MADRASSAS: RELIGION, POVERTY AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

By

Tariq Rahman Ph. D

Professor and Director, Chair on Quaid-i-Azam

and Freedom Movement

National Institute of Pakistan Studies

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

MADRASSAS: RELIGION, POVERTY AND THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

Introduction

The madrassas [Islamic seminaries] are associated with the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan some of whom were students of these institutions (see Rashid 2000). They have also been much in the news for sectarian killings and supporting militancy in Kashmir. They are considered the breeding ground of the Jihadi culture–-a term used for Islamic militancy in the English-language press of Pakistan (Singer 2001; Haqqani 2002; Ahmad 2000: 191-192).

There was not much writing on the madrassas before the events of Nine Eleven in Pakistan. J.D. Kraan, writing for the Christian study Centre, had provided a brief introduction (Kraan 1984) Later, A.H. Nayyar, an academic, had updated this introduction arguing that sectarian violence was traceable to madrassa education (Nayyar 1998). Both had used only secondary sources. Later, the present writer wrote an language-teaching in the madrassas (Rahman 2002). The book also contained a survey of the opinions of madrassa students on Kashmir, the implementation of the Sharia, equal rights for religious minorities and women, freedom of the media, democracy etc (Rahman 2002: Appendix 14). The seminal work on the ulema, and also the madrassas in which they are trained, is by Qasim Zaman (2002). This is an excellent study of how the traditional ulema can be differentiated from the Islamists who react to modernity by attempting to go back to fundamentalist, and essentially political, interpretations of Islam.

The ulema or the Islamists in Pakistan have been writing, generally in Urdu, in defence of the madrassas which the state sought to modernize and secularize. Two recent books, a survey by the Institute of Policy Studies (patronized by the revivalist, Islamist, Jamat-i-Islami) of the madrassas (IPS 2002) and a longer book by Saleem Mansur Khalid (Khalid 2002), are useful because they contain much resent data. Otherwise the Pakistani ulema’s work is polemical and tendentious. They feel themselves besieged increasingly by Western (Singer 2001) and Pakistani secular critics (Haqqani 2002; Ahmad 2000: 191-192) and feel that they should defend their position from the inside rather than wait for sympathetic outsiders to do it for them (as by Sikand 2001).

Type and number of Madrassas

There is hardly any credible information on the unregistered madrassas. However, those which are registered are controlled by their own central organizations or boards. They determine the syllabi, collect a registration fees and an examination fees. They send examination papers, in Urdu and Arabic, to the madrassas where pupils sit for examinations and declare results. The names of the boards are as follows:-

Box 1
Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan
Name	Sub-Sect	Place	Date Established
Wafaq ul Madaris	Deobandi	Multan	1959
Tanzim ul Madaris	Barelvi	Lahore	1960
Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia) Pakistan	Shia	Lahore	1959
Rabta-tul-Madaris-al-Islamia	Jamat-i-Islami	Lahore	1983
Wafq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia	Ahl-i-Hadith	Faislabad	1955
Source: Offices of the respective Boards.

At independence there were 245, or even fewer, madrassas (IPS 2002: 25). In April 2002, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, put the figure at 10,000 with 1.7 million students (ICG 2002: 2). They belong to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shias, However, Pakistan being a predominantly Sunni country, the Shia ones are very few. Among the Sunni ones there are three sub-sects: Deobandis, Barelvis and the Ahl-i-Hadith (salafi). Besides these, the revivalist Jamat-e-Islami also has its own madrassas.

The number of madrassas has been increasing during General Zia ul Haq’s rule (1977-1988). During the war by Islamic Afghan groups in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union the United States sent in money, arms and ammunition through Pakistan which is said to have been used to support the madrassas. Later, presumably because religiously inspired and madrassa students infiltrated across the line of control to fight the Indian army in Kashmir, they were supported by the Pakistan army (specifically the Inter Services Intelligence agency). However, both the ISI and the madrassas deny these links (see several issues of Wafaq al Madaris) and therefore, it cannot be ascertained as to how many madrassas have increased by the financial aid provided by foreign donors or the Pakistan army. The increase in the number of registered madrassas is as follows (for details of increase in provinces see Annexure 4).

Box 2
Sect-Wise Increase in the Number of Madrassas
Deobandi		Barelvi		Ahl-i-Hadith		Shia		Jamat-i-Islami		Total
1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002
1779	7000	717	1585	161	376	47	419	97*	500	2801	9880
Source: For 1988 see GOP 1988; for 2002 Report of Sindh Police in Dawn 16 Jan 2003. The other figures have been provided by the Central Boards of madrassas. *This figure in GOP 1988 was for ‘Others’ and not only for the Jamat-i-Islami madrassas. The figure for 2000 given in several sources is 6,761 (IPS 2002: 25).

P.W. Singer gives the figure of 45,000 madrassas but quotes no source for this number (Singer 2001).

The Saudi Arabian organization, Harmain Islamic Foundation, is said to have helped the Ahl-i-Hadith and made them powerful. Indeed, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, an organization which has been active in fighting in Kashmir, belongs to the Ahl-i-Hadith (Ahmed 2002: 10). In recent years, the Deobandi influence has increased as the Taliban were trained in their seminaries. However, contrary to popular belief, it is the other madrassas and not the Deobandi ones which have either got registered in large numbers since 1988 or actually increased in number. The increase in percentages in the different madrassas of the major sub-sects or sects between 1988 and 2000 is as follows:

Box 3
Increase in the Madrassas between 1988 and 2000 in percentages
Deobandi	6%
Barelvi	90%
Ahl-i-Hadish	93%
Shia	532%
Others	Not known
Total	136%
Source:	Khalid 2002: 176.

However, it should be remembered that the number of Deobandi madrassas is the highest to begin with and they are the ones who are associated with militant policies and revivalist fervour.

