Dr. Tariq Rahman

THE IMPACT OF NINE ELEVEN ON PAKISTAN

1. Introduction

On the 11th of September 2001 at about 9 a.m. Eastern Time (U.S.A) two aircrafts crashed into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center one after the other. Another aircraft crashed into the Pentagon and yet another crashed in Pennsylvania without, however, destroying any building. An unbelieving world watched in horror as television screens showed death, destruction and trauma on a scale unknown in terrorist attacks in the world till then. There were rumours of more than 6,000 deaths but in the end they turned out to be over 3,000---still a shockingly large number! (see Der Spiegel 2001).

This event, called Nine Eleven now, had an impact on the whole world. For one thing, the United States declared war on ‘terrorism’. As this act was blamed on Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network called Al-Qaeda, the U.S attacked Afghanistan’s Taliban regime which had been shielding Osama. This was the beginning of the new century’s American wars which are still going on. These wars have had direct and indirect effects which are making the world a different place than it was before Nine Eleven.

2. Objective

The objective of this article is to study the effects of Nine Eleven on Pakistan with a view to understanding in what directions Pakistan’s policies are moving and in what way they can lead to peace and security for all. In the end some suggestions are given as to how the West, especially the European Union, can help to achieve peace and stability.

3. The Effects of Nine Eleven on the World

There are numerous books, articles, websites and electronic media programmes devoted to the analysis of the effects of Nine Eleven on the world. One can sum them up in Fred Halliday’s words:

The crisis unleashed by the events of 11 September is one that is global and all-encompassing. It is global in the sense that it binds many different countries into conflict, most obviously the USA and parts of the Muslim world. It is encompassing in that, more than any other international crisis yet seen, it affects a multiplicity of life’s levels, political, economic, cultural and psychological (Halliday 2002: 31).

Above all, Nine Eleven is an event of the age of globalization. In no other age could the events in one country, however traumatic, would have been known by or influenced the lives of people all over the world. And, for that matter, in no other age would any group of people react to the policies of another in such a manner. This, indeed, is a new kind of violence and counter-violence; the curse of a globalized, technological world which has the power to destroy itself but not the wisdom to avoid it.

First, Nine Eleven created a pervasive atmosphere of fear. Terrorism, which has been present even in its modern version of young men killing innocent civilians, became a fearful reality all over the world (Karagoc 2002). Then the reaction to it---the wars, on Afghanistan and then Iraq by the U.S.A---brought much violence to the Muslim world. Nine Eleven was, indeed, the ‘New Terrorism’ and it was associated with radical Islam of which Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda became the prominent symbol in Western consciousness. As Afghanistan was bombed into submission; Saddam Hussain was shown in humiliating captivity on T. V screens in the last days of 2003; Libya and Iran gave in to American bellicosity and agreed to open their nuclear programmes; and Pakistan allowed its leading nuclear scientists to be interrogated (January 2004)---it appeared that colonialism had come full cycle. The Islamic world’s leaders had succumbed to the West and resistance could only be the prerogative of rogue elements, dissident groups and suicidal Islamist cadres.

This new alignment of the West with the leaders of the Muslim world strengthened right wing and oppressive forces of the state everywhere. Moreover, in the Western democracies too the right wing forces became ascendant. Not only in America did the neo-Conservatives begin to dominate policy making but almost everywhere the imperatives of security made the rights and freedoms won during the last two centuries become diluted. (as in Guatanomo Bay where America keeps prisoners without access to law). As human rights and anti-war groups protested against any curtailment of human rights, including the imposition of a war, the idea of a unilateral pre-emptive strike on another country was accepted as a reality by the world. However, much to their credit, the French and German governments did oppose the war on Iraq.

In short, Nine Eleven has created an unstable would; a world in which security is much sought after but remains elusive. The world has changed and, it would appear, for the worse.

4. Review of Literature

There are some writings on the direct effects of Nine Eleven on Pakistan’s policies regarding (1) Afghanistan (2) Kashmir (3) the Economy (4) Internal Security. Rodney W. Jones considers both the first two policies pointing out that they have changed because they were no longer sustainable in a post-Nine Eleven World. He then goes on to analyze the danger of nuclear conflict in South Asia pointing out that ‘the most hopeful development during the India. Pakistan confrontation was the dawning realization in the international community that the process of resolving the Kashmir problem must begin soon’ (Jones 2003: 99).

Another book, edited by Moonis Ahmar, looks at a number of issues such as a Pakistani perspective (Cheema 2003: 53-87); the link between terrorism and Islamic extremism (Ahmed 2003: 88-103); and the effects of Nine Eleven on the economy of the country (Siddiqui 2003: 219-252). Yet another book, this time focusing on Afghanistan in relation to Nine Eleven, is called The Anatomy of a Conflict: Afghanistan and 9/11 (Hussain et. al. 2002). In this Julie Storrs’ last chapter ‘Has the War Been Won?’ is perhaps more relevant now that Taliban elements are reported be gaining strength in Afghanistan now than it was when it was written.

As far as the internal security of Pakistan is concerned a number of accounts, some dramatic and personal each as Marianne Pearl’s moving account of her journalist husband David Pearl’s abduction and death (Pearl 2003) have been written. There are also many stories in the press, both in Pakistan and abroad, about the attacks on Western (or simply Christian) targets in Pakistan since Nine Eleven.

In Short, there is enough writing on the direct effects which will, therefore, be touched upon only briefly in this article. As there is little writing on what may be called the indirect effects---the effect on the worldview of Pakistanis, polarization in Pakistani society and what is called the military-mullah relationship---it will be these which will be the focus of this article. This will also be done because the author of this article, having carried out a survey of the opinions of students on some crucial variables which constitute worldview, is in a position to offer something not available elsewhere.

