DENIZENS OF ALIEN WORLDS

A Survey of the Education System

of

Pakistan

By

Tariq Rahman

DENIZENS OF ALIEN WORLDS: A Survey of the Education System

of Pakistan

1. Introduction

Every year the Government of Pakistan (GOP) publishes some report or the other about education. If it does not publish a specific report about education, at the Economic Survey of Pakistan carries a chapter on education. These reports confess that the literacy level is low, the rate of participation in education at all levels is low, and the country is spending too little in this area. Then there are brave promises about the future, such as the achievement of hundred percent literacy, increase in spending on education to 4 per cent (it has been hovering around 2 per cent for many years) and so on.

While there are several books on education (Quddus 1979; Zaman 1981; Hayes 1987) they defend present policies, talk of the necessity of nation-building and focus on public-funded schooling (i.e. vernacular-medium schools). They do not describe cadet colleges, private elitist English-medium schools and madrassas (Islamic seminaries) except in passing. Indeed, while government reports do give some space to the madrassas and some to cadet colleges, writers on education do not treating them as exceptions and therefore not deserving much treatment. Indeed, the collection of articles on education edited by Pervez Hoodbhoy on the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of Pakistan, Education and the State (1998), is exceptional in that it describes schools run by Non-Governmental Organizations (Baqir 1998: Chapter 6), Community-based Organizations (Khan 1998: Chapter 7) and the madrassas (Nayyar 1998: Chapter 8). But even this book does not touch upon the elitist English-medium schools either of the private type or cadet colleges. This has, however, been done with reference to language-teaching and world view in the present author’s previous book Language, Ideology and Power (Rahman 2002). To give a realistic picture of Pakistan’s schooling system one must look at the following major streams of education: Urdu-medium schools, English-medium elitist schools and madrassas. There are other types of schools also. For instance, private entrepreneurs and NGOs etc run non-elitist English-medium schools which cater to the lower middle classes and the working classes and which are not very different from the Urdu-medium ones. They do claim to teach all subjects in English but their teachers are generally not competent to do so. Thus the teaching is actually in Urdu. Then there are the Sindhi-medium and Pashto-medium schools also but the former are only found in the Sindhi-speaking part of Sindh while the latter are only up to class-5 after which the students join Urdu-medium schools. In short, a study of the above noted major types of institutions gives a good idea of the Pakistani educational system.

What is really alarming, and relatively less known, is the fact that the students of these institutions (the vernacular-medium schools, English-medium schools and madrassas) have such different opinions as to live in different worlds. This has happened partly because their textbooks and methods of learning are different and partly because their teachers, the discourses they are exposed to inside and outside school, and their families are so different from each other. Indeed, all these influences are from worlds which are alien, and even hostile, to each other. To understand these different institutions and their products is to understand how dangerously polarized Pakistani society is and how this has hampered national cohesion and a sense of commitment to unified policies.

2. OBJECTIVES

The objective of this article is to describe the three major streams of education--- madrassa, English-medium and Urdu-medium--- with a view to determining how they function and what kind of opinions or world view, their students express.

3. METHODOLOGY

The historical part of the report relies upon documents on education policy and published sources. The condition of educational institutions at present relies both on published and unpublished sources such as school budget statements, interviews of teachers and administrators and so on. The most interesting part of the report is about the views of 618 students 243 teachers about sensitive and controversial issues such as Kashmir, the rights of minorities and those of women etc. These have been carried out between December 2002 to June 2003 in Urdu -medium schools, private elitist English-medium schools, cadet colleges and Sunni madrassas.

4. Educational Policies in Pakistan

Beginning with the National Education Conference of 1947 there have been at least twenty-two major reports on education issued by the government from time to time. Among the most salient ones are: Report of the Commission on National Education (GOP 1959); The New Education Policy (GOP 1970); The Education Policy (1972-1980) (GOP 1972); National Education Policy (GOP 1992) and the National Education Policy: 1998-2010 (GOP 1998). These reports have been summed up very ably by Kaiser Bengali who tells us that ‘setting targets, bemoaning the failure to achieve the same, and setting new targets with unqualified optimism has been a continuing game policy makers have played ad nauseam and at great public expense over the last 50 years (Bengali 1999: 41).

These educational reports touch upon all kinds of educational institutions but they focus more on modern education provided in the government schools, colleges and universities. For the madrassas, however, the government commissioned separate reports of which the best known are: The report of the National Committee on the Religious Seminaries (GOP 1979); and the comprehensive report on the madrassas (GOP 1988).

After discounting all the rhetoric about development several salient features of the states’ real educational policy become clear. They are as follows:

(1) To allow the status quo to prevail as far as possible (i.e. a class-based system of education functioning in different languages: the vernaculars for the common people and English for the elite).

