1. Introduction
Language policy is the systematic manipulation of language in pursuance of certain state-, or society-, driven goals. It has also been called language planning, language engineering (Miller 1950) language development, (Noss 1967) language management (Jernudd and Neustupny 1986) and language treatment (Neustupny 1970) Sometimes language policy refers merely to overall policy while planning refers to what linguists do i.e. creating scripts, writing grammars, preparing new words etc.
For the purposes of this paper, language policy (LP) refers only to overall policy and not to the means of implementing it. In short, it takes into account political goals of politicians, bureaucrats and other wielders of powers and not to the specific products of this overall policy (i.e. grammars, dictionaries, means of disseminating languages etc).
In this paper, then, the goals of language policy will be defined in a small theoretical section. The subsequent, larger section will focus on Pakistan to understand the consequences of language policy.
The aim of policy is to increase the power of a given group or individual. In a small village the feudal lord may pursue a policy of intimidating his peasants so as to retain, consolidate, or increase his power. Others may react to this by policies of their own: passive acquiescence, co-optation, resistance or migration.
Since power is the capacity to obtain gratifications of a tangible or intangible kind (Rahman 1996: 8 and 2002: 39), it is not possible for any human being not to desire power. Even insane persons desire gratification however wrong their perception of what will bring enduring or long-term gratification may be. Thus, all policy is a conscious and systematic effort to increase power and, hence, the capacity for obtaining gratifications.
The state is an institution which concentrates maximum legalized power in itself. Hence, it tries to ensure that this power is retained, consolidated, and increased. All policies, including language policy, is to facilitate this.
We are not concerned here how this power is used and whether it is good or bad or a mixture of both. It may be used in the interests of citizens or only of a clique or some institutions. That is not the point at issue just now. The point is that this power should appear as legal, legitimate, authority and not as coercion. Hence the state aims at creating policies which should legitimize their hold on power. Education and language create discourses for this legitimization. However, these are not the only things they do as we shall see.
In Robert L-Cooper’s book on language planning three kinds of planning activities are mentioned (1) Status Planning (2) Corpus Planning (3) Acquisition Planning (Cooper 1989: 31). Other theoreticians have created different labels for such policies and the activities related to them but for our purposes these are adequate. However, we must distinguish between the policy aspects of these phenomena and the processes and activities associated with them.
Status planning, for instance, is always a policy matter. It is the state which decides whether a language will be given the status of a national or an official language. Ethnic or other dissident groups might contest this but both the policy and the resistance to it are ultimately related to policies---to the distribution of power or the ideology which goes with this power. Corpus planning follows from policy. The state, for instance, decides that it will use the Arabic rather than the Roman script for reasons of identity. It decides that it will use such and such variety of the language in the domains of power or that, in coining new words, care will be taken that the roots of words reflect identity. After these policy decisions linguists or others actually write primers, grammars, dictionaries which are not part of policy. They are the products of policies and might influence the policy but are themselves dependent on policies.
Acquisition planning refers to spreading a language among the citizens of a country, a diaspora or foreigners. Again, while the policy of spreading it (and to whom? at what level? with what resources? for how long?) is political, the actual techniques and methods of dissemination are in the domains of teachers, administrators, media experts and bureaucrats.
In short, while the indication of preferences or goals are part of policy exactly what to do and how are not. So, while language policies can be, and are, made by powerful decision-makers they are carried out by others. In the case of language policies, those who carry them out are linguists, language planners, teachers, educationists, media persons and bureaucrats. Let us now turn to Pakistan in order to see what language policies have been and what their consequences are.
There have been statements about language policy in various documents in Pakistan---the different versions of the constitution, statements by governmental authorities in the legislative assembly debates, and, above all, in the various documents relating to education policy which have been issued almost by every government. These are stated in the 1973 constitution as follows:
(1) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu, and arrangements shall be made for its being used for official and other purposes within fifteen years from the commencing day.
(2) Subject to clause (1) the English language may be used for official purposes until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.
(3) Without prejudice to the status of the National language, a Provincial Assembly may be law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language (Article 251).
The national language is Urdu (it was Urdu and Bengali from 1955 till 1971 when East Pakistan became Bangladesh) though it is, and has always been, the mother-tongue of a minority of the population of Pakistan. This minority came from India, mostly after the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and is called Mohajir (refugee or immigrant).
