The Potential for Communal Conflict in Pakistan: The Results of a Survey

Introduction

For the first time in Pakistan’s Political History, a religious party, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)¹, has won power in two provinces and has a considerable presence in the politics of the country. This is unusual in many ways but what is significant for us in the context of this paper is that the different Sunni sub-sects (Deobandi, Barelvi, Ahl-i-Hadith), which were very antagonistic to each other, now seem to be cooperating with each other. Moreover, even though Shia-Sunni conflict goes on, the Muharram (month of mourning in which the Shias mourn the tragedy of Karbala and which was marred by attacks on Imambargahs by the Sunnis) passed by without the killings---or very few of them---associated with it. Moreover, the Shias are still part of the MMA.

According to an International Crisis Group report the ‘Shias are 15 to 20 per cent of the Muslim population’ of Pakistan. The Deobandis and Barelvis are 77 per cent and the Ahl-i-Hadith about 6 per cent (ICG 2003: 5). While they may be temporarily in harmony, they agree to recognize the Ahmedis (Qadianis or Mirzais) as non-Muslims. The other religious minorities, the Christians and the Hindus, are small minorities but they too are targets of violence at times.

While Pakistan has been experiencing ethnic conflict ever since 1948 when the Bengali Language Movement started (Rahman: 1996; Dil and Dil 2000), communal conflict---called ‘sectarian’ conflict as it is usually between the two main sects of Islam the Sunnis and the Shias---started in the eighties and has continued since then. Persecution of the Ahmadis has occurred twice in the form of widespread riots---in 1953 and 1974--- but since they were dedared non-Muslims in that year (thus fulfilling a long standing demand of the ulema) they have been persecuted on an individual level but not attacked on a large scale (for small level persecution see Human Rights Reports of all the years including the most recent are HRR 2003). Sectarian conflict has been blamed on the proliferation of madrassas (Nayyar 1998: 215-250) but has not really been analyzed in a scholarly fashion. Ethnic conflict has, however, received scholarly attention (Amin

1988; Ahmed 1998; Rahman 1996). It is time that some empirical facts about the potential for communal conflict in Pakistan be obtained. But first, what is the meaning of the term ‘communal’?

SECTION-1

This section is theoretical and historical. The first part defines terms and tries to understand the phenomenon of communalism. The second looks at the cleavages between religious sects and sub-sects in Pakistan

Communalism and Ethnicity

The term ‘communal’ is associated with the antagonism which developed between Muslims and Hindus or between the Muslims and the Sikhs in pre-partition India. Because of this historical legacy, Pakistani and Indian scholars have different perceptions of this phenomenon. I would, therefore, begin by disassociating the term from its controversial part. In this paper it refers to identity-forming or group-creating set of symbols using religion or the emotions created by the religious experience. It is, therefore, very similar to ethnicity which is too complex a phenomenon to be susceptible to a single definition. Ethnicity, as we observe, is a very similar phenomenon. The essence of ethnicity is the construction of communities on the basis of real or imagined symbols such as language, religion, history or shared experience. The primordialists thought that these symbols were ascribed and transmitted from times immemorial (Shils 1957; Geertz 1963; Cannor 1993) while the instrumentalists thought they could well be invented, though perhaps unconsciously, in order to mobilize a pressure group so as to obtain tangible and intangible gratifications (jobs, share in power, wealth, prestige etc) (Deutsch 1953; Yinger 1981; Williams 1984). The consensus among scholars, following Benedict Anderson’s insights into ‘imagining’ communities (1983), is that ethnic groups are ‘imagined’ or ‘constructed’. Among other approaches, the ‘ethno-symbolists’ concern themselves ‘with the persistence, change, and resurgence of ethnies, and with the role of the ethnic part or parts in shaping cultural communities’ (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 10). In short, there is much interest on change, or imagining groups, on emphasizing or de-emphasizing certain symbols which constitute the identity of a group and so on.

Under this definition of ethnicity, certain forms of identity formation and group mobilization---such as that of the Irish Catholics against the English Protestants and that of the Muslims of India---were ethnic. Exploring the role of religion in ethnic formation Cynthia Enloe writes:

It may be futile and unrealistic to separate religion and ethnic identity. Many individuals behave as if their ethnic affiliation and professed religion are one and the same (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 199).

