (11 and 12 class) course is taught. English is also taught in the colleges of the Jamat-i-Islami (Khalid 2002: Annexure 7 and interviews of Jamat activists in 2003). In India too, the Jamaat teaches English at the school level (Khalid 2002: Annexure 10).

A number of people themselves educated in government schools and colleges have come increasingly under the Islamist influence either because of the perceived dominance and injustice of Western, especially American, neo-imperialist policies or because of the Pakistani state’s use of Islam for the creation of the Pakistani identity. Such people are very conscious of having been left behind in the world and they seek Islam as a defining feature of their identity. The rule of General Zia ul Haq (1977-1988) has made this section of society more articulate, and perhaps increased their strength in the state apparatus, so that Islamist discourse is much more salient since the eighties than it was before in Pakistan.

One of the activities of Islamists is to create schools which combine modern education with Islam. One such project is the Hira Educational project which teaches sciences and mathematics in English but call themselves English-medium (Rahman 2002: 302-303). Another such chain of schools is the Siqara school system which calls itself English-medium though the present author found that most lessons were being given by the teachers in Urdu in 2000. One principal of a Lahore School had drawn full sleeves and head scarves with his own pen in the pictures of women in English books for use in schools.

It is because of these tendencies that Khalid Ahmed, a well known Pakistani editor and columnist, said that ‘90 per cent’ of the English medium institutions in Pakistan are ‘Islamist institutions’ (Ahmed 1999: 5). While the number may be disputed, it is true that the Islamists are aware that English, because of its global reach and the knowledge in it, is essential for them.

The Jihadi organizations, which practice jihad in order to transform the world, also ran their own schools. Those which are Ahl-i-Hadith in orientation are fundamentalist in the sense that they go back to the fundamental sources of Islam (Quran and Hadith) while the other ulema follow medieval jurists.

English and World View

English, like other languages, comes with normative baggage. The discourses in English, especially social, cultural and literary ones, assume certain distinctive features of ‘normality’---individualism, the nuclear family, individual rights, the desirability of development etc---which may not be considered ‘normal’ elsewhere in the world. The ulema as well as the Islamists fear this normative aspect of the discourses in English. They try to purge the discourses they make available to their students, when they do make them available at all, of precisely these very elements.

The Jihadi schools such as that of the Ad-Da’ wah (Ahl-i-Hadith), which created the now banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba has printed its own textbooks for English. They focus entirely on Islam, as interpreted by the Ahl-i-Hadith, and more on the militant aspect of this interpretation than other things. The preface of Ad Da’ wah Way to English says:

We earnestly desire to enable our students to view Islam as a complete way of life rather than a mere set of rituals (FYG 2002: 64).

However, the young children are introduced to weapons and war in primers (p= pistol. In the Urdu ones t= talwar = sword and r = rocket and so on) (ibid 65). The books instruct teachers to repeat again and again ideas such as that of the necessity of making war with the infidels and using weapons (Ibid 66).

However, it is only very poor children who cannot leave their boarding houses and who are not exposed to the T.V, the radio and Urdu newspapers who are most influenced by their textbooks and teachers. In other cases, many other discourses do have an impact on them and dilute the religious fervour which is sought to be inculcated in them by the Islamic conservatives and the Islamist militants.

Students who are exposed more to English, and hence have better access to discourses created in liberal circles in the Islamic world as well as the West and the rest of the world, do have a radically different world view than their less exposed counterparts. They believe much more in the equality of men and women in society, equal rights and opportunities of work for Muslims and non-Muslims in the country and, generally, oppose militancy in foreign policy. In the context of Pakistan this means that they do not favour either an open war with India or covert militant activities, such as sending guerrillas across the line of control, in Kashmir.

The results of a survey of the opinions of 10^th-11^th class students of elitist English medium schools, cadet colleges, Urdu medium schools and madrassas is given in Annexure B. It is clear that the madrassa students do not favour equal rights for Ahmedis, Hindus and Christians while those from elitist English-medium schools do. Also, students of English-medium schools oppose militant policies in Kashmir while those of the madrassas support them more than all other types of students. As for the equality of men and women according to the Western definition of ‘equality’, once again the madrassa students oppose it while those from the English-medium schools favour it ardently. (See Annexure B).