The Sectarian Divide Among the Madrassas

Because of the disintegration of the Mughal empire and colonial rule, Indian Muslims felt threatened, disillusioned and frustrated. Some, like Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareilly (1786-1831), responded militantly but were defeated. Others, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1808-1898) learnt English, entered the British bureaucracy and became junior partners of the British in the exercise of power. Still others, blaming Muslims themselves for their loss of power, tried to purify Islam in various ways. The Ahl-i-Hadith (also called Wahabis), the Deobandis, the Barelvis among the Sunnis as well as the Shias created madrassas to preserve and propagate what, in their view, was the correct interpretation of Islam (or maslak). These madrassas are described below.

Deobandis

The madrassa at Deoband, a small town in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) of India, was founded by Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905). While earlier seminaries were loosely organized, Deoband had a rector (sarparast), a chancellor (muhtamim) and the chief instructor (sadr mudarris). Its income was derived from popular contributions and the curriculum was based on the Dars-i-Nizami which had been evolved by Mulla Nizam Uddin Sihalvi (d. 1748) at Farangi Mahall, a famous seminary of a family of Islamic scholars (ulema) in Lucknow (Robinson 2002). The Dars-i-Nizami emphasized studies based on human reasoning (maqulat) but at Deoband the traditional sciences which were transmitted unchanged to the learner (manqulat) were emphasized. Thus Deoband taught much more hadith than the Dars-i-Nazami had originally prescribed.

The Deobandis opposed the folk Islam in which intercession by saints occupied a major place, seeking initiation in a mystic order was considered the path to salvation and miracles etc were seen as the crucial and defining attributes of saints and prophets. They did not oppose mysticism altogether but did argue that adherence to the Islamic law (Sharia) was the path to mystical exaltation. They also opposed folk practices like fixing days for distributing food to gain spiritual merit and celebrating the days of religious personages (for details see Metcalf 1982).

The Durul Uloom at Deoband was established in 1867 and after a hundred years it had produced 6,986 graduates and established 8,934 maktabs (schools) and madrassas (seminaries) teaching the Dars-i-Nizami). In 1967 the number of graduates from Pakistan was 3,191 (including those from East Pakistan) (Metcalf 1982: 110-111) while now the number of students exceeds 1, 02, 865 and the number of those who appeared in the Alimia (M.A) examination were 4,676 . The number of registered madrassas in Pakistan is 7000 which shows how fast they have multiplied in recent years in this country (all these figures are from the central office of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris, Multan).

Barelvis

The Barelvi movement was inspired by Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly (1856-1921) who is highly revered by his followers (Sanyal 1996). The Barelvis justified the ‘mediational, custom-laden Islam, closely tied to the intercession of the pirs of the shrines’ (Metcalf 1982: 296). They believed that prophet Mohammad (Peace be Upon Him) was made of Divine Radiance (Noor) and had knowledge of the unknown (Ilm ul Ghaib). Both these beliefs were challenged by the Deobandis and the Ahl-i-Hadith ulema. Relating to this was the debate on the issue of the imkan-i-nazir ---the question whether God could make another person equal to Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). The Barelvis denied the possibility while the others did not. The Barelevi madrassas in Pakistan also teach the Dars-i-Nazami and appeal to the ordinary folk of the country (for the views of the Barelvis see Sanyal 1996).

Ahl-i-Hadith

The movement inspired by Sayyed Ahmed was called Wahabi because, like Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (1703-1792) of Saudi Arabia, Sayyid Ahmed and his associates also wanted to purify and reform Islam. They claimed to follow no particular school of jurisprudence---Hanafi, Shafi, Hambali, Maliki---and were called nonconformists (ghair muqallid = one who does not follow a fixed path) by their opponents. They used the term Jama’at Ahl-i-Hadith for themselves and appealed to the Government of India that the term Wahabi should not be used for them. The government ‘ordered in 1886 that the term Wahabi should not be used in official correspondence’ (Ahmed 1994: 203) but it is still used by many people in Pakistan.

The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas also teach the Dars-i-Nazami but they emphasize the Quran and Hadith and oppose folk Islam and common practices like the anniversaries of saints, the distribution of food on religious occasions and popular mysticism.

Jamat-i-Islami

The Jamat-i-Islami is a revivalist political party created by Abul ala Maudoodi (also spelled Mawdudi) (1903-1979) whose life and achievements have been ably described by Syyed Vali Reza Nasr (1996).

Maudoodi believed in borrowing technology and other concepts from the West in order to empower the Islamic community. As such he favoured more modernist education than any of the orthodox organizers of the traditional madrassas. He did, however, also emphasize upon the refutation of Western culture and intellectual domination and, therefore, his anti-Western critique is more thorough, trenchant and appealing than that of the traditionalist seminarians (Maudoodi 1974).

In the Jamat’s madrassas the traditional texts are taught but politics, economics and history is also emphasized with a view to preparing the young ulema for confronting the ideas of the West.

Besides the Sunni madrassas, there are Shia madrassas too as we have seen. The Shias believe that the successor of the Prophet (PBUH) was Ali Ibn-e-Abi Talib and not the first three caliphs whom Sunnis take to be his successors. They mourn the battle of Karbala, fought between the Prophet’s grandson Hussain and the Omayyad caliph Yazid bin Muawiya in 680 A.D. This led to the birth of the supporters of Ali and the rise of Shia Islam which has been described very competently by S.H.M Jafri (1979).

All the madrassas, including the Shia ones, teach the Dars-i-Nizami though they do not use the same texts. They also teach their particular point of view (madhab or maslak) which clarifies and rationalizes the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-i-Hadith). Moreover they train their students to refute what in their views are heretical beliefs and some Western ideas. All madrassas teach modern subjects in some measure and with varying degrees of competence. Let us examine the teaching in the madrassas in some detail.

The Curriculum of the Madrassas

Before Mulla Nizam Uddin standardized the curriculum known as the Dars-i-Nazami different teachers taught different books to students. Shah Abdul Rahim (d. 1718) had made an attempt to create a fixed curriculum. It was taught at the Madrassa-i-Rahimiya and it emphasized the manqulat ( such as hadith). The Dars-i-Nazami on the other hand, emphasized the maqulat. Thus there were more books on grammar, logic and philosophy than before (Sufi 1941: 68-75). According to Francis Robinson.