However, she goes on to argue that there are counter examples---and Pakistan is given as an example (Enloe 1996; 200)---where ethnicity is a different force from religion and uses other symbols (such as language).

If one looks deeply enough one comes up with surface differences between the ethnic and the communal phenomenon in Pakistan. Ethnic identity is defined with reference to language, culture (Bengali, Sindhi, Baluch and Pathan) or shared experience (Mohajir) while the communal one rests on the interpretation of Islam (Shia versus Sunni; Barelvi versus Deobandi; Ahl-i-Hadith versus other sects; Muslims versus non-Muslims etc. In some cases, ethnic groups want more autonomy within the state or even to break up from it; the communal groups do not talk in these terms though they do want to restrict powerful positions of the state to their own group. This, however, may be true only because conditions demanding autonomy or more political power may not be ripe at present. Basically, religious symbols help ‘imagine’ a group identity and this can lead to mobilization and violence under conducive circumstances. Hence, in my view, at the theoretical level at least, communalism is not distinguishable from ethnicity. What does make it distinguishable in Pakistan at present is that communal groups (sects) are inspired more for ideological reasons than for instrumental ones. Even if the priesthood (the maulvis) are motivated, at least in part, by the desire to increase power (or clientele or mosques etc), the rank and file is inspired by the certitude that they are striving to establish the true religion. In short, communal identity-formation is ideological and, therefore, part of one’s worldview. Thus, the level of tolerance for people of different religious communities is one indicator of the potential for conflict in the country.

Sects and Sub-Sects of Islam in Pakistan

Because of the disintegration of the Mughal empire and colonial rule, Indian Muslims felt threatened, disillusioned and frustrated. Some, like Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareilly (1786-1831), responded militantly but were defeated. Others, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1808-1898) learnt English, entered the British bureaucracy and became junior partners of the British in the exercise of power. Still others, blaming Muslims themselves for their loss of power, tried to purify Islam in various ways. The Wahabis (also called Al-i-Hadith), the Deobandis, the Barelvis among the Sunnis as well as the Shias created madrassas to preserve and propagate what, in their view, was the correct interpretation of Islam. As these views are preserved and disseminated by the madrassas, let us look at the different kinds of madrassas in Pakistan.

Deobandis

The madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) of India, was founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905). While earlier seminaries were loosely organized, Deoband had a rector (sarparast), a chancellor (muhtamim) and the chief instructor (sadr mudarris). Its income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based on the Dars-i-Nizami which had been evolved by Mulla Nizam Uddin Sihalvi (d. 1748) at Farangi Mahall, a famous seminary of a family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Lucknow (Robinson 2002). The Dars-i-Nizami emphasized studies based on human reasoning (maqulat) but at Deoband the traditional sciences which were transmitted unchanged to the learner (manqulat) were emphasized. Thus Deoband taught much more hadith than the Dars-i-Nazami had originally prescribed.

The Deobandis opposed the folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a major place, seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation and miracles etc were seen as the crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They did not oppose mysticism altogether but did argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation. They also opposed folk practices like fixing days for distributing food to gain spiritual merit and celebrating the days of religious personages (for details see Metcalf 1982).

The Durul Uloom at Deoband was established in 1867 and after a hundred years it had produced 6,986 graduates and established 8,934 maktabs (schools) and madrassas (seminaries) teaching the Dars-i-Nizami). In 1967 the number of graduates from Pakistan was 3,191 (including those from East Pakistan) (Metcalf 1982: 110-111) while now the number of students exceeds 1, 02, 865 and the number of those who appeared in the Alimia (M.A) examination were 4,676 . The number of registered madrassas in Pakistan is 7000 which shows how fast they have multiplied in recent years in this country (all these figures are from the central office of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris, Multan).

Barelvis

The Barelvi movement was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921) who is highly revered by his followers (Sanyal 1996). The Barelvis justified the ‘mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs of the shrines’ (Metcalf 1982: 296). They believed that prophet Mohammad (Peace be Upon Him) was made of Divine Radiance (Noor) and had knowledge of the unknown (Ilm ul Ghaib). Both these beliefs were challenged by the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema. Relating to this was the debate on the issue of the imkan-i-nazir ---the question whether God could make another person equal to Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). The Barelvis denied the possibility while the others did not. The Barelevi madrassas in Pakistan also teach the Dars-i-Nazami and appeal to the ordinary folk of the country (for the views of the Barelvis see Sanyal 1996).