It should, however, be clarified that the students of elitist English-medium schools are not exposed to English as a subject alone. Nor does exposure mean merely an hour or two of English lessons in the classroom. What it means is listening to English songs, watching English films, watching the T.V with channels such as the CNN and the BBC, reading books written in the West, interaction with similarly exposed members of the peer group and interaction with adults who have travelled abroad. Because of the normative content of the discourses one is exposed to, certain Western concepts such as the rights of women do get internalized in the students of elitist English-medium schools. Their less militant reaction to Kashmir is probably because the idiom of peace disseminated by the Western media---notwithstanding the fact that it is used to justify aggression in the post Nine Eleven world by the United States---has become part of the vocabulary of the English-using classes in Pakistan (and the parents of elitist children come from the affluent classes; see Annexure A). Moreover, Pakistani liberals too oppose war and support peace. It may be because of these reasons that English-medium students oppose militant policies. However, it must never be forgotten that it is the Western educated leadership of Pakistan, both military and civilian, which has created the militaristic policies in which the religious groups joined only in the 1980s and are mostly used as cannon fodder.

In short, what emerges is a scenario of acute polarization between those who are most exposed to English (elitist English-medium school products) and those who are least exposed (madrassa products) to it. As it happens, the first category is also the most affluent while the last is the least (see Annexure A). Thus, the apartheid of language is coterminous with the class division in Pakistani society. Does this mean that class struggle, the rage of the have-nots, is being expressed in Pakistan through the idiom of religion? Qasim Zaman provides evidence that in Jhang the rhetoric against the exploitative landed gentry which happened to be Shia, created the sectarian zeal of the newly launched Sipah-i-Sihaba (Zaman 2002: 120-125). Mawlana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi (1952-90) the pioneer of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, helped common people in the courts (Zaman 2002: 125) as did Maulana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-91) who was known for ‘denouncing them [Shia magnates of the area] for their high-handed dealings with their peasants’ (Ibid 127). It should, however, be mentioned that feudal lords in most parts of Pakistan are Sunnis and there seems to be no organized movement against them. It appears then that the Jhang case is atypical and is seen as being anti-Shia than being anti-feudal by the actors involved in the case. While in this case the militant energies were channeled against rival sects, it is possible that the same energy is also directed at the non-Muslim---Hindu, American, Jewish---‘Other’ outside Pakistan. Even more worrisome is the prospect of this militant energy being used to launch a civil war against Pakistani modernist Muslims and secular people who can all be grouped together under the label of pragmatist acceptors of English. However, such foreboding lies in the realm of the unknown and we will leave them unexplored.

Conclusion

There were three responses to English when the colonial conquest of India introduced it to the Indian Muslims: resistance and rejection (Islamic conservatives); acceptance and assimilation (the secular professional and middle classes); and pragmatic utilization (Islamists). The state, both colonial and Pakistani, created market conditions which made English an expensive product to which the elite of wealth or power had privileged access. As such English became a constructor of the modern, Westernized, secular identity in South Asia. It became a class marker and the basis of a new kind of social division and polarization in society.

English is still unevenly divided with the rich having easier access to it than these down the socio-economic ladder. It is still looked at with misgivings by the Islamic conservatives though, in principle, no significant alim opposes learning it. It is, however, valued as a tool for empowerment by the Islamists and the Islamic militants because it contains technologically useful knowledge. However, primarily because of the Western provenance of discourses in English, the Islamic conservatives and militants teach such restricted courses in English that their students do not become very proficient in it.