(2) To use Islam and Pakistani nationalism to prevent ethnic groups from breaking away from the centre and to build a modern, cohesive nation out of different linguistic and ethnic groups.

(3) To enhance literacy, impart skills and create an educated workforce capable of running a developing society.

These features were mutually contradictory at times. For instance, it is not possible to create an educated workforce capable of running a modern state if most people get only sub-standard education in the ordinary vernacular-medium schools. Moreover, by denying ethnicity what is promoted is not necessarily cohesiveness but resentment against the Punjabi-dominated centre.

The first feature, of which the decision-makers may not have been conscious, was actually the result of unequal distribution of educational funds and the educational bureaucracy’s inertia. Thus, while government schools in the rural areas do not even have chairs for the pupils, the great so-called ‘Public’ schools (‘Public’ in the sense of the public schools of Britain such as Eton and Harrow), have not only facilities but even luxuries for their pupils. The second aim, that of nation-building through Islam and Pakistani nationalism, was a conscious objective but it was not always pursued in the same manner or with equal vigour. During General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule (1977-1988) the Islamization of education and textbooks was more thorough than at any other time. The Islamic Ideology Council, established in sixties, passed most of its Islamizing recommendations during the Zia ul Haq period (see CII 1993). The third aim, that of improving literacy and other educational skills through conscious efforts, suffered as a result of the other two as we have described above. While elitist children found it much easier to enter elitist domains of power, ordinary government school pupils found it much more difficult and the students of madrassas were, in reality, barred from them. Thus the workforce was almost as class differentiated as a result of the process of education as society otherwise was.

5. Urdu-Medium Schools

The number of all government schools is given as follows in the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2002)

Box-1
Level	Number	Student Strength	Teachers
Primary	169,089	19,921,232	345,457
Middle	19,180	4,278,392	99,098
Secondary	13,108	1,795,444	66,522
Source GOP 2002 : 146

These numbers include Sindhi-medium government schools also. The number of these, however, was 36,750 in 1998. The Pashto-medium primary schools were 10,731 in 1999 (field research). Thus, most of these schools are Urdu-medium ones.

These students and teachers both come from the lower-middle class. In a small survey of 230 students and 100 teachers of Urdu-medium schools undertaken in December 2002 and January 2003, it was discovered that they belonged to low income groups. They were reluctant to reveal their families’ income because of the social stigma of poverty so that 95 (41.30 per cent) did not write their father’s income. As for mothers, most of them did not have paid employment. Those who are in the lower middle class income group, i.e. between Rs. 5001 to 10,000 per month, are 26.66%.. Very few families are in higher income brackets (see Annexure 1 for details).

Most teachers (65.96%) have an income of between Rs. 5001 to 10,000 per month i.e. they belong to the lower middle class. Those few families (only 18) where both spouses work have a higher income going into the upper middle class bracket. i.e between 20,001 to 50,000 (see Annexure-1 for details).

Schools are not accessible to all children and even where they do exist, attending them daily requires considerable time, energy and money. According to the PIHS (2002) most children travel less than 2 kms and very few travel more than 5 kms to their schools. However, girls do have to travel long distances in Balochistan and Sindh which is difficult and unsafe for them.

Schools are very dull and stringent places, often painted blue, and with broken glass panes. They are highly regimented with semi-educated teachers forcing their pupils to memorize passages out of badly written, badly printed and extremely dull books. Classrooms are overcrowded with 41 girls and 38 boys per teacher in the primary schools of all provinces except Balochistan. In Balochinstan, the most deprived province of all, there are 48 girls per teacher (PIHS 2002).

After ten years of schooling students sit for examinations held by the different Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education. Most of the examination papers are in Urdu (except in Sindh where they are in Sindhi) and English is like a sieve which separates the ‘sheep’ from the ‘goats’.

5.1 Influences of Textbooks on Urdu-medium School Students

Textbooks are one out of many influences on a person’s worldview. How significant the influence may be depends on many variables---teachers, peer group pressure, family and friends, childhood experiences, exposure to discourses other than textbooks---and cannot be easily determined. What can be determined, however, is the intention of the writers of textbooks; the policy guidelines of those who get the textbooks written; and the values which the educational authorities responsible for writing and disseminating textbooks in educational systems support (see Annexure-3 for the various influences on students).

In general these values belong to the ‘in-group’ i.e. they are values and perceptions which support one’s own group: nation, ethnic group, religious group, ideological group etc. This necessitates the creation of an ‘out-group’ or ‘Other’ which must be held in opposition to the self. The ‘Other’ is generally created on the basis of selective data and in this process of creation it is transformed. It may either be romanticized or demonized. Edward Said in his book Orientalism (1978) tells us how the European scholars of the Orient created an image of the ‘Other’ which made it the ‘Other’ of the Occident. Said further postulates that this justified the conquest of the Orient in order to ‘civilize’ it.