Ahl-i-Hadith

The movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed was called Wahabi because, like Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed and his associates also wanted to purify and reform Islam. They claimed to follow no particular school of jurisprudence---Hanafi, Shafi, Hambali, Maliki---and were called nonconformists (ghair muqallid = one who does not follow a fixed path) by their opponents. They used the term Jama’at Ahl-i-Hadith for themselves and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahabi should not be used for them. The government ‘ordered in 1886 that the term Wahabi should not be used in official correspondence’ (Ahmed 1994: 203) but it is still used by many people in Pakistan.

The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas also teach the Dars-i-Nazami but they emphasize the Quran and Hadith and oppose folk Islam and common practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on religious occasions and popular mysticism.

Jamat-i-Islami

The Jamat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (also spelled Mawdudi) (1903-1979) whose life and achievements have been ably described by Syyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996).

Maudoodi believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such he favoured more modernist education than any of the orthodox organizers of the traditional madrassas. He did, however, also emphasize upon the refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, therefore, his anti-Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing than that of the traditionalist seminarians (Maudoodi 1974).

In the Jamat’s madrassas the traditional texts are taught but politics, economics and history is also emphasized with a view to preparing the young ulema for confronting the ideas of the West.

Besides the Sunni madrassas, there are Shia madrassas too as we have seen. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet (PBUH) was Ali Ibn-e-Abi Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunnis take to be his successors. They mourn the battle of Karbala, fought between the Prophet’s grandson Hussain and the Omayyad caliph Yazid bin Muawiya in 680 A.D. This led to the birth of the supporters of Ali and the rise of Shia Islam which has been described very competently by S.H.M Jafri (1979).

Teaching in the Madrassas

All the madrassas, including the Shia ones, teach the Dars-i-Nizami though they do not use the same texts. They also teach their particular point of view (madhab or maslak) which clarifies and rationalizes the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith). Moreover they train their students to refute what in their views are heretical beliefs and some Western ideas. All madrassas teach modern subjects in some measure and with varying degrees of competence. Let us examine the teaching in the madrassas in some detail. This paper will omit the Dars-i-Nizami in order to focus only on that part of the teaching which may promote divisiveness and antogonism for the ‘Other’ in whatever manner it may be perceived.

The Refutation of Other Sects and Sub-Sects

Refutation (Radd in Urdu) has always been part of religious education. However, it is only in recent years that it has been blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan.

According to A.H. Nayyar ‘The madrasahs have, not surprisingly, become a source of hate-filled propaganda against other Sects and the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent’ (Nayyar 1998: 243). However, it appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflict cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs.

The theological debate (munazra) is taught to students in madrassas. Barbara Metcalf describes the munazras between the Christians, Muslims and Arya Samajists (1982: 219-232) in her book. She says:

The debates were, indeed, a form of social event, a public ritual, that took on new form and meaning in the late nineteenth century. In a society largely illiterate and equipped only minimally with modern forms of communication, they came to serve as a new forum for communicating issues at once religious and social (Metcalf 1982: 233).

They were also very bitter as the Deobandi-Barelvi munazras of 1928 collected in Futoohat-e-Nomania (Nomani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs. For instance Ahmed Raza Khan, the pioneer of the Barelvi school, wrote a series of fatawa (plural of fatwa = religious decree) against Sir Sayyid of Aligarh, the Shi’is, the ahl-i-Hadith, the Deobandis and the Nadwat ul-‘Ulama in 1896. These were published as Fatawa al-Haramain bi-Rajf Nadwat al-Main (1900) (Sanyal 1996: 203). The Barelvis, in turn, were refuted by their rivals. The followers of the main debaters sometimes exchanged invectives and even came to blows but never turned to terrorism as witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history.