5. The Direct Effects of Nine Eleven on Pakistan

Let us look at the four variables mentioned earlier---the Afghanistan policy, the Kashmir policy, the state of the economy and internal security---one by one.

5.1 The Afghan Policy

The Taliban (students of religious seminaries or madranas in Afghanistan) were welcomed when they emerged as first in 1994 (Rashid 2001; Yusufzai 2002; Griffin 2001). Pakistan needed someone to open up routes for its convoys which were stopped and made to pay toll tax by so many armed warlords that it was no longer profitable to use the Afghan land route to Central Asia. Later, the Pakistani military felt that Afghanistan could give it the ‘strategic depth’ ---a term used by General Aslam Beg---which Pakistan with its little width lacked. Moreover, Pakistani governments also felt that the Durand Line, the British-demarcated border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be recognized and Afghanistan would not have any more irredentist claims on Pakistan’s North West frontier Province (Hussain 2002: 182-183).

With these aims in mind, the Pakistani government had been the staunchest supporter of the Taliban till Nine Eleven. On 13 September Colin Powell provided a list of concrete demands to General Musharraf. Two days later he confirmed that these had been accepted and they pertained to military action against Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden was still hiding. This was the turning point of Pakistan’s Afghan policy.

On 19 September General Musharraf gave a televised speech in which be declared:

It is not a question of bravery or cowardice. But bravery without thinking is stupidity…We have to save our interests. Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary…Let me say that I am concerned about Afghanistan and the Taliban. I have tried my best, but sadly without much success…(Pakistan Television).

From this time onwards, it was clear that the days of the Taliban were numbered. On October 7 the United States began its military strikes in Afghanistan while the Islamic parties came out on the streets protecting against the American action and also condemning General Musharraf’s change of policy. However, the protests were confined to a small ultra-religious fringe and did not catch the imagination of the people in general. As such the government remained in control of the situation.

5.2 The Kashmir Policy

The war in Afghanistan was hardly over when, on 13 December 2001, the Indian parliament was attacked by terrorists. India blamed Pakistan and brought troops on Pakistan’s borders where they remained till October 2002. Whatever India’s domestic compulsions might be---Pervez Iqbal Cheema enumerates many (Ahmar 2003: 81-82)---the message that terrorism would not be tolerated in the post-Nine Eleven world became clear. Seeing this General Musharraf gave a historic speech on 12 January 2002 banning those religious groups which were seen as being terrorists; declared that Pakistan would not let its soil be used for terrorists activities; and held out the olive branch to India.

This too was seen as a reversal, or at least an apparent reversal, of an earlier militant policy--that of abetting or helping religious militants to cross the line of control into Indian held Kashmir to carry out how intensity guerrilla war with the occupying Indian army. The groups which had been most implicated in Kashmir were that Jaish-e-Mohammad and the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. These were banned with Maulana Masood Azhar) the head of the Jaish, and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, head of the Lashkar, in detention for some time.

5.3 Economic Policies

The immediate effect of Nine Eleven was that the American and European governments started cracking down upon the illegal movement of money across the globe. It was this which made Pakistanis start switching away from the informal hundi and hawala system to regular banks. The hundi and hawala works by agents collecting foreign exchange in the country of origin and telling their contacts in Pakistan to give rupees in exchange for these amounts. This deprives the state of foreign exchange though people get richer in rupees. It was this system which was disrupted after Nine Eleven so that the State Bank of Pakistan started accumulating foreign exchange. There are two views about these economic changes: the ‘rosy’ view and the ‘dark’ one. Let us take them one by one.

5.3.1 The Rosy Picture

The rosy view takes the accumulation of dollars in the state’s banking system calling it a product of good policies which were adopted in the wake of Nine Eleven. It is true, of course, that at least some of the increse in foreign exchange reserves was because of the changed American attitude towards the country. After the May 1998 nuclear blasts and then the October 1999 military coup Pakistan was under sanctions. These were now lifted and the United States announced that over one billion U. S. dollars were to be given to Pakistan. Moreover additional loans and rescheduling of previously contracted loans was also announced. The U. S. realized that it was necessary to avert the economic crisis in Pakistan otherwise, combined with resistance to Musharraf’s policies, Pakistan could be destabilized (Congress 2002: 6-7).

The State Bank of Pakistan report released on October 29, 2001 observed that lifting of the economic sanctions by the U. S and the G-7 countries and other measures adopted by foreign countries would have a positive impact on the economy (SBP 2001: 5). The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2002-2003 states:

A strong build up of foreign exchange reserves has been the most important achievements of the outgoing fiscal year. During July-May 2002-2003, the country has added $ 4.279 billion in its reserves and on May 30, 2003 the total foreign exchange reserves stood at $ 10.513 billion---sufficient to finance 11 months of imports. The current fiscal year began with a total foreign exchange reserves of $ 6.234 billion, of which $ 4,308 billion was held by the State Bank of Pakistan and $ 1.926 billion was held by banks (other than SBP). The SBP’s net reserves rose to $ 9.314 billion on May 30, 2003---an addition of $ 5.0 billion but at the same time the reserves held by banks declined by $ 0.727 billion. Thus, the net accumulation of reserves amounted to $ 4.279 billion during the current fiscal year until May 30, 2003 (GOP 2003: viii).

As mentioned earlier, most of this increase is because of the direct remittances in foreign exchange than any real change in the volume of remittances themselves.