The rationale for this privileging of Urdu, as given by the government of Pakistan, is that Urdu is so widely spread that it is almost like the first language of all Pakistanis. Moreover, since most jobs are available through Urdu, it is only just that all children should be given access to it. Above all, it is a symbol of unity and helps in creating a unified ‘Pakistan’ identity. In this symbolic role, it serves the political purpose of resisting ethnicity which would otherwise break the federation. As for the provision that other Pakistani languages may be used, it is explained that the state, being democratic and sensitive to the rights of the federating units, allows the use of provincial languages if desired.
As for the medium of instruction, the rationale is that Urdu, the most widespread urban language, is the one which is used for teaching. As English is useful being the official and international language, it too is taught at the higher levels especially to those who seek to study science and technology.
The Political Consequences of the
Privileging of Urdu.
The major consequence to the privileging of Urdu has been ethnic resistance to it. As mention before, Urdu is not the mother tongue of most Pakistan as the following figures bear out.
Box 1 |
|
|
Pakistani Languages |
|
|
Language |
Percentage of Speakers |
|
Punjabi |
44.15 per cent |
|
Pashto |
15.42 per cent |
|
Sindhi |
14.10 per cent |
|
Siraiki |
10.53 per cent |
|
Urdu |
7.57 per cent |
|
Balochi |
3.57 per cent |
|
Others |
4.66 per cent |
|
Source: Census 2001: 107 |
|
However, Urdu is indeed the most widely understood language and perhaps the major medium of interaction in the urban areas of the country, Even ethnic activists agree that it could be a useful link language between different ethnic groups. However, it has been resisted because it has been patronized, often in insensitive ways, by the ruling elite of the centre.
The story of this patronization is given in detail in several books (see Rahman 1996) but it always fell short of what the more ardent supporters of Urdu demanded (for their position see Abdullah 1976). In the beginning, since a very powerful section of the bureaucracy spoke Urdu as a mother-tongue (being Mohajirs), there was an element of cultural hegemony about the privileging of Urdu. The Mohajir elite’s position, stated or implied, was that they were more cultured than the speakers of the indigenous languages of Pakistan. Hence it was only natural that Urdu should be used in place of the ‘lesser’ languages. This position, with which we are familiar through the works of linguists who oppose the arrogance of monolingual English speakers (see the following authors for such arrogance in other contexts Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Crystal 2000: 84-88; Nettle and Romaine 2000) created much resentment against Urdu and, indeed, may be said to have infused the element of personal reaction to or antagonism against the speakers of Urdu in the first twenty years of Pakistan’s existence.
The main reason for opposition to Urdu was, however, not merely linguistic nor even cultural. It was because Urdu was the symbol of the central rule of the Punjabi ruling elite that it was opposed in the provinces. The use of Urdu as an ethnic symbol is given in detail in Rahman (1996) but a brief recapitulation of major language movements may be useful.
The most significant consequence of the policy that Urdu would be the national language of Pakistan was its opposition by the Bengali intelligentsia or what the Pakistani sociologist Hamza Alavi calls the ‘salariat’ ---people who draw salaries from the state (or other employers) and who aspire for jobs (Alavi 1987). One explanation is that the Bengali salariat would have been at a great disadvantage if Urdu, rather than Bengali, would have been used in the lower domains of power (administration, judiciary, education, media, military etc). However, as English was the language of the higher domains of power and Bengali was a ‘provincial’ language, the real issue was not linguistic. It was that the Bengali salariat was deprived of its just share in power at the centre and even in East Bengal where the most powerful and lucrative jobs were controlled by the West Pakistani bureaucracy and the military. Moreover, the Bengalis were conscious that money from the Eastern wing, from the export of jute and other products, was predominantly financing the development of West Pakistan or the army which, in turn, was West Pakistani- (or, rather, Punjabi-) dominated (HBWI: 1982: Vol 6: 810-811; Jahan 1972). The language, Bengali, was a symbol of a consolidated Bengali identity in opposition to the West Pakistani identity. This symbol was used to ‘imagine’, or construct, a unified Bengali community as communities, such as nations, were constructed through print language and other unifying devices in Europe (Anderson 1983).
In Sindh, Balochistan, the N.W.F.P and South Western Punjab the languages used as identity symbol were Sindhi, Balochi and Brahvi, Pashto and Siraiki. The mobilization of people, especially the intelligentsia, as a pressure group which became possible through these language made them powerful ethnic symbols (Rahman 1996). However, Urdu was not resented or opposed much except in Sindh where there were language riots in January 1971 and July 1972 (Ahmed 1992). But even in Sindh the crucial issue was of power. The Mohajirs were dominant in the urban areas and the rising Sindhi salariat resented this. The most evocative symbol to mobilize the community was language and it was this which was used.