As the inculcation of sectarian bias is an offence, no madrassa teacher or administrator confessed to teaching any text refuting the beliefs of other sects. Maulana Mohammad Hussain, Nazim-e-Madrassa Jamiat us-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith) (Islamabad) said that comparative religious was taught in the final Almiya (M.A) class and it did contain material refuting heretical beliefs. Moreover, Islam was confirmed as the only true religion, refuting other religions. The library did contain books refuting other sects and sub-sects but they were not prescribed in the syllabus. Maulana Muhammad Ishaq Zafar of the Jamia Rizvia Aiz ul Uloom (Barelvi) in Rawalpindi said that books against other sects were not taught. However, during the interpretation of texts the maslak was passed on to the student. Students of the final year, when questioned specifically about the teaching of the maslak, said that it was taught through questions and answers, interpretation of texts and sometimes some teachers recommended supplementary reading material specifically for the refutation of the doctrines of other sects and sub-sects.

In some cases, as in the Jamia Ashrafia, a famous Deobandi seminary of Lahore, an institution for publication, established in 1993, publishes ‘only those articles and journals which are written by the scholars of Deoband school of thought. (Hussain 1994: 42). Moreover, in writings, sermons, and conversation, the teachers refer to the pioneers of their own maslak so that the views of the sub-sect are internalized and became the primary way of thinking.

However, despite all denials, the printed syllabi of the following sects do have books to refute the beliefs of other sects. The Report on the Religious Seminaries (GOP 1988) lists several books of Deobandi madrassas to refute Shia beliefs including Maulana Mohammad Qasim’s Hadiyat ul Shia which has been reprinted several times and is still in print. There are also several books on the debates between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and even a book refuting Maudoodi’s views (GOP 1988: 73-74) The Barelvis have given only one book Rashidiya under the heading of ‘preparation for debates on controversial issues’ (Ibid, p.76). The Ahl-i-Hadith have given a choice of opting for any two of the following courses: the political system of Islam, the economic system of Islam, Ibn-e-Khaldun'’ Muqaddamah, the history of ideas and comparative religious systems. The Shia courses list no book on this subject.

Recently published courses list no book on maslak for the Deobandis. The Barelvis mention ‘comparative religions’ but no specific books. The Ahl-i-Hadith retain almost the same optional courses as before. The Shia madrassas list books on beliefs which includes comparative religions in which, of courses, Shia beliefs are taught as the only true ones. Polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available. Incidentally such pamphlets, warning about alleged Shia deviations from the correct interpretations of the faith are also in circulation among Sunni madrassas and religious organizations.

Moreover, some guidebooks for teachers note that Quranic verses about controversial issues should be taught with great attention and students should memorize them. In one Barelvi book it is specified that teachers must make the students note down interpretations of the ulema of their sub-sect concerning beliefs and controversial issues so that students can use them later --- i.e. as preachers and ulema.

The Jamat-i-Islami syllabus (2002) mentions additional books by Maulana Maudoodi and other intellectuals of the Jamat on a number of subjects including the Hadith. They also teach ‘comparative religions’.

The Refutation of Heretical Beliefs

One of the aims of the madrassas, ever since 1057 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad, was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influences which could change or dilute Islam. Other religions are refuted in ‘comparative religions’ but there are specific books for heresies within the Islamic world. In Pakistan the ulema unite in refuting the beliefs of the Ahmedis (or Qaidianis) (for these views see Friedmann 1989). The Deoband course for the Aliya (B.A) degree included five books refuting Ahmedi beliefs (GOP 1988: 71). The Barelvis prescribe no specific books. However, the fatawa of the pioneer, Ahmad Raza Khan, are referred to and they refute the ideas of the other sects and sub-sects. The Ahl-i-Hadith note that in ‘comparative religions’ they would refute the Ahmedi beliefs. The Shias too do not prescribe any specific books. The Jamat-i-Islami’s syllabus (2002) prescribes four books for the refutation of ‘Qaidiani religion’. Besides the Ahmedis, other beliefs deemed to be heretical are also refuted. All these books are written in a polemical style and are in Urdu which all madrassa students understand.

The Refutation of Alien Philosophies

The earliest madrassas refuted Greek philosophy which was seen as an intellectual invasion of the Muslim ideological space. Since the rise of the West, madrassas, and even more than them revivalist movements outside the madrassas, refute Western philosophies. Thus there are books given in the reading lists for Aliya (B.A) of 1988 by the Deobandis refuting capitalism, socialism, capitalism and feudalism. These books are no longer listed but they are in print and in the libraries of the madrassas. The Jamat-i-Islami probably goes to great lengths --- judging from its 2002 syllabus --- to make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies. Besides Maudoodi’s own books an all subjects relating to the modern world, a book on the conflict between Islam and Western ideas (Nadvi n.d) is widely available.