However, there were some negative repercussions also. Orders were cancelled and, especially because of Daniel Pearl’s murder and attacks on churches and the confrontation with India, foreign investors shied away from Pakistan. According to Dr. Ishrat Hussain, Governor State Bank of Pakistan:

September 11, 2001 made Pakistan the front line state in the War against terrorism and inflicted a lot of damage to the economy including cancellation of export orders (Hussain 2002).

Despite these defences of economic performance and in the face of the improvement of some macro economic indicators, the economic performance of the country belies the optimism in the following words of Shahid Hasan Siddiqui:

Pakistan would successfully meet the challenge of post-September 11 events including the challenges that have emerged in the post- U.S-Iraq war or a subsequent change in attitudes of the U. S and the IFIs (Siddiqui 2003: 252)

This brings us to what called the ‘dark’ picture of economic changes in this period.

5.3.2 The Dark Picture

In reality, poverty has been steadily increasing and by 2001 the percentage of the population below the poverty line had neared the 1964 level of 40 per cent (SPDC 2002: Chart 2.1, p. 14). Between 1987-88 the poor had declined to 17.3 per cent but then started rising again.

The rate of unemployment has increased from 5.89 per cent in 1998 to 7.82 per cent in 2003 according to a labour force survey of the Federal Bureau of Statistics (SPDC 2003: 185). The International Labour Organization reported that at least one third of Pakistan’s population is below the poverty line owing to the macroeconomic policies regarding withdrawal of subsidies on food, education and health (SPDC 2003: 184). In short, Nine Eleven has not been an economic boon for the ordinary people of Pakistan.

It has, however, helped the affluent because higher remittances lead to more purchase of items of military consumption and that benefits the intermediaries who make such purchases possible. Moreover, as people returned from the U. S and other Western countries because of the initial panic and harassment there, they tended to invest in real estate. This led to a hike in the prices of urban property especially in the posh defence societies and Islamabad. The rush of Western journalists soon after Nine Eleven, and to a lesser extent later, brought in ready cash for journalists, intermediates, hotels and transportations businesses. Apart from such gains, all concentrated in the affluent, urban classes, Nine Eleven has not benefited the ordinary people of Pakistan.

5.4 Internal Security

Pakistan’s internal security situation has worsened as a consequence of Nine Eleven. The U. S war on Afghanistan brought out religious activists on the streets of Pakistan without, however, evoking much sympathy from the ordinary people or the professionals. Soon, however, there were attacks on churches and Western targets out of which the killing of the journalist Daniel Pearl had the most negative effect.

General Musharraf himself was attacked four times because the extremist religious outfits he had banned had vowed to eliminate him. The latest attack, on 25 December 2003, was so well coordinated that analysts, such as Mohammad Shehzad, observed:

Some analysts have gone to the extent of saying that terrorists may have had access to confidential information about the President’s movement (Shehzad 2003: 2).

This idea---that the security apparatus of the country is itself divided---is spine chilling. Though there is no evidence yet to substantiate such misgivings, the influence of the Islamists in the military and security apparatus may well have created resentment against Musharraf’s policies among elements of such agencies possibly acting in their individual capacity.

Besides the insecurity to General Musharraf or Western targets, there is much unrest in the tribal areas. Recently South Waziristan has seen military operations against members of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. They move in an area of 15 kilometers between the Afghan border and the South Waziristan tribal agency. They are said to be Chechens and Arabs but are protected by some tribesmen. The tribesmen could have been bribed by these outsiders but it would be misleading to deny that they are also acutely anti-American. They see the American war in Afghanistan as unjust and resist it by protecting those who are fighting it (Gul 2004: 3).

In short, one indirect consequence of Nine Eleven is that Pakistan has become more insecure than before. There are now many fanatical people deeply committed to the reversal of policies which are seen to favour the United States and betray the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir.

6. Indirect Effects of Nine Eleven on Pakistan

Let us now look at the changes in worldview of Pakistanis and, connected with it, the polarization in Pakistani society. The military’s relationship with the religious right will also be considered to evaluate how this has been affected by Nine Eleven.

6.1 Polarization Among Pakistan

To understand the polarization in the worldview of Pakistanis we should first consider their worldview.

Worldview is too vast and elusive a subject to be fully understood or measured. What has been done is to pose some questions to elicit the attitudes or opinions of young people about Kashmir, religious minorities and liberal values (democracy, women’s rights etc).

The findings of two surveys carried out in 1999-2000 and after Nine Eleven in 2002-2003 are being reported here (see Annexures 1 and 2 for details). The most interesting examples come from the madrassas. Let me give a brief introduction of the madrassas before going on the views of their students as compared to other students.

The Islamic seminaries (madrassas) were seen as providing the cadres for the war against the West. The madrassas became militant when they were used by the Pakistani state to fight in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and then in Kashmir so as to force India to leave the state. The United States indirectly, and sometimes directly, helped in creating militancy among the clergy. For instance, special textbooks in Darri (Afghan Persian) and Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with a USAID grant in the 1980s (Stephens and Ottaway 2002: Sec A, p. 1). American arms and money flowed to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Inter services Intelligence as several books indicate (See Cooley 1999). At that time all this was done to defeat the Soviet Union. Later, while Pakistan’s military is said to have kept using the militant Islamists in Kashmir, the United States was much alarmed by them---not without reason as the events of Nine Eleven demonstrated later. After this the Americans tried to understand the madrassas better. P.W. Singer, an analyst in the Brookings Institute, wrote that there were 10-15 percent ‘radical’ madrassas which teach anti-American rhetoric, terrorism and even impart military training (Singer 2001). No proof for these claims was offered but they are credible given the fact that madrassa teachers often say that the U.S.A is at war with Islam.