The polarization of views on issues such as militancy, tolerance for non-Muslims etc in Pakistan between the products of elitist English-medium schools and madrassas is alarming because it carries the potential of internal violence and even civil war. If exposure to English is increased Western views will gain in strength. If, however, this exposure is restricted the potential for violence will increase as tolerance for the religious ‘Other’ will decrease. Also, as those least exposed to English favour militant policies, the possibility of militant conflict in Kashmir will also increase. The policy on Kashmir, however, is controlled ultimately by the military which is hawkish for nationalistic and not religious reasons. Thus exposure to English is not related in any direct way with the implementation of a policy for peace (as opposed to talking about it). Indeed, most policies and possibilities are not, of course, reducible to only one variable: exposure to English. Even more important is socio-economic class, degree of Westernization and secularization, one’s own personality and so on. However, this one variable has been given attention in this paper because it has not been studied in this context and related to such values as tolerance and militancy.

In short, the solutions one wants will depend upon what kind of world one wants to see. The present author, for instance, opposes the hegemony of Western norms of behaviour encoded in English studies. He also feels that the Pakistan’s real policy, as opposed to the stated one of supporting the national language Urdu, is that of subsidizing the elite in its quest for acquiring English. He emphatically feels that this policy is unjust. It devalues Urdu as well as the other languages of Pakistan and should, therefore, be corrected. However, English should be taught as a subject to all students in a uniform, state-financed, competent system of education. The teaching of good English as a subject need not be the monopoly of English-medium schools only. Indeed, there should be no English-medium schools at all. All schools must teach in the local language, or at least the provincial language, at the primary level and then in Urdu if it is accepted as a link language by all the provinces. But English should be taught in a just manner (i.e. to all students) through texts which expose students to the values of peace, tolerance and respect for rights. These concepts may have been articulated in their present form in Western democracies but they are of universal application. If English is useful in disseminating them then that is an aspect of it which should be valued. In short, instead of allowing English to become a source of class and ideological conflict, it can be made into a source of empowerment and humanitarian improvement for all in Pakistan.

Annexure-A

Monthly Income and Social Mobility of Students and Faculty in Different Educational Institutions in Pakistan

The following information has been collected in response to section 1 of the questionnaire which is given in Annexure-B. These questions are about the income of the family and, in the case of teachers, the medium of instruction of the school which they attended and their children attended.

Section-1: Monthly Income

The figures below give the monthly income of the families of students and faculty as reported by them in our sample. Those who have not written the income, as well as those those who have, have been tabulated separately. The correspondence with socio-economic class, however rough, is as follows:

Working (lower) class = Upto Rs 5000 per month.

Lower middle class = 5001 – 10,000

Middle class = 10,001-20,000

Upper middle class = 20,001 – 50,000

Lower upper class = 50,001 – 100,000

Middle upper class = Above 100,000

The income is for the whole family and not of the individuals earning it. In most cases income of female has not been written presumably because they are housewives and do not get paid. In case their income is written, the family income is calculated by adding their income to the income of the male earning member’s income.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Students

N = 142

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000- 100,000
Pay father	65 of 142 (47.77%)	59 of 77 (76.62%)	10 of 77 (14.86%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	Nil
Pay mother	139 of 142 (97.89%)	02 of 3 (66.66%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and Mother	N.A	1 of 3 (33.33%)	01 of 3 (33.33%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)
Analysis: Most madrassa students belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Teachers

N = 27

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000
Pay self	09 of 27 (33.33%)	13 of 18 (72.22%)	03 of 18 (16.66%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse	26 of 27 (96.30%)	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis: Most madrassa teachers belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Faculty

N = 65

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self	11 of 65 (16.92%)	03 of 54 (5.55%)	22 of 54 (40.74%)	18 of 54 (33.33%)	10 of 54 (15.38%)	01 of 54 (1.85%)	Nil
Pay spouse	55 of 65 (84.62%)	Nil	1 of 10 (10%)	6 of 10 (60%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	Nil	3 of 10 (30%)	04 of 10 (40%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)
Analysis: Most teachers have written their own income but not of their spouses. They fall between middle and upper middle class brackets. When husband and wife both earn, the family goes up in income even going into the lower upper class.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Students