The significance of the enhanced emphasis on ma’ qulat in the Dars-i-Nizamiyya lies in part in the superior training it offered prospective lawyers, judges and administrators. The study of advanced books of logic, Philosophy and dialectics sharpened the rational faculties and, ideally, brought to the business of government men with better-trained minds and better-formed judgement (Robinson 2002: 53).

While this may have been the intention of Farangi Mahall’s ulema, it is also true that the Arabic madrassas were much fewer (150) than the Persian schools (903) in 1850 (Edn. NWP: 1850), presumably because they offered a more thorough grinding in Persian which facilitated entry into administrative jobs for their pupils. However, Farangi Mahall was established before the British created the category of ‘Persian schools’ and it does appear that the Dars-i-Nizami educated men were sought for employment outside the domain of religion at that time.

In Pakistan, however, the Dars-i-Nizami has been modified though the canonical texts are still there. In my view these texts are used as a symbol of continuity and identity. The madrassas saw themselves as preservers of Islamic identity and heritage during the colonial era when secular studies displaced the Islamic texts as well as the classical languages of the Indian Muslims---Arabic and Persian---from their privileged pedestal. Thus the madrassas, despite the desire to reform their courses, do not give up the canonical texts (for a debate on reform see IPS 1987). The greatest critic of the madrassa texts was Maulana Maududi who argued that, being based on memorization of medieval texts, the madrassas were not providing relevant education to the Muslim society (Maudoodi 1974).

However, though old books like Sarf-e-Meer and Kafiya remain in the course, easier and more modern books are used to supplement them. Arabic, for instance, is taught through modern and much easier books than the canonical works mentioned in the Dars-i-Nizami (for details see Rahman 2002: 106-1-7). The canonical texts are taught in Arabic but, because students do not become really competent in the language, they are either memorized or understood from Urdu translations available in the market.

The Dars-i-Nizami has come to symbolize the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught through canonical texts which, however, are taught through commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes (hashiya) and supercommentaries (taqarir). There are commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries. For the South Asian students, they no longer explain the original text being themselves in Arabic. They have to be learned by heart which makes students use only their memory not their analytical powers. Indeed, the assumption on which the Dars functions is that the past was a golden age in which all that was best has already been written. What remains to the modern age is merely to preserve it.

It was this backward-looking nature of core madrassa texts which made Taha Hussain (1889-1973), the famous blind modernist scholar of Egypt, disillusioned with Jamia Azhar in Cairo. According to Abderlarshid Mahmoudi, the writer of a book on Taha Hussain’s education:

On the collective level, entanglement in what was derivative and purely verbal, meant, among other things, the relegation of major and original works to oblivion. Thus a procedure whose role raison d’etre was to the conservation of tradition, resulted in a grave form of collective amnesia concerning what was best in Islamic culture, namely the classical heritage (Mahmoudi 1998: 20).

What was true of Jamia Azhar in 1902 (when Taha went to that seat of learning) is judged to be true of South Asian madrassas, or at least the Dars-i-Nizami component taught there, even now---and the judges are Arabic-knowing authorities such as Maudoodi and not only Western critics of the madrassas.

The Refutation of Other Sects and Sub-Sects

Refutation (Radd in Urdu) has always been part of religious education. However, it is only in recent years that it has been blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan.

According to A.H. Nayyar ‘The madrasahs have, not surprisingly, become a source of hate-filled propaganda against other Sects and the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent’ (Nayyar 1998: 243). However, it appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflict cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs.

The theological debate (munazra) is taught to students in madrassas. Barbara Metcalf describes the munazras between the Christians, Muslims and Arya Samajists (1982: 219-232) in her book. She says:

The debates were, indeed, a form of social event, a public ritual, that took on new form and meaning in the late nineteenth century. In a society largely illiterate and equipped only minimally with modern forms of communication, they came to serve as a new forum for communicating issues at once religious and social (Metcalf 1982: 233).

They were also very bitter as the Deobandi-Barelvi munazras of 1928 collected in Futoohat-e-Nomania (Nomani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs. For instance Ahmed Raza Khan, the pioneer of the Barelvi school, wrote a series of fatawa (plural of fatwa = religious decree) against Sir Sayyid of Aligarh, the Shi’is, the ahl-i-Hadith, the Deobandis and the Nadwat ul-‘Ulama in 1896. These were published as Fatawa al-Haramain bi-Rajf Nadwat al-Main (1900) (Sanyal 1996: 203). The Barelvis, in turn, were refuted by their rivals. The followers of the main debaters sometimes exchanged invectives and even came to blows but never turned to terrorism as witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history.

As the inculcation of sectarian bias is an offence, no madrassa teacher or administrator confessed to teaching any text refuting the beliefs of other sects. Maulana Mohammad Hussain, Nazim-e-Madrassa Jamiat us-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith) (Islamabad) said that comparative religious was taught in the final Almiya (M.A) class and it did contain material refuting heretical beliefs. Moreover, Islam was confirmed as the only true religion, refuting other religions. The library did contain books refuting other sects and sub-sects but they were not prescribed in the syllabus. Maulana Muhammad Ishaq Zafar of the Jamia Rizvia Aiz ul Uloom (Barelvi) in Rawalpindi said that books against other sects were not taught. However, during the interpretation of texts the maslak was passed on to the student. Students of the final year, when questioned specifically about the teaching of the maslak, said that it was taught through questions and answers, interpretation of texts and sometimes some teachers recommended supplementary reading material specifically for the refutation of the doctrines of other sects and sub-sects.

In some cases, as in the Jamia Ashrafia, a famous Deobandi seminary of Lahore, an institution for publication, established in 1993, publishes ‘only those articles and journals which are written by the scholars of Deoband school of thought. (Hussain 1994: 42). Moreover, in writings, sermons, and conversation, the teachers refer to the pioneers of their own maslak so that the views of the sub-sect are internalized and became the primary way of thinking.