The number of madrassas registered with the following Madrassa boards is 9, 880. This represents a growth from 1988 which is given below:

Name	1988	2002
Wafaq ul Madaris (Deobandis)	1779	7000
Tanzim ul Madaris (Barelvis)	717	1585
Wafaq ul Madaris al-salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith)	161	376
Wafaq ul Madaris Pakistan (Shia)	47	419
Rabta tul Madaris (Jamat-e-Islami)	97	500
Figure from 1988 are in GOP 1988.
Other figures were obtained by the author from the various boards of the madrassas.

Most madrassa students come from poor families Indeed, the present writer carried out a survey of madrassa students and teachers in which it emerged that most of them come from families with an income of below Rs. 5000 per month (see Annexure 3).

According to Mumtaz Ahmad, who carried out a survey of madrassas in 1976, ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The rest 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural labourers’ (Ahmad 2000: 185).

The madrassas cater for the poor and the disadvantaged. They provide the services which the welfare state is supposed to provide in other countries. These poor students are not allowed to watch the T. V or listen to the radio. Although some madrassas do teach a little English (Rahman 1999: Chapter 5), it is not sufficient to make them understand discourses in English with values different from their own. Thus they are exposed to discourses which refute Western ideologies even if they are not part of the traditional Dars-i-Nizami Which consists of medieval Arabic texts. To make matters worse, children in ordinary schools are also brought up on texts which create hatred against India and intolerance of religious minorities (Rahman 2002a). However, these children are exposed to other than clerical discourses with their jihad-centeredness. Children exposed to many Western discourses, such as those in the private elitist English-medium schools, are far less aggressive in their views on Kashmir and far more tolerant of religious minorities than their madrassa counterparts.

Now let us turn to the two surveys mentioned earlier. The questions in both are given in detail in Annexures 1 and 2. The first questionnaire was much more elaborate than the second one (see Rahman 2002b: Annexure 14). However, some crucial questions about militancy (in Kashmir) and intolerance (of religious minorities and women) are common to both surveys.

The major findings are that intolerance for religious minorities has not changed much because of Nine Eleven. However, the views on Kashmir have. All categories of students are less willing to support an all out war with India for Kashmir. This may be because these students have seen a war in Afghanistan, the threat of war to Pakistan from the amassing of Indian troops on the country’s borders and the announced change in government policy about Kashmir. All these factors might have induced the respondents to take a less militant view than they did before Nine Eleven. It is also possible that the way the questions were phrased (‘conquer Kashmir ‘-----’ in 1999 and ‘open war with India---in 2002) made people respond to them differently. After all ‘conquest’ has a romantic resonance while ‘open war’ jolts people into facing reality. Whatever the reason, the fact is that the polarization between the religious lobby (madrassas) and the Westernized elite (English medium schools) has actually increased. This means that Pakistanis are even less willing to agree to the same policies than they were before Nine Eleven. Indeed, Nine Eleven has brought out the cleavages between the different classes and ideological camps in the country more in the open than ever before.

After Nine Eleven the government of Pakistan, especially General Pervez Musharraf himself, has been trying to curb religious extremism through changes in the madrassas. The government made two laws for this purpose. The first was aimed to bring the madrassas in the mainstream by introducing secular subjects in them. This ordinance called, the ‘Pakistan Madrassas Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini Madaris) Board Ordinance 2001’ was promulgated on 18 August 2001. According to the Education Sector Reforms (GOP 2002b) three model institutions were established: one each at Karachi, Sukkur and Islamabad. Their curriculum ‘includes subjects of English, Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics, Political Science, Law and Pakistan Studies for its different levels (GOP 2002b: 23). These institutions were not welcomed by the ulema (for opposition from the ulema see Wafaq ul Madaris No. 6: Vol. 2, 2001). After this another law was introduced to control the entry of foreigners in the madrassas and keep check on them. This law --- Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 --- has, however, been rejected by most of the madrassas which want no state interference in their affairs (see Wafaq ul Madaris Vol. 3 No. 9, 2002 and unstructured interviews of the ulema). Indeed, according to Singer, ‘4,350, about one tenth, agreed to be registered and the rest simply ignored the statute’ (Singer 2001: ICG 2004: 7-8). The number of those who did not register is not known. Moreover, since the madrassas are not dependent on government funding, it is not easy to control them.

6.2 Changes in the Pakistani Worldview

Quite apart from what madrassa or other students feel, there has been some pressure on the Pakistani liberals as an indirect consequence of Nine Eleven.

The attacks on Pakistanis in America, arrests and humiliating searches in airports have led to misgivings about Western liberalism and human rights. Indeed, unless these trends are reversed, liberalism as understood in Pakistan is under pressure. This, in turn, puts Pakistani liberals under pressure because they looked to the West for support of these values.

There has been a resurgence in anti-Americanism all over the world. This rose more as a consequence of the war on Iraq than any of the initial actions in defence of mainland America soon after Nine Eleven. In Pakistan, however, the left and the right joined hands in opposing American policies after Pakistanis were subjected to hate crimes in America. During the countdown to the war on Iraq some activists, led by Dr. A. H. Nayyar, a liberal academic and an anti-nuclear activist, tried to picket such symbols of American cultural hegemony as Mc. Donald, KFC and Pizza Hut (Nayyar. Int. 2002).

This anti-Americanism helped the religious alliance of six parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), win the votes of the enraged Pashto-speakers of the North West Frontier Province. From their point of view only the religious parties had defied the Americans and only they had sympathized for their fellow Pashto-speakers, the Taliban. Thus, with the PPP and the PML (N) being out of the competition, the MMA bagged that vote in the elections of October 2002 which earlier went to the ethnic parties, the PPP or the PML (N).