N = 116

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		81 of 116 (69.83%)	Nil	01 of 35 (2.86%)	03 of 35 (8.57%)	18 of 35 (51.43%)	08 of 35 (22.86%)	05 of 35 (14.29%)
Pay mother		101 of 116 (87.07%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	03 of 15 (20%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	08 of 15 (53.33%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	1 of 15 (6.66%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	Nil	04 of 15 (26.66%)	05 of 15 (33.33%)	03 of 15 (20%)
Analysis:	Most of them have not written their parents’ income. Out of those who have most belong to the upper middle class. More than one third belong to the upper classes

Income of Families of Urdu-medium School Students

N = 230

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		95 of 230 (41.31%)	83 of 135 (61.48%)	36 of 135 (26.66%)	13 of 135 (9.63%)	03 of 135 (2.22%)	Nil	Nil
Pay mother		220 of 230 (95.65%)	8 of 10 (80%)	2 of 10 (20%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	2 of 10 (20%)	4 of 10 (40%)	4 of 10 (40%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their fathers’ income but not their mothers’ who are probably housewives. Out of those of who have written, most belong to working class families. About a quarter, however, also belong to the lower middle classes. Very few are above that in income.

Income of the Families of the Faculty of Urdu-medium Schools

N = 100

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		6 of 100 (6%)	17 of 94 (18.09%)	62 of 94 (65.96%)	15 of 94 (15.96%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		82 of 100 (82%)	3 of 18 (16.66%)	06 of 18 (33.33%)	07 of 18 (38.89%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	09 of 18 (50%)	09 of 18 (50%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most earners have written their income but not that of their spouse. Most belong to the lower middle class. Out of the few spouses whose income is reported, a fairly large proportion tend to have middle class incomes and a very small minority even higher than that.

Income of the families of Public School and Cadet College Students

N = 130

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		72 of 130 (55.38%)	Nil	5 of 58 (8.62%)	17 of 58 (29.31%)	33 of 58 (56.90%)	3 of 58 (5.17%)	Nil
Pay mother		111 of 130 (85.39%)	2 of 19 (10.53%)	8 of 19 (42.11%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	5 of 19 (26.32%)	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	Nil	Nil	2 of 19 (10.53%)	11 of 19 (57.89%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their father’s income but not that of their mother. They mostly fall in the upper middle class. Very few of them, however, also fall in the lower upper classes.

Income of the Faculty of Cadet Colleges/Public Schools

N= 51

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		1 of 51 (1.96%)	1 of 50 (2%)	17 of 50 (34%)	28 of 50 (56%)	4 of 50 (8%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		45 of 51 (88.24%)	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their own income but not their wife’s. They fall mostly in the middle class with families, where husband and wife both earn, falling mostly in the upper middle class.

Section-2: Medium of Instruction Showing Social Mobility

Social mobility has been measured in the case of teachers. The only indicators which have been taken into account are (a) the medium of instruction of the teachers themselves when they were students (b) the medium of instruction of their children. As English-medium school are more expensive than Urdu-or Sindhi medium ones, it is assumed that, when people get relatively prosperous, they tend to educate their children in English-medium schools. It should, however , be noted that a large number of non-elitist English-medium schools charging higher tuition fees than government Urdu-medium schools have started functioning in the last twenty years or so. As such the older teachers in this survey could either go to expensive English-medium schools or government Urdu-medium ones. They did not have the option of attending less expensive English-medium schools which their children have.

Own Medium of Instruction When in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges/Public schools	51	01 of 51 (1.96%)	31 of 50 (62%)	19 of 50 (38%)
English-medium schools	65	18 of 65 (27.69%)	10 of 47 (21.28%)	37 of 47 (78.72%)
Madrassas*	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Urdu-medium schools	100@	02 of 100 (2%)	88 of 98 (89.80%)	06 of 98 (6.12%)

*NB: Out of 25 teachers, 2 (8%) wrote Pashto and 2 (8%) wrote Arabic as their medium of instruction.

Childrens’ Medium of Instruction in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges	51	21 of 51 (41.18 %)	03 of 30 (10%)	27 of 30 (90%)
English-medium	65	38 of 65 (58.46%)	1 of 27 (3.70%)	26 of 27 (96.30%)
Madrassas	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)
Urdu-medium@	100	31 of 100 (31%)	36 of 69 (52.17%)	31 of 69 (44.93%)

@NB: The medium of instruction of 1 child (1.16%) and 3 teachers (3.06%) was Sindhi.