However, despite all denials, the printed syllabi of the following sects do have books to refute the beliefs of other sects. The Report on the Religious Seminaries (GOP 1988) lists several books of Deobandi madrassas to refute Shia beliefs including Maulana Mohammad Qasim’s Hadiyat ul Shia which has been reprinted several times and is still in print. There are also several books on the debates between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and even a book refuting Maudoodi’s views (GOP 1988: 73-74) The Barelvis have given only one book Rashidiya (1672) by Abdul Rashid Deewan Jaunpuri under the heading of ‘preparation for debates on controversial issues’ (Ibid, p.76). In some of the madrassas the other traditional text used for this purpose is the Sharifiya (1413) by Meer Sharif Ali Jarjani. It is not true, however, that the students are mired into medieval scholasticism despite the texts prescribed for them. They do put their debates in the contemporary context though they refer to examples on the lines established by the medieval texts. The Ahl-i-Hadith have given a choice of opting for any two of the following courses: the political system of Islam, the economic system of Islam, Ibn-e-Khaldun'’ Muqaddamah, the history of ideas and comparative religious systems. The Shia courses list no book on this subject.

Recently published courses list no book on maslak for the Deobandis. The Barelvis mention ‘comparative religions’ but no specific books. The Ahl-i-Hadith retain almost the same optional courses as before. The Shia madrassas list books on beliefs which includes comparative religions in which, of courses, Shia beliefs are taught as the only true ones. Polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available. Incidentally such pamphlets, warning about alleged Shia deviations from the correct interpretations of the faith are also in circulation among Sunni madrassas and religious organizations.

Moreover, some guidebooks for teachers note that Quranic verses about controversial issues should be taught with great attention and students should memorize them. In one Barelvi book it is specified that teachers must make the students note down interpretations of the ulema of their sub-sect concerning beliefs and controversial issues so that students can use them later --- i.e. as preachers and ulema.

The Jamat-i-Islami syllabus (2002) mentions additional books by Maulana Maudoodi and other intellectuals of the Jamat on a number of subjects including the Hadith. They also teach ‘comparative religions’.

The Refutation of Heretical Beliefs

One of the aims of the madrassas, ever since 1057 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad, was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influences which could change or dilute Islam. Other religions are refuted in ‘comparative religions’ but there are specific books for heresies within the Islamic world. In Pakistan the ulema unite in refuting the beliefs of the Ahmedis (or Qaidianis) (for these views see Friedmann 1989). The Deoband course for the Aliya (B.A) degree included five books refuting Ahmedi beliefs (GOP 1988: 71). The Barelvis prescribe no specific books. However, the fatawa of the pioneer, Ahmad Raza Khan, are referred to and they refute the ideas of the other sects and sub-sects. The Ahl-i-Hadith note that in ‘comparative religions’ they would refute the Ahmedi beliefs. The Shias too do not prescribe any specific books. The Jamat-i-Islami’s syllabus (2002) prescribes four books for the refutation of ‘Qaidiani religion’. Besides the Ahmedis, other beliefs deemed to be heretical are also refuted. All these books are written in a polemical style and are in Urdu which all madrassa students understand.

The Refutation of Alien Philosophies

The earliest madrassas refuted Greek philosophy which was seen as an intellectual invasion of the Muslim ideological space. Since the rise of the West, madrassas, and even more than them revivalist movements outside the madrassas, refute Western philosophies. Thus there are books given in the reading lists for Aliya (B.A) of 1988 by the Deobandis refuting capitalism, socialism, capitalism and feudalism. These books are no longer listed but they are in print and in the libraries of the madrassas. The Jamat-i-Islami probably goes to great lengths --- judging from its 2002 syllabus --- to make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies. Besides Maudoodi’s own books an all subjects relating to the modern world, a book on the conflict between Islam and Western ideas (Nadvi n.d) is widely available.

These texts, which may be called Radd-texts, may not be formally taught in most of the madrassas as the ulema claim, but they are being printed which means they are in circulation. They may be given as supplementary reading material or used in the arguments by the teachers which are probably internalized by the students. In any case, being in Urdu rather then Arabic, such texts can be comprehended rather than merely memorized. As such, without formally being given the centrality which the Dars-i-Nizami has, the opinions these texts disseminate --- opinions against other sects, sub-sects, views seen as being heretical by the ulema, Western ideas --- may be the major formative influence on the minds of Madrassa students. Thus, while it is true that education in the madrassa produces religious, sectarian, sub-sectarian and anti-Western bias, it may not be true to assume that this bias automatically translates into militancy and violence of the type Pakistan has experienced. For that to happen other factors ---- the arming of religious young men to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir; the state’s clampdown on free expression of political dissent during Zia ul Haq’s martial law; the appalling poverty of rural, peripheral areas and urban slums etc. etc ---must be taken into account.

As for teaching modern subjects, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas have been teaching Pakistan studies, English, Mathematics and General Science a long time (GOP 1988: 85). The Jamat-i-Islami also teachers secular subjects. The larger Deobandi, Barelvi and Shia madrassas too have made arrangements for teaching secular subjects including basic computer skills. According to a report in the weekly The Friday Times from Lahore the Deobandi Wafaq-ul Madaris has decided to accommodate modern subjects on a larger scale than ever before. They would make the students spend another two years to give a more thorough grounding in the secular subjects. The Wafaq ‘has also formed committees to devise ways to capitalise on the government’s U.S $ 255 million Madrassah Reforms Scheme for the transition” (Mansoor 2003). However, at present, the teaching is done by teachers approved of by the ulema or some of the ulema themselves. Thus the potential for secularization of the se subjects, which is small in any case, is reduced to nothingness. This might change if the courses are extended by two years and the teachers come from diverse backgrounds but as yet it is too early to say what might happen.

Poverty and Socioeconomic Class of madrassa students

Madrassas were supported by land grants and wealthy patrons in medieval India. They have always been supporting the poor and the lifestyles of the ulema were Spartan and closer to the poorer strata of society than the affluent ones. Maulana Abdul Ali Bahr al-Ulam of Farangi Mahall, for instance, ‘used in their support all but Rs. 40 of the Rs 1000 monthly stipend granted by Nawab Walajah. His ‘wife and family suffered and complained, as did those of his grandson, Jamal al-Din, who suffered in a similar way’ (Robinson 2002: 81). Barbara Metcalf in her study of Deoband tells us that the pioneers of that seminary took no, or very modest salaries, and ‘lived like poor men’ (1982: 167). The average expense of Deoband on each graduate between 1867 to 1967 was Rs 1,314 which is modest from any criterion (Metcalf 1982: 111). The Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas, which were patronised by wealthy people in British India, nevertheless lived in the same frugal manner (Ahmed 1994).