In short, one effect of Nine Eleven is to strengthen the religious lobby all over the Muslim world and also in Pakistan. This may appear to be paradoxical considering that religious extremists are being hounded out, incarcerated and killed in almost every country of the world. Yet, after the humiliation of Muslim forces from Afghanistan to Iraq and the capitulation Libya, Iran and Pakistan, a whole new cohort of angry anti-American Muslims are being produced. They represent what Bruce Lincoln calls the ‘maximalist’ Islamic ideology wherein Islam is conceived as pervading all aspects of life and all facets of society as against the secular notion of a minimalist Islam which relates to rituals and spirituality (Lincoln 2003). The maximalist approach seems to have been strengthened at least among the Islamist groups. It is too early to say whether this anti-Americanism will feed militant groups like Al-Qaeda but, unless American policies change, a new force will emerge in the world and it will be armed with technology such as the perpetrators of Nine Eleven were.

6.3 The Mullahs and the Military

Another effect of Nine Eleven is to put the relations between the religious lobby (called mullahs for short though inaccurately) and the military under new strain. The military has had an unannounced alliance with the mullahs since the rule of General Zai ul Haq (1977-88). The American assistance to the Afghan war effort against the soviet Union armed zealots from the religious parties some of whom later fought against the Indian army in Kashmir. The Kashmir policy, before Nine Eleven at least, provided the major reason for the Mullah-military alliance.

However, the mullahs, like the military, also support non-democratic, one-person or oligarchic rule. They too do not support either the freedom of the press, or women’s rights or democracy (see Annexures 1 & 2). The military, notwithstanding what General Musharraf personally says or supports, regards such liberal values as less desirable than enlightened authoritarian rule by its own nationalist leadership. These similarities in outlook have also make the mullahs and the military support each other in the past. Above all the mullahs provided the cannon fodder, albeit willingly, in the military’s policy of bleeding India in Kashmir to bring it to the negotiating table. And during this process of mutual support, some military officers too might have imbibed values of the religious right or may still believe that previous militant policies are irreversible because they are in the interest of the country.

Nine Eleven made the military adopt two conflicting policies. On the one hand the extreme Islamic groups were banned and the policies of supporting the Taliban were reversed. But on the other the legally registered religious parties were encouraged. Thus the MMA won a decisive victory in the N. W. F. P and holds 62 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly as well. Indeed, it is with the help of the MMA---notwithstanding its anti-Musharraf rhetoric---that General Musharraf got most of the provisions of his LFO incorporated in the constitution of 1973 as the 17^th Amendment and, being confirmed as president, addressed the joint session of the parliament on 17 January 2004. This duality of relationship with the mullahs helps to keep the PPP and the PML (N) out of the political area. However, as the ongoing aftermath of Nine Eleven forces Musharraf to crack down more and more decisively on the religious extremists, the tribesmen sheltering the Al-Qaeda elements and the would-be fighters in Kashmir, even the religious parties may get more and more alienated from the military. The other alternative is that the anti-extremist policies are not implemented wholeheartedly as the ICG report on this issue suggests when it says:

Bent on appeasing the mullahs, the military continues to stall on measures to contain Islamist extremism, including madrasa reform. However, its alliance with the mullahs has resulted in a resurgence of such extremism, which will ultimately work to its disadvantage. It is in the Pakistani military’s own interests to ensure that its religious clients do not gain even greater internal autonomy and influence. (ICG 2004).

The third alternative is that the policies are intended to be implemented fully and sincerely by General Musharraf himself but there are middle ranking functionaries who do not agree with him having been indoctrinated differently earlier. This possibility is too horrible to contemplate because it means that the polarization in Pakistani society mentioned earlier also extends to the military. However, on the positive side, there is no proof that such polarization exists in the military or that it will be expressed in this worse-case scenario mentioned above.

The effects of Islamization on the weaker sectors of society such as women are given in the yearly human rights reports issued by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. To sum up, in the words of one ICG report:

Exploiting their utility for the military and successfully pressuring elected governments, the religious lobby has managed to “Islamise” legislation by increments. The weakest segments of society, women and minorities, both Muslim and non-Muslim, are their specific agents (ICG 2003: 31).

It is this aspect of Islamization which is revealed in the answers to the questionnaires given in Annexures 1 and 2. The point is that the military has strengthened the mullahs for what it construed as the ‘national interest’. Now that the national interest has changed---and changed by a military regime---the military’s relationship with the mullahs is also changing. Whether this change is genuine, thorough and will be kept up is difficult to determine. However, what is evident is that the logic of the post Nine Eleven world dictates that the military distance itself from the militant part of the religious lobby while conciliating the non-militant religious forces which confine themselves to purely theological, ritualistic and clerical roles.

7. Analysis and Recommendations

7.1 Analysis. The most significant effect of Nine Eleven was on Pakistan’s previous policies of supporting the religious extremists in order to keep up a low intensity operation against India in Kashmir.

Because General Musharraf had the foresight of not defying the United States, he has alienated the religious extremists who have attacked him and Western targets and made Pakistan an insecure place. At the same time not only the religious extremists but also the ordinary people and the left wing intellectuals have become more anti-American especially in the wake of the humiliation of the Afghans and the Iraqis. This increased the polarization between the religious and the Westernized Pakistanis and fractured the unannounced alliance between the religious groups and the military.