These texts, which may be called Radd-texts, may not be formally taught in most of the madrassas as the ulema claim, but they are being printed which means they are in circulation. They may be given as supplementary reading material or used in the arguments by the teachers which are probably internalized by the students. In any case, being in Urdu rather then Arabic, such texts can be comprehended rather than merely memorized. As such, without formally being given the centrality which the Dars-i-Nizami has, the opinions these texts disseminate --- opinions against other sects, sub-sects, views seen as being heretical by the ulema, Western ideas --- may be the major formative influence on the minds of Madrassa students. Thus, while it is true that education in the madrassa produces religious, sectarian, sub-sectarian and anti-Western bias, it may not be true to assume that this bias automatically translates into militancy and violence of the type Pakistan has experienced. For that to happen other factors ---- the arming of religious young men to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir; the state’s clampdown on free expression of political dissent during Zia ul Haq’s martial law; the appalling poverty of rural, peripheral areas and urban slums etc. etc ---must be taken into account.

As for teaching modern subjects, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas have been teaching Pakistan studies, English, Mathematics and General Science a long time (GOP 1988: 85). The Jamat-i-Islami also teachers secular subjects. The larger Deobandi, Barelvi and Shia madrassas too have made arrangements for teaching secular subjects including basic computer skills. However, the teaching is done by teachers approved of by the ulema or some of the ulema themselves. Thus the potential for secularization of the se subjects, which is small in any case, is reduced to nothingness.

SECTION-2

Objective

The objective of this section of the paper is to measure the level of communal tolerance and, hence, the potential for conflict in Pakistan.

Methodology for the Survey

This part of the paper reports the findings of a survey of the opinions of school students and teachers conducted between December 2002 and January 2003. The students were roughly between the ages of 14 to 16 in Urdu-medium and English-medium schools. In the Islamic seminaries (madrassas) they were older for the same level (10^th class), being between 18 to 20 years old.

It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones.

Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools and (3) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:

FACULTY
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			192

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			488

As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan. There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.

Results of the Survey:

The following are the results to the questions concerning giving equal rights to the religious minorities. The other questions, which were about militant policies regarding Kashmir, have not been included in this paper.

Urdu Medium Schools

Questions about giving equal (equal to Pakistani Muslims) rights to Ahmedis (a sect declared as a non-Muslim minority in 1974 in Pakistan), Pakistani Hindus and Christians and women are tabulated as percentages. These students and teachers both come from the lower-middle class as their income indicates. They were reluctant to reveal their families income because of the social stigma of poverty so that 95 (41.30 per cent) did not write their father’s income. As for mothers, most of them did not have paid employment so that 220 (95.65 per cent) did not write their income. Out of those who did, Most belonged to the poorer classes (working and lower middle classes) as the figures below indicate.

Box – 1
Monthly Income of Students’ Parents
	Not written	Rs 5000 and below	Rs 5001-10,000	Rs 10,001-15,000	Above 15,000
Father	95 of 230 (41.30%)	82 of 135 (60.74%)	36 of 135 (26.66%)	10 of 135 (7.41%)	7 of 135 (5.18%)
Mother	220 of 230 (95.65%)	8 of 10 (80%)	2 of 10 (20%)	Nil	Nil

In this sample only 3 wrote incomes between Rs 15,001 and 20,000; one showed an income ranging between 20,001 to 20,000 and three wrote an income ranging between 25,001 to 35,000.

The teachers (N=100) responded to the questions on their own income and their spouse's as follows:

Box-2
Monthly Income of Urdu Medium School Teachers
Not written Percentages out of 100		Rs 5000 and below	Rs 5001-10,000	Rs 10,001-15,000	Above 15,001
Own	6 (6%)	17 of 94 (18.09%)	62 of 94 (65.96%)	14 of 94 (14.89%)	1 of 94 (1.06%)
Spouse’s	82 (82%)	3 of 18 (16.66%)	8 of 18 (44.44%)	3 of 18 (16.66%)	4 of 18 (22.22%)

No teacher, or spouse, wrote an income above Rs 20,000 per month which means that most of them belong, like their students, to the lower middle class.