Madrassas in Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Some of them are also given financial assistance by foreign governments ---the Saudi government is said to help the Ahl-i-Hadith seminaries and the Iranian government the Shia ones---but there is no proof of this assistance. And even if it does exist, it goes only to a few madrassas whereas the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts etc).

The government of Pakistan gives financial assistance to the madrassas for modernizing textbooks, including secular subjects in the curricula and introducing computers. In 2001-02 a total of 1,654,000 was given to all madrassas which accepted this help. As the number of students is 1,065,277 this comes to Rs. 1.55 per student per year. An additional aid of Rs. 30.45 million is promised for providing computers and changing the syllabi in 2003-04 and this will come to Rs. 28.60 per student per year (these figures are from IPS 2002 table 1.17 and 1.19). However, as all madrassas do not accept financial help from the government the money is not distributed evenly as the above calculations might suggest.

According to the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, the annual expenditure on the seminary, which has about 700 students, is 40,00,000 rupees. Another madrassa, this time a Barelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students. This comes to Rs 5,714 per year (or Rs 476 per month) which is an incredibly small amount of money for education, books, board and lodging. The expenditure from the government in 2001-2002 was Rs. 1,654,000 for all the madrassas in the country and about 32.60 per cent madrassas do not received any financial support at all, the total spending on these institutions is very little (IPS 2002: 33). However, as mentioned above, there are plans to change this in a radical manner.

As the madrassas generally do not charge a tuition fees---though they do charge a small admission fees which does not exceed Rs 400--- they attract very poor students who would not receive any education otherwise. According to Fayyaz Hussain, a student who competed his ethnographic research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, students joined the madrassa for the following reasons:-

Box 4
Causes of Joining Madrassas Given by Students
Economic	48.95 per cent
Social	40.63 per cent
Religious	5.71 per cent
Educational	3.12 per cent
Political	2.09 per cent
Source: Hussain 1994 : 84

The categories have not been explained by the author nor is it known exactly what questions were asked from the students. According to Singer, the ‘Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential Madrassahs (it includes most of the Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni)---has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces’ (Singer 2001). According to a survey conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976 ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The remaining 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural laborers’ (quoted from Ahmad 2000: 185). According to a survey by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) 64 per cent madrass students come from rural areas and belong to poor agrarian families (IPS 2002: 41). The present researcher also observed that many students, upon probing, confessed that their parents had admitted them in the madrassas because they could not afford to feed them and educate them in the government schools. Even such students, while making this confession, also insist that they are in the madrassas because of their love for Islam.

In the survey of December 2002 and January 2003, madrassa students and teachers were asked about their income. Many did not reply these questions but those who did suggest that they mostly (76.62%) belong to poor sections of society (see Annexure-1 for details). The teachers of the madrassas also mostly (61.11%) belong to the same socio-economic class as their students (see Annexure-1 for details). The madrassas provide sustenance for all these poor people.

In short the madrassas are performing the role of the welfare state in the country. This being so, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases.

Poverty and the Roots of Religious Violence

While it can only be speculated that there is a connection between poverty and religious violence, the proposition does have empirical backing. Qasim Zaman tells us, for instance, that in Jhang---the birth place of the militant Sunni organization called the Sipah-i-Sahaba---the proportion of Shias in the affluent urban middle class is higher than other areas of Pakistan. Moreover, the feudal gentry too has many Shia families. Thus the Sipah-i-Sahaba appeals to the interests of the ordinary people who are oppressed by the rich and the influential. Indeed, Maulana Haqq Nawaz, the fiery preacher who raised much animosity against the Shias, was ‘himself a man of humble origin’ and ‘had a reputation for being much concerned with the welfare of the poor and the helpless, and he was known to regularly spend time at government courts helping out poor illiterate litigant’s (Zaman 2002: 125).

Another leader of the Sipah-i-Sahaba, Maulana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-1991), also preached in Jhang. He too denounced the Shia magnates of the area and the peasants, terrorized by the feudal magnates, responded to him as if he were a messiah. Even shopkeepers rejoiced in the aggressive Sunni identity he helped create. When the Shia feudal lords attacked and burnt some defiant Sunni shops this identity was further radicalized (Zaman 2002: 127).

In the same manner the Muslim radicals in the Philippines too attack social and economic privilege. Indeed, Islamist movements from Turkey to Indonesia talk of the poor and the oppressed and sometimes do take up their cause. This has won them votes in Turkey where they have been suppressed by the secular military. It was also a major factor for mobilization in Iran against the Shah who was seen as being rich, wasteful, corrupt and decadent. So, though difficult to demonstrate, Islamic militancy---whether by radicalized madrassa students or members of Islamist or Jihadi groups in Pakistan---has an element of class conflict. It is, at least in some part, a reaction of the have-notes against the haves. This is a dangerous trend for the country because madrassa students are taught to be intolerant of religious minorities and are hawkish about Kashmir. As they are also from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.

The Worldview of Madrassa Students

The madrassa students are the most intolerant of all the other student groups in Pakistan. They are also the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy. In the survey of 2002-2003 they responded to questions about these issues as follows:

Box 5
Militancy Among Madrassa Students in 2003 (N=142)
(In percentages)
What should be Pakistan’s Priorities?
1.	Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?	Yes 59.86	No 31.69	Don’t Know 8.45
2.	Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?	52.82	32.39	14.79
3.	Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of Control)	33.80	54.93	11.27
Source: Anexure-2

The views of the teachers were even more militant:

Box 6
Militancy Among Madrassa Teachers (N=27)
(In percentages)
1.	Open War	Yes 70.37	No 22.02	Don’t Know 7.41
2.	Jihadi Groups	59.26	29.63	11.11
3.	Peaceful means	29.63	66.67	3.70
Source : Annexure-2

According to the IPS survey quoted earlier madrassa students are tolerant of the major Islamic sects and sub-sects. About 45 per cent, however, considered women is lesser than men and only 11 per cent considered them equal to men. To the question ‘how can Jihad be waged in Pakistan?’ only 8 per cent students agreed with using force. However, 46 per cent Deobandi students favoured the Taliban as their model (IPS 2002: 42-47).