In short, the major cumulative effect of Nine Eleven has been to render Pakistan more insecure and polarized than before. On the positive side, Pakistan is now set on the path of a peaceful solution of the Kashmir conflict and has distanced itself from religious extremists. Thus conflicting stabilizing and destabilizing tendencies have been set in motion as a consequence of Nine Eleven. As to which one will win out is difficult to predict. If the destabilizing one wins out there will be internal friction, reversal of the peace process with India and possibly the branding of Pakistan as a ‘terrorist’ state. This will mean less investment, more poverty and more angry young men out to target the West and liberal Pakistanis.

If, on the other hand the stabilizing tendencies win out there will be peace in Kashmir and religious extremism will be curbed. This will mean less expenditure on internal security and the military. This, in turn, means there will be more money for education and development. This is the road to the creation of a strong civil society and a moderate Pakistan which is in everybody’s interest.

7.2 Recommendations

Can the West do something positive at the moment? Yes, the West can strengthen the stabilizing tendency. This can be done by taking the following concrete steps.

7.2.1. Persuading lobbyists in the U. S. A. to change their policies towards Palestinians, Iraqis, Iran, Libya and the Muslim world in general. This, indeed, is the single most important change of policy which is needed. States such as Germany and France might not be able to bring about any direct change in American policy but their resolute stance on policies seen as being anti-Islam or anti-Muslims will be very useful in convincing Muslims that it is not a Huntingtonian world of the West versus Islam but rather a world in which a particular American government is pursuing wrong policies.

In this context states such as France should be persuaded not to provoke Muslim opinion by banning headscarves. This goes as much against the spirit of freedom as decrees to impose headscarves or the hijab ,which religious activists among Muslims advocate, does.

7.2.2. Strengthening the peace process between India and Pakistan by making India give concessions which do not make Musharraf’s stance on Kashmir appear as a sellout. The European Union, as much as the United States, can bring about this flexibility in India’s attitude towards Kashmir.

7.2.3. Using European Union resources to create school textbooks emphasizing peace, tolerance and human rights etc.

7.2.4. Helping the state set up free schools and providing inducements (milk, clothes, books, notebooks etc) to children and their parents to reduce the total number of the poor from which madrassas recruit their students.

7.2.5. Giving scholarships and subsidizing exchange programs for university students and faculty.

7.2.6. Creating T. V. and radio programmes extolling the virtues of peace and tolerance.

7.2.7. Helping institutions of civil society to develop and become powerful so that they can counter fascist tendencies and of the left and the right.

8. Conclusion

Nine Eleven has had tremendous impact on Pakistan. It has set about two conflicting tendencies: one the stabilizing one which promises to reduce the power of the militant Islamists and bring about a final settlement of Kashmir with peace in India; the other a destabilizing one which threatens to make the Islamists a powerful force in Pakistan’s electoral politics and continue the low intensity proxy conflict with India over Kashmir. As the financial gains made from remittances, loans, aid etc have yet to decrease poverty in real terms, the destabilizing forces, if they increase any further, will provide armies of angry and desperate young men who may join groups which resort to the kind of terrorism which the world witnessed on 11 September 2001.

The Western world, especially Germany and France whose role in the Iraq War was appreciated in the Muslim world, are in a unique position to influence the USA to change its policies and support peace, economic stability and human rights in Pakistan.

Annexure-1

SURVEY 2000

Consolidated Comparison of Opinions of Students

of Different Types of Schools Expressed in Percentages

This survey of the opinions of school students of matriculation (Xth class) of equivalent was carried out in 1999 and 2000. The matriculation level was chosen because after this students enter college life in Pakistan. However, in elitist English-medium institutions, whether they call themselves schools or colleges, students stay on for another year till they complete their ordinary level (British standard) examination. In the madrassas too they stay on after sania, the equivalent of class X, till they get their final degrees. As the book for which this questionnaire was intended is on language teaching (Rahman 2002), and language teaching does not continue after school, this level had to be chosen.

The survey was non-random as it was not possible either to obtain a complete list of all institutions or to visit them. Schools were treated as clusters and questionnaires were given out to all students of class X or equivalent in Urdu, Sindhi and English. The number of students who filled out the questionnaires are as follows:

Urdu-medium schools 520

English-medium schools 302

Sindhi-medium schools 132

Madrassas 131

Total 1085

The English-medium schools are further sub-divided as follows:

Private elitist (tuition fees Rs. 1500 per month or more) 97

Cadet Colleges (administered by a board of governors) 86

Non-elitist (tuition fees Rs. 50 to 1000 per month) 119

This survey is given in detail in Language, Ideology and Power (Rahman 2002: Appendix 14). The results are as follows:

	Madrassa (N=131)		Sindhi Medium (N=132)		Urdu Medium (N=520)		English Medium
							Elitist (N=97)		Cadet Colleges (N=86)		Ordinary (N=119)
What should be Pakistan’s priorities?
(a) Conquer Kashmir
Agree		99.24		88.64		95.58		62.89		88.37		88.24
Disagree		NIL		4.54		02.12		31.96		6.98		06.72
Don’t care		0.76		6.82		02.31		05.15		04.65		05.04
(b) Develop nuclear weapon?
Agree		96.18		49.24		79.81		64.95		79.07		73.11
Disagree		1.53		35.61		13.65		26.80		15.12		18.49
Don’t care		2.29		15.15		6.54		08.25		05.81		08.40
(c) Develop a strong army?
Agree		87.79		87.12		95.96		88.66		91.86		94.96
Disagree		02.29		05.30		02.12		08.25		03.49		03.36
Don’t care		03.82		07.58		01.92		03.09		04.65		01.68
(d) Reduce Army budget?
Agree		45.04		69.70		55.58		69.07		67.44		62.18
Disagree		42.75		12.88		32.50		17.53		24.42		20.17
Don’t care		12.21		17.42		11.73		13.40		08.14		17.65
(e) Implement Sharia’h?
Agree		97.71		81.82		95.58		52.58		79.07		86.55
Disagree		0.76		07.58		01.73		23.71		05.81		01.68
Don’t care		01.53		10.60		02.69		23.71		15.12		11.76
(f) Make press free?
Agree		43.51		62.88		58.65		62.89		73.26		53.78
Disagree		34.35		18.18		26.35		19.59		18.60		30.25
Don’t care		22.14		18.94		15.00		17.52		08.14		15.97
(g) Make TV free?
Agree		08.39		46.21		36.92		67.01		48.84		26.89
Disagree		76.34		31.06		46.92		18.56		31.40		63.03
Don’t care		15.27		22.73		16.15		14.43		19.74		10.08
(h) Establish democracy?
Agree		27.48		69.70		75.77		64.95		68.61		74.79
Disagree		48.09		06.06		08.46		14.43		13.95		10.08
Don’t care		24.43		24.24		15.38		20.62		17.44		15.13
(i) Give equal rights to women?
Agree		18.32		84.85		84.81		86.60		88.37		84.87
Disagree		73.28		05.30		09.04		07.22		05.81		08.40
Don’t care		08.40		09.85		06.15		06.18		05.81		06.72
(j) Give equal rights to Ahmedis?
Agree		06.87		58.33		44.04		53.61		33.72		47.90
Disagree		81.68		18.18		33.85		22.68		39.54		28.57
Don’t care		11.45		23.48		22.12		23.71		26.74		23.53
(k) Give equal rights to Hindus, etc?
Agree		11.45		65.15		56.73		57.73		41.86		51.26
Disagree		71.76		18.18		23.65		20.62		36.05		27.73
Don’t care		16.79		16.67		19.62		21.65		22.09		21.01

Annexure-2

SURVEY 2003

Survey of Schools and Madrassas

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of two research assistants Imran Farid and Shahid Gondal whom I take this opportunity to thank. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, to which I am very grateful.

Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools (3) Cadet Colleges/Public Schools and (4) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:

TEACHERS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Cadet college/public schools	51	Nil	51
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			243

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Cadet college/public schools	130	Nil	130
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			618

As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan.

The ages of the students are as follows:

Institutions	Mean	Mode	Range
Madrassas	19	20	14-27
English-medium schools	14.1	15	13-18
Urdu-medium school	14.4	16	13-20

In the case of the madrassas the range is higher because some of the sanvia class groups had older boys who had joined the seminary late. In the O’level groups both 10^th and 11^th were represented. Urdu-medium schools had only class-10 clusters.

There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.

The questionnaires for students and teachers are reproduced here. Please note that part-2 (on opinions) is exactly the same. Only part-1 is different for both.

QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.

1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D

3. Which subject (s) do you teach?

What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.

What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?

What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?

QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDENTS)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.

1. age.

2. Class

3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?

PART-II

(for both faculty and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools
1.	Open War	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00
		Don’t Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92
		Don’t Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54
5.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85
6.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62
7.	Women	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38
		Don’t Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).
Comparative Chart for Opinions of Faculty Members of Different

Educational Institutions

			Madrassas (27)	Urdu-medium schools (100)	English-medium schools (65)	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools (51)
1.	Open War	Yes	70.37	20	26.15	19.61
		No	22.22	70	64.62	68.63
		Don’t Know	7.41	10	9.23	11.76
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	59.26	19	38.46	39.22
		No	26.63	68	50.77	52.94
		Don’t Know	11.11	13	10.77	7.84
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	29.63	85	60.00	66.66
		No	66.67	10	33.85	19.61
		Don’t Know	3.70	5	6.15	13.73
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	3.70	27	43.07	29.41
		No	96.23	65	36.92	62.75
		Don’t Know	NIL	8	20.00	7.84
5.	Hindus	Yes	14.81	37	61.54	60.78
		No	85.19	58	26.15	35.29
		Don’t Know	NIL	5	12.31	3.92
6.	Christians	Yes	18.52	52	81.54	60.18
		No	77.77	42	10.77	33.33
		Don’t Know	3.70	6	7.69	5.88
7.	Women	Yes	3.70	61	78.46	37.25
		No	96.67	33	13.85	58.82
		Don’t Know	NIL	6	7.69	3.92

Annexure-3

Monthly Income and Social Mobility of Students and Faculty in Different Educational Institutions in Pakistan

The following information has been collected in response to section 1 of the questionnaire which is given in Annexure-2. These questions are about the income of the family and, in the case of teachers, the medium of instruction of the school which they attended and their children attended.

Section-1: Monthly Income

The figures below give the monthly income of the families of students and faculty as reported by them in our sample. Those who have not written the income, as well as those those who have, have been tabulated separately. The correspondence with socio-economic class, however rough, is as follows:

Working (lower) class = Upto Rs 5000 per month.