Apart from the riots, peoples real conduct remains pragmatic. The Mohajirs, knowing that they can get by without learning Sindhi, do not learn it except in rural areas where it is necessary for them. The Sindhis, again because they know they cannot get by without learning Urdu, do learn it (Rahman 2002: Chapter 10).
In short, the privileging of Urdu by the state has created ethnic opposition to it. However, as people learn languages for pragmatic reasons (Rahman 2002: 36), they are giving less importance to their languages and are learning Urdu. This phenomenon, sometimes called ‘voluntary shift’, is not really ‘voluntary’ as the case of the native Hawaiians, narrated by Daniel Nettle and Suzanne Romaine, illustrates (Nettle and Romaine 2000: 94-97). What happens is that market conditions are such that one’s language becomes deficit on what Bierre Boundieu, the French Sociologist, would call cultural ‘capital’ (Bourdieu 1991: ). Instead of being an asset it becomes a liability. It prevents are from rising in society. In short, it is ghettoizing. Then, people become ashamed of it as the Punjabis, otherwise a powerful majority in Pakistan, have done (Mansoor 1993: 49-54). Or, even if language movements and ethnic pride does not make them ashamed of their languages, they do not want to teach them to their children because that would be overburdening the children with for too many languages. For instance, Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Khan (1864-1937) reported in 1932 that the Pashtuns wanted their children to be instructed in Urdu rather than Pashto (LAD-F 12 October 1932: 132). And even this year (2003), the MMA government has chosen Urdu, not Pashto, as the language of the domains of power, including education, in the N.W.F.P. In Boluchistan too the same phenomenon was noticed. Balochi, Brahvi and Pashto were introduced as the compulsory medium of instruction in government schools in 1990 (LAD-Bal 21 June and 15 April 1990). The language activists enthusiastically prepared instructional material but on 8 November 1992, these languages were made optional and parents switched back to Urdu (Rahman 1996: 169). Such decisions amount to endangering the survival of minor language and they devalue even major ones but they are precisely the kind of policies which have created what is often called ‘Urdu imperialism’ in Pakistan.
In short, the state’s use of Urdu as a symbol of national integration has had two consequences. First, it has made Urdu the obvious force to be resisted by ethnic groups. This resistance makes them strengthen their languages by corpus planning (writing books, dictionaries, grammars, orthographies etc) and acquisition planning (teaching languages, pressurizing the state to teach them, using them in the media). But paradoxically, as Urdu spreads through schooling, media and urbanization, pragmatic pressures make the other Pakistani languages retreat. In the Northern Areas, after the opening of a major road (the KKH), Urdu and English have made the local languages (Shina, Burushaski, Batti etc) retreat to the home. In short, in the absence of a policy to actively promote the other languages---merely saying that the provinces can use them is not enough---all of Pakistans numerous language (see Annexure 1) are under pressure. Only by using them in the domains of power would include people to learn them. And only them would teaching them in schools be acceptable to the people. In short, the consequence of privileging Urdu strengthens ethnicity while, at the same time and paradoxically, threatens linguistic and cultural diversity in the country.
English was supposed to continue as the official language of Pakistan till such time that the national language (s) did not replace it. However, this date came and went by as many other dates before it and English is as firmly entrenched in the domains of power in Pakistan as it was in 1947. The major reason for this is that this is the stated but not the real policy of the ruling elite in Pakistan. The real policy can be understood with reference to the elite’s patronage of English in the name of efficiency, modernization and so on.
To begin with the civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) was an Anglicized body of men who had mounded themselves in the tradition of the British. The officer corps of the armed forces as Stephen P. Cohen suggests, was also Anglicized. It was, in his words, the ‘British generation’ which dominated the army till 1971 (Cohen 1994: 162-163). It is understandable that members of this elite had a stake in the continuation of English because it differentiated them from the masses; gave them a competitive edge over those with Urdu-medium or traditional (madrassa) education; and, above all, was the kind of cultural capital which had snob value and constituted a class-identity marker. What is less comprehensible is why members of these two elites, who now come increasingly from the lower-middle and middle classes who have studied in Urdu-medium schools (or schools which are called English-medium but teach mostly in Urdu), should also want to preserve, and indeed strengthen, the hegemony of English---a language which has always been instrumental in suppressing their class?