While the survey carried out for this study gives somewhat different results, it is clear that most of the differences are because of the difference in questions. The madrassas are obviously institutions which have a blueprint of society in their mind. What needs explanation is that the madrassas, which were basically conservative institutions before the Afghan-Soviet War of the nineteen eighties, are both ideologically activist and sometimes militant. According to Peter L. Bergen, author of a book on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group: ‘nowhere is bin Laden more popular than in Pakistan’s madrassas, religious schools from which the Taliban draw many of its recruits’ (Bergen 2001: 150). Even with the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the madrassas have plenty of zealous young people who can potentially act as crusaders against both Western interests and the moderate regimes, both military and civilian, whom they perceive as the allies of the West (for Central Asian parallels see Ahmed Rashid’s [2002] excellent book on militant Islamic movements in that part of the world).

General Pervez Musharraf’s military government, in an attempt to control religious extremism, made two laws to control the madrassas. The first was aimed to bring the madrassas in the mainstream by introducing secular subjects in them. This ordinance called, the ‘Pakistan Madrassah Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini Madaris) Board Ordinance 2001’ was promulgated on 18 August 2001. According to the Education Sector Reforms (GOP 2002c) three model institutions were established: one each at Karachi, Sukkur and Islamabad. Their curriculum ‘includes subjects of English, Mathematics, Computer Science, Economics, Political Science, Law and Pakistan Studies for its different levels (GOP 2002c: 23). These institutions were not welcomed by the ulema (for opposition from the ulema see Wafaq ul Madaris No. 6: Vol. 2, 2001). After this another law was introduced to control the entry of foreigners in the madrassas and keep check on them. This law --- Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002 --- has, however, been rejected by most of the madrassas which want no state interference in their affairs (see Wafaq ul Madaris Vol. 3 No. 9, 2002 and unstructured interviews of the ulema). Indeed, according to Singer, ‘4,350, about one tenth, agreed to be registered and the rest simply ignored the statute’ (Singer 2001). The number of those who did not register is not known.

The madrassas became militant when they were used by the Pakistani state to fight in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and then in Kashmir so as to force India to leave the state. Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir, as discussed by many including Alastair Lamb (1977), has led to conflict with India and the Islamic militants or Jihadis, who have entered the fray since 1989. The United States indirectly, and sometimes directly, helped in creating militancy among the clergy. For instance, special textbooks in Darri (Afghan Persian) and Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with a USAID grant in the 1980s (Stephens and Ottaway 2002: Sec A, p. 1). American arms and money flowed to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Inter services Intelligence as several books indicate (See Cooley 1999). At that time all this was done to defeat the Soviet Union. Later, while Pakistan’s military kept using the militant Islamists in Kashmir, the United States was much alarmed by them---not without reason as the events of Nine Eleven demonstrated later. After this catastrophic incident in which more than three thousand people died in New York, the Americans tried to understand the madrassas better. P.W. Singer, an analyst in the Brookings Institute who has been referred to earlier, wrote that there were 10-15 percent ‘radical’ madrassas which teach anti-American rhetoric, terrorism and even impart military training (Singer 2001). No proof for these claims was offered but they are credible given the fact that madrassa teachers often say that the U.S.A is at war with Islam.

Apart from the madrassas proper, religious parties---such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin---print militant literature which circulates among the madrassas and other institutions. According to chapter-3 of a book entitled Ideas on Democracy, Freedom and Peace in Textbooks (2003) Ad-Dawah uses textbooks for English in which many questions and answers refer to war, weapons, blood and victory. According to the author:

The students studying in jihadi schools are totally brain washed right from the very beginning. The textbooks have been authored to provide only one-dimensional worldview and restrict the independent thought process of children (Liberal Forum 2003: 72).

Although these parties have been banned, their member are said to be dispersed all over Pakistan, especially in the madrassas. The madrassas, then, may be the potential centres of Islamic militancy in Pakistan. The government proposes to change this by teaching secular subjects in the madrassas, but change will come only when the level of party is reduced so that poor people can afford other systems of schooling. Above all, it will come when there is peace between India and Pakistan and the United States, as well as other Western powers, do not appear to oppress Muslims as in Palestine today. Such global changes cannot be brought about by any one government so it is futile to blame, or expect too much from, any one country as far as madrassa-based militancy, or merely intolerance creating a potential for such militancy, is concerned.

Annexure-1

Monthly Income and Social Mobility of Students and Faculty in Madrassas in Pakistan

The following information has been collected in response to section 1 of the questionnaire which is given in Annexure-2. These questions are about the income of the family and, in the case of teachers, the medium of instruction of the school which they attended and their children attended.

Section-1: Monthly Income

The figures below give the monthly income of the families of students and faculty as reported by them in our sample. Those who have not written the income, as well as those those who have, have been tabulated separately. The correspondence with socio-economic class, however rough, is as follows:

Working (lower) class = Upto Rs 5000 per month.

Lower middle class = 5001 – 10,000

Middle class = 10,001-20,000

Upper middle class = 20,001 – 50,000

Lower upper class = 50,001 – 100,000

Middle upper class = Above 100,000

The income is for the whole family and not of the individuals earning it. In most cases income of female has not been written presumably because they are housewives and do not get paid. In case their income is written, the family income is calculated by adding their income to the income of the male earning member’s income.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Students

N = 142

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000- 100,000
Pay father	65 of 142 (47.77%)	59 of 77 (76.62%)	10 of 77 (14.86%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	Nil
Pay mother	139 of 142 (97.89%)	02 of 3 (66.66%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and Mother	N.A	1 of 3 (33.33%)	01 of 3 (33.33%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)
Analysis: Most madrassa students belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Teachers

N = 27

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000
Pay self	09 of 27 (33.33%)	13 of 18 (72.22%)	03 of 18 (16.66%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse	26 of 27 (96.30%)	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis: Most madrassa teachers belong to the working classes.