The responses to questions about giving the same rights as Muslims in employment and other fields to religious minorities are as follows:

Box-3
Tolerance Among Urdu-medium school students 2002-2003 (N=230)
(In percentages)
What should be Pakistan’s priorities?
		Yes	No	Don’t Know
1.	Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?	46.95	36.95	16.09
2.	Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?	47.39	42.61	10
3.	Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?	65.65	26.52	7.83

Tolerance of Religious Minorities Among Urdu School Teachers

In the previous survey (Rahman 2002: Appendix 14) the opinions of teachers had not been taken. This survey reports the opinions of the teachers also.

Tolerance of Religious Minorities among School Teachers

Box-4
Tolerance of Religious Minorities and Women in Urdu-medium Among School Teachers 2002-2003
(N=100) (In percentages)
		Yes	No	Don’t Know
(1)	Ahmedis	27	65	08
(2)	Hindus	37	58	05
(3)	Christians	52	42	06

As we can see, the teachers are less tolerant of religious minorities, at least as far as their participation in the economic life and power distribution system of Pakistan (high state positions), than students. This may be because the teachers were exposed to anti-minority rhetoric at crucial periods of their lives such as the anti-Ahmedi agitation of 1974 and the Zia ul Haq years when there was much religious intolerance in the air.

Elitist English Medium Schools

The present survey is on 116 students, 62 males and 52 females, of the average age of 15 who are in class-10 (O’ level) in schools of Islamabad and Lahore charging a tuition fees of at least Rs 2,500 per month. Most of them belong to the upper-middle and the upper classes as the following income pattern indicates:

Box-5
Monthly Income of Students’ Parents Between Rs 10,001 and 25000
Not written Percentages out of 116		Below 20,000	20,001 to 25,000	25,001 to 35,000	25,000 to 50,000	50,001 to 100,000	Above 100,000
Father	81 (69.83%)	4 of 35 (11.43%)	3 of 35 (8.57%)	11 of 35 (31.43%)	4 of 35 (11.43%)	8 of 35 (22.86%)	2 of 35 (5.71%)
Mother	101 (87.07%)	6 of 15 (40%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)	4 of 15 (26.66%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	Nil
NB: The averages of those who have written their parents salaries are out of 35 (fathers) and 15 (mothers)

Besides what the students have written, an indicator of their socio-economic background is the exorbitant tuition fees their parents pay; their dress (Western and expensive); their lifestyle (travelling in cars, eating out, going to concerts, celebrating birthdays with parties and expensive gifts etc), and the houses they live in (modern, expensive, urban).

The teachers in these institutions are mostly females from middle and, sometimes, higher socio-economic backgrounds. However, they are not from as high socio-economic class as their students. The following figures illustrate this.

Box-6
Monthly Income of Teachers Families (Percentages in brackets)
Not Written Percentages out of 65		5000 & Below	5001-10,000	10,001 to 15000	15001 to 20000	20001 to 25000	25001 to 35000	Above 35001
Own	11 (16.92)	3 of 54 (5.55)	22 of 54 (40.74)	13 of 54 (24.07)	5 of 54 (9.26)	4 of 54 (7.41)	3 of 54 (5.55)	4 of 54 (7.41)
Spouse	55 (84.62)	Nil	1 of 10 (10)	4 of 10 (40)	2 of 10 (20)	1 of 10 (10)	Nil	2 of 10 (20)
Source: Appendix-3 NB: The averages of those who have written their family income are out of 54 (self) and 10 (spouse).

Another indicator of teachers having climbed up the socio-economic ladder is that whereas 15.38 per cent said they were educated in Urdu-medium schools themselves, only 1.54 per cent have children studying in these schools now (the response to the question about own medium of instruction in school is 27.69 per cent and for children’s medium of instruction is 58.46 per cent).