The answer lies in the fact that the elite has invested in a parallel system of elitist schooling of which the defining feature is teaching all subjects, other than Urdu, through the medium of English. This has created new generations, and ever increasing pools, of young people who have a direct stake in preserving English. All the arguments which applied to a small Anglicized elite of the early generation of Pakistan now applies to young aspirants who stand ready to enter the ranks of this elite. And their parents, themselves not at ease in English, have invested far too much in their children’s education to seriously consider decreasing the cultural capital and weightage of English.
Moreover, most people think in terms of present-day realties which they may be critical of at some level but which they take as permanent facts of life. This makes them regard all change as utopian or suspiciously radical activities. To think of abolishing English is one such disquieting thought because, at least for the last century and a half, the people of this part of the world have taken the ascendancy of English for granted. In recent years with more young people from the affluent classes appearing in the British O’ and A’ level examinations; with the world-wide coverage of the BBC and the CNN; with globalization and the talk about English being a world language; with stories of young people emigrating all over the world armed with English---with all these things English is a commodity in more demand than ever before.
The present author carried out a survey of 1085 students from different schools in Pakistan in 1999-2000. The results of this survey regarding English are reproduced below:
Box 2 |
||||||
|
|
Madrassas (N=131) |
Sindhi medium schools (N=132) |
Urdu medium schools (N=520) |
English-medium schools |
||
|
elitist (N=97) |
Cadet college (N=86) |
Ordinary (N=119) |
||||
|
1. What should be the medium of instruction in schools? |
||||||
|
Urdu |
43.51 |
9.09 |
62.50 |
4.12 |
23.26 |
24.37 |
|
English |
0.76 |
33.33 |
13.65 |
79.38 |
67.44 |
47.06 |
|
Mother tongue |
0.76 |
15.15 |
0.38 |
2.06 |
Nil |
1.68 |
|
Arabic |
25.19 |
Nil |
0.19 |
Nil |
Nil |
0.84 |
|
No response |
16.79 |
37.88 |
16.54 |
5.15 |
Nil |
8.40 |
|
2. Do you think higher jobs in Pakistan should be available in English? |
||||||
|
Yes |
10.69 |
30.30 |
27.69 |
72.16 |
70.93 |
45.38 |
|
No |
89.31 |
63.64 |
71.15 |
27.84 |
29.07 |
53.78 |
|
NR |
Nil |
6.06 |
1.15 |
Nil |
Nil |
0.84 |
|
3. Should English-medium schools be abolished? |
||||||
|
Yes |
49.62 |
13.64 |
20.19 |
2.06 |
12.79 |
5.88 |
|
No |
49.62 |
84.09 |
79.04 |
97.94 |
86.05 |
93.28 |
|
NR |
00.76 |
2.27 |
0.77 |
Nil |
1.16 |
0.84 |
|
Note: The results do not add up to 100 in some cases because those choosing two or more languages have been ignored. Source: Rahman 2002: Appendix-14. |
||||||
These results suggest that 16 year-old students of matriculation (or equivalent level) in Pakistani schools are not in favour of English as the medium of instruction in schools except in English-medium schools. In the other schools they suffer because of English and, therefore, do not favour it. When they grow up and enter elitist positions their investment in English, which now becomes the language of schooling of their children, grows and they no longer support policies which would replace English with other languages.
However, paradoxically, even school students do not support the abolition of English-medium schools. Perhaps this seems too radical, visionary and impractical to them. Perhaps they feel that English-medium schools provide good quality education and should remain available for the modernization of the country. Or perhaps they understand that such schools are a ladder out of the ghetto of their socio-economic class to a privileged class which their siblings or children might make use of. In short, it is probably their pragmatism and a shrewd realization that nothing is going to change that they want the English-medium schools to keep flourishing.
Ahmar Mahboob, a researcher on English, asked questions on English from 255 informants in 1998. Out of these were 245 students of Karachi University from different faculties. There were also 10 teachers of English. The results of this survey are as follows:
Box 3 |
|||
|
Question |
No of Respondents |
Yes |
No |
|
Is it important to study English? |
255 |
98.8% |
1.2% |
|
Should English be the medium of instruction for primary education? |
250 |
76% |
24% |
|
Should English be the medium of instruction for high school education? |
248 |
94.4% |
5.6% |
|
Should English be the medium for university education? |
250 |
94.4% |
5.6% |
|
Source: Mahboob 2003: 17 |
|||
As these are university students about to enter the job market and, therefore, acutely aware of the advantages of English ‘they believe that the only way to achieve success in education and in life is to study (in) English’ (Mahboob 2003: 22).