Lower middle class = 5001 – 10,000

Middle class = 10,001-20,000

Upper middle class = 20,001 – 50,000

Lower upper class = 50,001 – 100,000

Middle upper class = Above 100,000

The income is for the whole family and not of the individuals earning it. In most cases income of female has not been written presumably because they are housewives and do not get paid. In case their income is written, the family income is calculated by adding their income to the income of the male earning member’s income.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Students

N = 142

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000- 100,000
Pay father	65 of 142 (47.77%)	59 of 77 (76.62%)	10 of 77 (14.86%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	Nil
Pay mother	139 of 142 (97.89%)	02 of 3 (66.66%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and Mother	N.A	1 of 3 (33.33%)	01 of 3 (33.33%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)
Analysis: Most madrassa students belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Teachers

N = 27

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000
Pay self	09 of 27 (33.33%)	13 of 18 (72.22%)	03 of 18 (16.66%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse	26 of 27 (96.30%)	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis: Most madrassa teachers belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Faculty

N = 65

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self	11 of 65 (16.92%)	03 of 54 (5.55%)	22 of 54 (40.74%)	18 of 54 (33.33%)	10 of 54 (15.38%)	01 of 54 (1.85%)	Nil
Pay spouse	55 of 65 (84.62%)	Nil	1 of 10 (10%)	6 of 10 (60%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	Nil	3 of 10 (30%)	04 of 10 (40%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)
Analysis: Most teachers have written their own income but not of their spouses. They fall between middle and upper middle class brackets. When husband and wife both earn, the family goes up in income even going into the lower upper class.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Students

N = 116

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		81 of 116 (69.83%)	Nil	01 of 35 (2.86%)	03 of 35 (8.57%)	18 of 35 (51.43%)	08 of 35 (22.86%)	05 of 35 (14.29%)
Pay mother		101 of 116 (87.07%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	03 of 15 (20%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	08 of 15 (53.33%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	1 of 15 (6.66%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	Nil	04 of 15 (26.66%)	05 of 15 (33.33%)	03 of 15 (20%)
Analysis:	Most of them have not written their parents’ income. Out of those who have most belong to the upper middle class. More than one third belong to the upper classes

Income of Families of Urdu-medium School Students

N = 230

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		95 of 230 (41.31%)	83 of 135 (61.48%)	36 of 135 (26.66%)	13 of 135 (9.63%)	03 of 135 (2.22%)	Nil	Nil
Pay mother		220 of 230 (95.65%)	8 of 10 (80%)	2 of 10 (20%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	2 of 10 (20%)	4 of 10 (40%)	4 of 10 (40%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their fathers’ income but not their mothers’ who are probably housewives. Out of those of who have written, most belong to working class families. About a quarter, however, also belong to the lower middle classes. Very few are above that in income.

Income of the Families of the Faculty of Urdu-medium Schools

N = 100

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		6 of 100 (6%)	17 of 94 (18.09%)	62 of 94 (65.96%)	15 of 94 (15.96%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		82 of 100 (82%)	3 of 18 (16.66%)	06 of 18 (33.33%)	07 of 18 (38.89%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	09 of 18 (50%)	09 of 18 (50%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most earners have written their income but not that of their spouse. Most belong to the lower middle class. Out of the few spouses whose income is reported, a fairly large proportion tend to have middle class incomes and a very small minority even higher than that.

Income of the families of Public School and Cadet College Students

N = 130

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		72 of 130 (55.38%)	Nil	5 of 58 (8.62%)	17 of 58 (29.31%)	33 of 58 (56.90%)	3 of 58 (5.17%)	Nil
Pay mother		111 of 130 (85.39%)	2 of 19 (10.53%)	8 of 19 (42.11%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	5 of 19 (26.32%)	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	Nil	Nil	2 of 19 (10.53%)	11 of 19 (57.89%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their father’s income but not that of their mother. They mostly fall in the upper middle class. Very few of them, however, also fall in the lower upper classes.

Income of the Faculty of Cadet Colleges/Public Schools

N= 51

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		1 of 51 (1.96%)	1 of 50 (2%)	17 of 50 (34%)	28 of 50 (56%)	4 of 50 (8%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		45 of 51 (88.24%)	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their own income but not their wife’s. They fall mostly in the middle class with families, where husband and wife both earn, falling mostly in the upper middle class.

Section-2: Social Moblity

Social mobility has been measured in the case of teachers. The only indicators which have been taken into account are(a)the medium of instruction of the teachers themselves when they were students(b) the medium of instruction of their children. As English-medium school are more expensive than Urdu-or Sindhi medium ones, it is assumed that, when people get relatively prosperous, they tend to educate their children in English-medium schools. It should, however , be noted that a large number of non-elitist English-medium schools charging higher tuition fees than government Urdu-medium schools have started functioning in the last twenty years or so. As such the older teachers in this survey could either go to expensive English-medium schools or government Urdu-medium ones. They did not have the option of attending less expensive English-medium schools which their children have.

Own Medium of Instruction When in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges/Public schools	51	01 of 51 (1.96%)	31 of 50 (62%)	19 of 50 (38%)
English-medium schools	65	18 of 65 (27.69%)	10 of 47 (21.28%)	37 of 47 (78.72%)
Madrassas*	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Urdu-medium schools	100@	02 of 100 (2%)	88 of 98 (89.80%)	06 of 98 (6.12%)

*NB: Out of 25 teachers, 2 (8%) wrote Pashto and 2 (8%) wrote Arabic as their medium of instruction.

Childrens’ Medium of Instruction in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges	51	21 of 51 (41.18 %)	03 of 30 (10%)	27 of 30 (90%)
English-medium	65	38 of 65 (58.46%)	1 of 27 (3.70%)	26 of 27 (96.30%)
Madrassas	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)
Urdu-medium@	100	31 of 100 (31%)	36 of 69 (52.17%)	31 of 69 (44.93%)

@NB: The medium of instruction of 1 child (1.16%) and 3 teachers (3.06%) was Sindhi.

Analysis: Upward socio-economic mobility has occurred in the lives of all but madrassa teachers.

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