The students of English medium schools showed more tolerance for religious minorities than Urdu medium school students as the following figures indicate:

Box-7
Tolerance of Religious Minorities among Elitist English-medium School Students N=116
(In percentages)
What should be Pakistan’s priorities?		Yes	No	Don’t Know
1.	Gives equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?	65.52	9.48	25.00
2.	Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs?	78.45	13.79	7.76
3.	Give equal right to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?	83.62	8.62	7.76

The opinions of teachers are less tolerant probably because they belong to lower socio-economic classes than their students and were exposed more often to intolerant and anti-minority views when they were younger.

Box-8
Tolerance for Religious Minorities Among Elitist English School Teachers N=65 (In percentages)
		Yes	No	Don’t Know
1.	Ahmedis	43.07	36.92	20
2.	Hindus	61.54	26.15	12.31
3.	Christians	81.54	10.77	7.69

Madrassas

Madrassas were supported by land grants and wealthy patrons in medieval India. They have always been supporting the poor and the lifestyles of the ulema were Spartan and closer to the poorer strata of society than the affluent ones. Maulana Abdul Ali Bahr al-Ulum of Farangi Mahall, for instance, ‘used in their support all but Rs. 40 of the Rs 1000 monthly stipend granted by Nawab Walajah. His ‘wife and family suffered and complained, as did those of his grandson, Jamal al-Din, who suffered in a similar way’ (Robinson 2002: 81). Barbara Metcalf in her study of Deoband tells us that the pioneers of that seminary took no, or very modest salaries, and ‘lived like poor men’ (1982: 167). The average expense of Deoband on each graduate between 1867 to 1967 was Rs 1,314 which is modest from any criterion (Metcalf 1982: 111). The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas, which were patronized by wealthy people in British India, nevertheless lived in the same frugal manner (Ahmed 1994).

Madrassas in Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Some of them are also given financial assistance by foreign governments ---the Saudi government is said to help the Ahl-i-Hadith seminaries and the Iranian government the Shia ones---but there is no proof of this assistance. And even if it does exist, it goes only to a few madrassas whereas the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts etc).

According to the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, the annual expenditure on the seminary, which has about 700 students, is 40,00,000 rupees. Another madrassa, this time a Barelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students. This comes to Rs 5,714 per year (or Rs 476 per months) which is an incredibly small amount of money for education, books, board and lodging. As the madrassas generally do not charge a tuition fees---though they do charge a small admission fees which does not exceed Rs 400--- they attract very poor students who would not receive any education otherwise. According to Fayyaz Hussain, a student who competed his ethnographic research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, students joined the madrassa for the following reasons:-

Box-9
Causes of Joining Madrassas Given by Students
Economic	48.95 per cent
Social	40.63 per cent
Religious	5.71 per cent
Educational	3.12 per cent
Political	2.09 per cent
Source: Hussain 1994 : 84

The categories have not been explained by the author nor is it known exactly what questions were asked from the students. According to Singer, the ‘Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential Madrassahs (it includes most of the Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni)---has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces’ (Singer 2001). According to a survey conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976 ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The remaining 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural laborers’ (quoted from Ahmad 2000: 185). The present researcher also observed that many students, upon probing, confessed that their parents had admitted them in the madrassas because they could not afford to feed them and educate them in the government schools. Even such students, while making this confession, also insist that they are in the madrassas because of their love for Islam.

In short the madrassas are performing the role of the welfare state in the country. This being so, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases. This is a dangerous trend for the country because madrassa students are taught to be intolerant of religious minorities and are hawkish about Kashmir. As they are also from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.

Box-10 Tolerance of Religious Minorities Among Madrassa Students N= 142 (in Percentages)
Abbreviated Questions	Yes	No	Don’t Know
(4) Ahmedis	12.68	82.39	4.93
(5) Hindus	16.90	76.06	7.04
(6) Christians	18.31	73.24	8.45

The teachers of madrassas were very reluctant to give their views. Thus only 27 questionnaires could be filled in. Moreover, it was not possible to have access to females although there are madrassas for females. The views of the teachers, inadequate as they might be, are as follows:

Box-11 Tolerance of Religious Minorities Among Madrassa Teachers N= 27 (in Percentages)
Abbreviated Questions	Yes	No	Don’t Know
(4) Ahmedis	3.70	96.23	Nil
(5) Hindus	14.81	85.19	Nil
(6) Christians	18.52	77.77	3.70

As we can see, the madrassa students and teachers do not support equal rights for Muslims and religious minorities. This is called ‘intolerance’ by secular or educated members of the intelligentsia but the religious people have a different interpretation of it. They believe that non-Muslims are zimmis i.e. the responsibility of a Muslim society and the state. As zimmis they are entitled to protection and exempted from military service on the payment of a tax called jaziya. They do not have the right to be employed in powerful decision-making appointments in an Islamic state. However, Pakistan’s founding father, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah did give equal rights to all citizens because of which the liberals insist that it would violate the principles of equality under law if such rights are not given.