Section-2: Social Moblity

Social mobility has been measured in the case of teachers. The only indicators which have been taken into account are (a) the medium of instruction of the teachers themselves when they were students (b) the medium of instruction of their children. As English-medium school are more expensive than Urdu-or Sindhi medium ones, it is assumed that, when people get relatively prosperous, they tend to educate their children in English-medium schools.

Medium of Instruction in School
	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Own*	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Children’s	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)

*NB: Out of 25 teachers, 2 (8%) wrote Pashto and 2 (8%) wrote Arabic as their medium of instruction.

Annexure-2

SURVEY 2003

Survey of Schools and Madrassas

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of two research assistants Imran Farid and Shahid Gondal whom I take this opportunity to thank. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, to which I am very grateful.

Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools (3) Cadet Colleges/Public Schools and (4) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:

TEACHERS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Cadet college/public schools	51	Nil	51
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			243

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Cadet college/public schools	130	Nil	130
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			618

As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan.

The ages of the students are as follows:

Institutions	Mean	Mode	Range
Cadet colleges	15.5	15	12-19
Madrassas	19	20	14-27
English-medium schools	14.1	15	13-18

In the case of the madrassas the range is higher because some of the sanvia class groups had older boys who had joined the seminary late. In the O’level groups both 10^th and 11^th were represented. Urdu-medium schools had only class-10 clusters.

There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.

The questionnaires for students and teachers are reproduced here. Please note that part-2 (on opinions) is exactly the same. Only part-1 is different for both.

QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.

1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D

3. Which subject (s) do you teach?

What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.

What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?

What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?

QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDENTS)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.

1. age.

2. Class

3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?

PART-II

(for both faculty and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools	Govt Colleges (326)	Public Universities (206)	Private Universities (133)
1.	Open War	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92	46.01	34.95	35.34
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00	48.47	55.34	57.89
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08	5.52	9.71	6.77
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08	50.00	46.12	34.59
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00	38.04	43.20	57.14
		Don’t Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92	11.96	10.68	8.27
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15	60.43	58.25	57.14
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92	22.70	28.64	35.34
		Don’t Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92	16.87	13.11	7.52
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54	38.04	38.83	40.60
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92	38.34	49.51	36.84
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54	23.62	11.65	22.56
5.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62	59.20	54.37	69.92
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54	31.90	38.83	21.05
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85	8.89	6.80	9.02
6.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92	72.09	66.99	78.95
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46	21.17	29.13	14.29
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62	6.75	3.88	6.77
7.	Women	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69	65.34	64.56	76.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38	30.98	31.55	17.29
		Don’t Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92	3.68	3.88	6.02

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).
Comparative Chart for Opinions of Faculty Members of Different

Educational Institutions

			Madrassas (27)	Urdu-medium schools (100)	English-medium schools (65)	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools (51)	Govt Colleges (127)	Private Universities (44)	Public Universities (127)
1.	Open War	Yes	70.37	20	26.15	19.61	20.47	20.45	14.17
		No	22.22	70	64.62	68.63	68.50	63.64	77.17
		Don’t Know	7.41	10	9.23	11.76	11.02	15.91	8.66
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	59.26	19	38.46	39.22	18.11	34.09	25.98
		No	26.63	68	50.77	52.94	63.78	45.45	62.99
		Don’t Know	11.11	13	10.77	7.84	18.11	20.45	11.02
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	29.63	85	60.00	66.66	77.17	68.18	75.59
		No	66.67	10	33.85	19.61	13.39	18.18	18.11
		Don’t Know	3.70	5	6.15	13.73	9.45	13.64	6.30
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	3.70	27	43.07	29.41	32.28	59.09	50.39
		No	96.23	65	36.92	62.75	52.76	29.55	34.65
		Don’t Know	NIL	8	20.00	7.84	14.96	11.36	14.96
5.	Hindus	Yes	14.81	37	61.54	60.78	41.73	68.18	66.14
		No	85.19	58	26.15	35.29	48.03	22.73	25.98
		Don’t Know	NIL	5	12.31	3.92	10.24	9.09	7.87
6.	Christians	Yes	18.52	52	81.54	60.18	59.06	75.00	68.50
		No	77.77	42	10.77	33.33	32.28	15.91	24.41
		Don’t Know	3.70	6	7.69	5.88	8.66	9.09	7.09
7.	Women	Yes	3.70	61	78.46	37.25	66.14	79.55	71.65
		No	96.67	33	13.85	58.82	30.71	15.91	22.05
		Don’t Know	NIL	6	7.69	3.92	3.15	4.55	6.30

Annexure-3

NUMBER OF MADRASSAS

The Government of Pakistan’s report on the madrassas (GOP 1988) has given the number of madrassas in every province and other parts of Pakistan. The report, along with the increase in recent years, is being reproduced here. However, the numbers in each province is not available in recent sources. Thus the numbers for 2002 are based on many sources (like IPS 2002 and Khalid 2002) and do not give a reliable picture for all provinces.

Area	Others/ Jamat		Deobandi		Barelvi@		Ahl-i-Hadith		Shia		Total
	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002
Punjab	43	Nk	500	1176	548	994	118	Nk	21	202	1320	2372+
NWFP	8	Nk	631	382?	32	51	5	Nk	2	13	678	446+
Sindh	6	Nk	208	687	61	487	6	26	10	48	291	1248
B’tan	31	Nk	278	624	34	25	3	Nk	1	15	347	664+
AK	3	Nk	51	36	20	28	2	Nk	Nil	03	76	140+
Islamabad	3	Nk	51	Nk	20	Nk	Nil	Nk	2	7	76	7+
FANA	3	Nk	60	Nk	2	Nk	27	Nk	11	33	103	33+
Girls Madrassas	Nk	40	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	448
Total of Sects	97	500	1779	7000	717	1585	161	376	47	419	2801	9,880
Source: For 1988 GOP 1988. For other figures the sources are given below.