As mentioned earlier, the British colonial government and its successor Pakistani government has rationed out English. Its stated policy was to support Urdu but that was only to create a subordinate bureaucracy at low cost (vernacular-medium education costs less than English-medium education). It was also to keep an anti-ethnic, centrist, ideological symbol potent and vibrant in the country.
The armed forces, better organized than any other section of society, created cadet colleges from the nineteen fifties onwards. These schools, run on the lines of the elitist British public schools, were subsidized by the state. In the 1960s when students from ordinary colleges, who came by and large from vernacular-medium schools, protested against these bastions of privilege, the government appointed a commission to investigate into their grievances. The report of this commission agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are equal before low’ (Paragraph 15 under Right No. Vl of the 1962 Constitution). However, the commission was also convinced that these schools would produce suitable candidates for filling elitist positions in the military and the civilian sectors of the country’s services (GOP 1966: 18). This meant that the concern for equality was merely a legal nicety. And this, indeed, was what happened. Today the public schools are as well-entrenched in the educational system of the country as ever before. The total spending is as follows:
Box 4 |
|||||
|
Cadet college |
Budget |
Average monthly tuition Fees |
Part of the budget covered by fees |
Number of students |
Total cost per student per year |
|
Kohat |
19,981,217 |
4,701 |
44% (8,785,923) |
575 |
34,750 |
|
Larkana |
23,176,006 |
550 |
95% (22,017,205) |
480 |
56,617 |
|
Pitaro |
71,720,000 |
6000 |
80% (57,376,000) |
700 |
1,02,457 |
|
Lawrence |
98,886,181 |
2000 |
18.19% (17,987,396) |
711 |
1,39,080 |
|
Hassanabdal |
48,223,000 |
1350 |
12.75% (6,148,433) |
480 |
100,465 |
|
Mastung |
36,300,000 |
2200 |
15.75% (5,500,000) |
360 |
100834 |
|
Source: Offices of the respective institutions except for the cost per student per year which was obtained by dividing the total budget by the number of students. |
|||||
The total expenditure is not covered by tuition fees. The cadet colleges report subsidies from the provincial government, grants by visiting dignitaries and free gifts of various kinds from old boys and officials of the state.
The spending on other educational institutions is as follows:
|
Box 5 |
|||
|
DIFFERENCES
IN COSTS IN MAJOR TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (in Pakistani
rupees) |
|||
|
Institution
|
Average
cost per student per year |
Payer
(s) |
Cost
to the state |
|
Madrassas |
5,714 (includes board and lodging) |
Philanthropists + religious organizations |
Very little as subsidy on computers, books etc in some madrassas |
|
Urdu-medium Schools |
2264.5 (only tuition) |
State |
2264.5 |
|
Elitist English medium schools |
96,000---for ‘A’ level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition) |
Parents |
None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments. |
|
Cadet colleges/public schools |
90,061 (tuition and all facilities). |
Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school |
14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only) |
|
Public universities |
68,000 |
Parents + state (parents pay an average of Rs. 13,000 per year) |
55,000 |
|
Public Colleges (provincial) |
9,572 |
State + parents (parents pay Rs. 1,591 per year on the average). |
7,981 |
|
Public Colleges (federal) |
21,281 |
Parents pay Rs 2,525 for B.A on the average. |
18,756 |
|
Source: Data obtained from several institutions. |
|||
In short, Pakistan’s ruling elite is an ally of the forces of globalization at least as far as the hegemony of English, which globalization promotes, is concerned. The major effect of this policy is to weaken the local languages and lower their status even in their home country. This, in turns, militates against linguistic and cultural diversity; weakens the ‘have-nots’ even further and increases poverty by concentrating the best paid job in the hands of the international elite and the English-using elite of the peripheries.
We have seen that the language policies of Pakistan, declared and undeclared, have increased both ethnic and class conflict in the country. Moreover, our Westernized elites, in their own interests, are helping the forces of globalization and threatening cultural and linguistic diversity. In this process they are impoverishing the already poor and creating much resentment against the oppression and injustice of the system. The symbols and idiom of Islam which is seen as an untried force of equity and justice. If this takes the form of overt conflict, as reaction to globalization and elite exploitation may in other parts of the world, Pakistan will become a conflict-prone country. If this is to be avoided more just and people-friendly language policies should be made and implemented.
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