Comparison of the Attitudes Towards Religious Minorities Among Pakistani Students

Let us compare the opinions of students from the three type of institutions be have been considering before.

Box-12 Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)
Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium
1.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00
2.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76
3.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76

In short, the madrassa students, for reasons which they consider justified according to their interpretation of religion, are the least tolerant of religious minorities. The Urdu medium students, who happen to be in majority in the country, are more tolerant but do not come up to the level of tolerance shown why the elitist English medium students. This is not because English medium students are nicer people but because they live in a more secularized atmosphere than their other counterparts. Indeed, English medium students are highly intolerant of people from the villages, people from the lower socio-economic classes, religious people and, especially, the students and teachers of the madrassas. Moreover, the English medium students are alienated from most of the ordinary people and their life in the country. Thus, what appears as tolerance is actually indifference to the concerns of the rest of their countrymen.

11. Conclusion

This article presents the results of a survey of three types of educational institutions. This was done so as to get a cross section of the opinions of the major divisions along socio-economic lines in the country. This is because Pakistan’s educational system is stratified according to socio-economic class which is expressed roughly in terms of media of instruction or type of educational institution. The madrassas cater for very poor children mostly from rural and urban working class localities. The Urdu-medium schools cater for lower-middle-class and some middle class children while the elitist English-medium schools cater for the upper-medium and upper classes. There are also non-elitist English-medium schools which cater for lower-middle and middle-class children and cadet colleges (Public Schools) which cater for the middle classes, especially professionals and armed forces employees. The worldview of the students of these institutions is so different from each other that they seem to live in different worlds. The most acute polarization is between the madrassa students and the students of elitist English-medium schools. The former are deprived but they express their anger---the rage of the dispossessed---in the idiom of religion. This brings them in conflict with the Westernized elite which looks down upon them in contempt although its most powerful members legitimize their hold on the state apparatus in the name of Islam. The state has strengthened the Islamic lobby itself by Islamizing education and sacralizing the Kashmir dispute so that religious and nationalistic emotion has come to be invested in it. Now that the state feels obliged to reverse these policies, it is already facing resistance from the Islamic lobby. This may increase if the madrassa-educated young men are marginalized even further while remaining both poor and armed. The majority of the students, from the Urdu-medium stream, are also alienated both from their madrassa as well as English-medium counterparts. In socio-economic terms they belong roughly to the same class as the madrassa students but their training is different and hence their views are also different. Moreover, not sharing the Westernization and the wealth of the English-medium students, they too are alienated from them and have a vague sense of having been cheated. These differences in views and dissatisfaction do not augur well for nation-building or cohesion. They have a divisive potential along class lines which will probably be expressed in the nationalistic and religious idiom in any future crisis. Indeed, if the state keeps investing only in defense and on the elite, it will withdraw further and further away from the social sector. This has already occurred and both religious extremists and the ethnic nationalists have tried to fill in the vacant space. If the armies of the unemployed and the marginalized are not to be increased till they become unmanageable, the state should invest on the poor.

Notes

1. The MMA comprises the following parties: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Fazlur Rehman); Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Samiul Haq); Jamaat-i-Islami (Qazi Hussain Ahmed); Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan (Shah Ahmed Noorani); Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (Sajid Mir) and the Islami Tehrik, Pakistan (Syed Sajjid Naqvi). The JUI is Deobandi; the JUP is Barelvi, the JAH is of the Ahl-e-Hadith and ITP or represents the Shias.

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and January 2003. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC). Karachi, to which I am very grateful.

QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDENTS)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.

1. age.

2. Class

3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?

PART-II

(for both teachers and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.

1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D

3. Which subject (s) do you teach?

4. What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.

6. What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?

7. What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?

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