+ The sign of plus means that the number of madrassas is more but cannot be determined.

x For madrassas in Sindh in 2002, Report by Sindh police quoted in Dawn [Karachi] 16 January 2003

@ For Barelvi Madrassas, except those in Sindh, see Fehrist Madaris-e-Mulhaqa (Lahore: Tanzeem ul Madris, 1996).

The number of the madrassas given by the Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Shia), Lahore, is 354 which is more than the number which comes from adding the madrassas given in the police report for Sindh. The number for 2000 given in IPS 2002 is 297 (p. 32).

Nk = Not Known. Note: Numbers do not add up because the number of madrassas in the provinces is not given for 2002.

REFERENCES

Section-1

Primary Sources

Madrassa Books (Radd-Texts)

Qasim, Muhammad. n.d. Hidayat ul Shi’a Multan: Taleefat -e-Ashrafiya. [Refutes Shia doctrines].

Nadvi, Syed Abul Hasan Ali .n.d. Muslim Mamalik Mein Islamiat our Maghribiat Ki Kash Makash Karachi: Majlis-e-Nashriat-e-Islam. [historical and philosophical book about the conflict between Islam and Westernization in the Muslim world].

Nomani, Mohamad Manzur. 2002 Futuhat-e-Nomania: Manzir-e-Ahl-e-Sunnat Lahore: Anjuman-e-Irshad ul Muslameen [Discussions between Deobandis and Barelvis written by Deobandis to refute the Barelvis. Very polemical]

Section-2

Secondary Sources

Ahmad, Mumtaz .2000. ‘Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan’. In Baxter, Craig and Kennedy, Charles H. (eds) Pakistan 2000 Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Ahmed, Khalid. 2002. ‘The Power of the Ahle Hadith’, The Friday Times [English weekly from Lahore] 12-18 July.

Ahmed, Qeyamuddin. 1994. The Wahabi Movement in India New Delhi: Manohar.

Bergen, Peter L. 2001. Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden New York : Simon & Schuster Inc.

Cooley, John .K. 1999. Unholy War: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism London: Pluto Press.

Friedmann, Yohann. 1989. Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background Berkeley; University of California Press.

GOP. 1988. Deeni Madaris ki Jame Report [Urdu] Islamabad: Islamic Education Research Cell, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan.

___. 2002. Education Sector Reforms: Action Plan 2001-2004 Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Educaation.

Haqqani, Husain. 2002. ‘Islam’s Medieval Outposts’, Foreign Affairs (December), 58-` 64.

Hussain, Fayyaz. 1994. ‘An Ethnographic study of Jamia Ashrafia; A religious school at Lahore With Special Emphasis on Socio-practical Relevance of its objective’. M.Sc Dissertation, Dept of Anthropology, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

ICG. 2002. Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military Islamabad/Brussels: International Advisory Group Asia Report No. 36, 29 July 2002.

IPS. 1987. Deeni Madaris ka Nizam-e-Taleem [Urdu: The System of Education of the Religious Madrassas]. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

___. 2002. Pakistan: Religious Education Institutions---An Overview Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Jafri, S.H.M. 1979. The Origins and Early Development of Shia Islam This edition. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Khalid, Saleem Mansoor. (ed.). 2002. Deeni Madaris Mein Taleem [Urdu: Education in the Religious Seminaries] Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Kraan, J.D. 1984. Religious Education in Islam with Special Reference to Pakistan: An Introduction and Bibliography, Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre.

Lamb, Alistair. 1997. Incomplete Partition : The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948 Karachi : Oxford University press.

Liberal, Forum. 2003. Ideas on Democracy, Freedom and Peace in Textbooks: Campaign against hate speech: Islamabad: Liberal Forum of Pakistan, Future Youth Group.

Mahmoudi, Abdelrashid. 1998. Taha Husain’s Education: From the Azhar to the Sorbonne Surrey: Curzon Press.

Mansoor, Hasan . 2003. “Groundwork to Modernise Seminaries Begins”, The Friday Times [Lahore] 1-7 August.

Maudoodi, Abul Ala. 1974. Talimat [Urdu: education] Lahore: Islamic Publications.

Metcalf, Barbara D. 1982. Islamic Revival in British India : Deoband, 1860-1900 Repr. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1989.

Nasr, Sayyed Vali Reza. 1996 Mawdudi And the Making of Islamic Revivalism New York: Oxford University Press.

Nayyar, A.H 1998. ‘Madrassa Education: Frozen in Time’. In Hoodbhoy 1998: 213-250.

Rahman, Tairq. 2002 Language, Ideology and Power: Language-Learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Rashid, Ahmed. 2000. Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia London: 1. B Taurus.

______2002. Jihad : The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia Lahore : Vanguard.

Robinson, Francis. 2002 The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia Lahore: Feroz Sons.

Sanyal, Usha. 1996. Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Sikand, Yoginder. 2001. ‘The Indian State and the Madrasa’, Himal. From www//:himalmag.com

Singer, P.W. 2001. ‘Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not Jihad’. Analysis Paper # 14, November 2001. http://www.brookings. edu/views/papers/ singer/20020103.htm

Stephens, Joe and Ottaway, David B. 2002. ‘From U.S., the ABC’s of Jihad in Afghanistan’, The Washington Post, 23 March, 2002 p.1. Quoted from www//:washingtonpost.com

Sufi, G.M.D 1941. Al-Minhaj: Being the Evolution of Curriculum in the Muslim Educational Institutions of India Delhi: Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Dilhi. This edition. 1977.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim .1999. ‘Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrassa in British India and Pakistan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 41, No. 2.

………..2002. The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change Princeton: Princeton University Press.

SECTION –3

Interviews

Many ulema and most students of madrassas did not want their interviews to be recorded by name. Those who allowed their names to be mentioned are listed below.

Hussain, Mohammad. 2002. Interview with the Nazim-e-Daftar of Jamiat us Safia’, Islamabad, 13 December.

Zafar, Mohammad Iqbal. 2002. ‘Interview with the Head of Jamia Rizvia Zia ul

Uloom, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi, 26 December.