Analysis: Upward socio-economic mobility has occurred in the lives of all but madrassa teachers.

Annexure-B

SURVEY 2003

Survey of Schools and Madrassas

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of two research assistants Imran Farid and Shahid Gondal whom I take this opportunity to thank. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, to which I am very grateful.

Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools (3) Cadet Colleges/Public Schools and (4) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:

TEACHERS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Cadet college/public schools	51	Nil	51
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			243

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Cadet college/public schools	130	Nil	130
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			618

As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan.

The ages of the students are as follows:

Institutions	Mean	Mode	Range
Madrassas	19	20	14-27
English-medium schools	14.1	15	13-18
Urdu-medium school	14.4	16	13-20

In the case of the madrassas the range is higher because some of the sanvia class groups had older boys who had joined the seminary late. In the O’level groups both 10^th and 11^th were represented. Urdu-medium schools had only class-10 clusters.

There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.

The questionnaires for students and teachers are reproduced here. Please note that part-2 (on opinions) is exactly the same. Only part-1 is different for both.

QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.

1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D

3. Which subject (s) do you teach?

What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.

What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?

What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?

QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDENTS)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.

1. age.

2. Class

3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?

PART-II

(for both faculty and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools	Govt Colleges (326)	Public Universities (206)	Private Universities (133)
1.	Open War	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92	46.01	34.95	35.34
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00	48.47	55.34	57.89
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08	5.52	9.71	6.77
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08	50.00	46.12	34.59
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00	38.04	43.20	57.14
		Don’t Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92	11.96	10.68	8.27
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15	60.43	58.25	57.14
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92	22.70	28.64	35.34
		Don’t Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92	16.87	13.11	7.52
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54	38.04	38.83	40.60
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92	38.34	49.51	36.84
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54	23.62	11.65	22.56
5.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62	59.20	54.37	69.92
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54	31.90	38.83	21.05
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85	8.89	6.80	9.02
6.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92	72.09	66.99	78.95
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46	21.17	29.13	14.29
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62	6.75	3.88	6.77
7.	Women	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69	65.34	64.56	76.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38	30.98	31.55	17.29
		Don’t Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92	3.68	3.88	6.02

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).
Comparative Chart for Opinions of Faculty Members of Different

Educational Institutions

			Madrassas (27)	Urdu-medium schools (100)	English-medium schools (65)	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools (51)	Govt Colleges (127)	Private Universities (44)	Public Universities (127)
1.	Open War	Yes	70.37	20	26.15	19.61	20.47	20.45	14.17
		No	22.22	70	64.62	68.63	68.50	63.64	77.17
		Don’t Know	7.41	10	9.23	11.76	11.02	15.91	8.66
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	59.26	19	38.46	39.22	18.11	34.09	25.98
		No	26.63	68	50.77	52.94	63.78	45.45	62.99
		Don’t Know	11.11	13	10.77	7.84	18.11	20.45	11.02
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	29.63	85	60.00	66.66	77.17	68.18	75.59
		No	66.67	10	33.85	19.61	13.39	18.18	18.11
		Don’t Know	3.70	5	6.15	13.73	9.45	13.64	6.30
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	3.70	27	43.07	29.41	32.28	59.09	50.39
		No	96.23	65	36.92	62.75	52.76	29.55	34.65
		Don’t Know	NIL	8	20.00	7.84	14.96	11.36	14.96
5.	Hindus	Yes	14.81	37	61.54	60.78	41.73	68.18	66.14
		No	85.19	58	26.15	35.29	48.03	22.73	25.98
		Don’t Know	NIL	5	12.31	3.92	10.24	9.09	7.87
6.	Christians	Yes	18.52	52	81.54	60.18	59.06	75.00	68.50
		No	77.77	42	10.77	33.33	32.28	15.91	24.41
		Don’t Know	3.70	6	7.69	5.88	8.66	9.09