Most of the 25,995,068 (GOP 2002: 146) students, being from Urdu-medium schools, study the textbooks provided by the Textbook Boards of the provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan) which constitute Pakistan. Ethnicity is denied so as to create a Pakistani identity although these centrist policies have been resented by ethnic communities and have resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 but still the textbooks reinforce them (for ethnic politics see Amin 1988; Rahman 1996 and Ahmed 1998). There is also much glorification of war and the military and many anti-Hindu and anti-India remarks and together bias interspersed throughout the books (for detailed analysis see Aziz 1993; Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 1995; Saigol 1995; and Rahman 2002: 515-524. For a comparison between the history textbooks of India and Pakistan see Kumar 2001).

5.2 Instructional Objectives and Methods

The Government of Pakistan lays down certain objectives for the teaching of various subjects. These are often ideological. They use Islam as a marker of identity to define the boundaries of the self. The ‘Other’ is, by definition, non-Muslim. However, this notion of Islam is so tempered with nationalism as to exclude Indian Hindus rather than non-Muslims who are friendly with Pakistan. Because of this Pakistani students exposed to the Textbook Board books tend to be intolerant of Hindus, Christians and non-Muslim minorities.

It should be added that lessons are taught through rote learning in crammed classes where the teacher is authoritative and, indeed, very intimidating. The teacher often makes a child recite the lesson in a sing-song voice (ek dooni dooni; do dooni char) and the class joins in the chorus. Children rock their bodies as they chant the familiar parroted formulas. Nor does this happen in arithmetical tables only---of which the above is an example---but, indeed, it is the major method of instruction. Essays in languages are written on the black board to be copied verbatim. Any originality, any questioning of given facts, any deviation from the traditional interpretation is frowned upon and sometimes punished. Actually, what will become clear later in the context of madrassa education, the Urdu-medium schools continue the tradition of the madrassa which functioned in a society in transition from orality to literacy (hence the use of mnemonic devices, repetition, chorus etc) and one which had to conserve the sacred texts and their orthodox interpretations from the irreverent attacks of the heretics (hence the intolerance of questioning and analytical analysis leading to new results).

Hence, while the British implanted modern education in India, it adopted itself to time-honoured cultural norms and became a hybrid between madrassa education and modern education.

5.3 Funding of Urdu schools

The average expenditure per pupil per year in ordinary Urdu-medium government schools can be judged by looking at the schools of the Rawalpindi district in 2003.

Box-2 Cost Per Pupil Per Year in Urdu-Medium Government Schools in 2003 (Rawalpindi District)
	Male	Female	Total
Schools	1,191	1,213	2,404
Enrollment	389,259	170,696	559,955
Teachers	7,236	6,073	13,309
Teachers/student ratio	54 students per teacher	28 per teacher	42 per teacher
Budget			Rs. 1268 million
Cost per pupil per year	-	-	Rs. 2,264.5
Cost to the state (per pupil per year)	-	-	Rs. 2,264.5
Source: Office of the District Executive officer (Education), Rawalpindi.

Just as the poorest children have the lowest enrolment in schools, they also tend to drop out more than others. Thus 53 per cent of the poorest quintile dropped out before completing class 6 compared with only 23 per cent of the richest quintile (HID 2002: 15). Parents explain this as lack of motivation as do teachers. This shifts the burden of failure on to the pupil. However, if one considers the extremely harsh conditions at home and the cruel treatment children receive at school, one wonders why more do not drop out.

5.4 Other Influences on Urdu-Medium Students

Urdu-medium students, being from the upper-working and lower-middle class backgrounds, are less exposed to Western discourses available on cable T.V, English books and in the conversation of peer group members, family and friends who have been abroad. Their families are conservative and religious as Jasmin Mirza, a sociologist working on transformation of norms governing gender-specific behaviour in Lahore, has mentioned in relation to women (Mirza 2002). The Urdu newspapers, which their family reads or hears being read out in the bazaar, are also conservative and religious. Their teachers, being from the same socio-economic class, reinforce the ideas otherwise disseminated by the Urdu press (see the views of teachers given below), the school textbooks, the Pakistani official radio and T.V, the families and the peer group. These ideas---the worldview of the lower middle classes in Pakistan---favour the Islamization of the state though they do not favour rule by the clergy. This is often explained by saying that maulvis are harsh, or corrupt or not aware of modern ideas but that Islam, if implemented in its true spirit by honest and enlightened leaders, can solve all social problems. A corollary of this Islamic outlook is emotionality about religious issues and, hence, intolerance for the religious ‘Other’ i.e. the Hindu, the Ahmedi² and, to a lesser degree, the Christian. Part of this emotion has also been transferred to Pakistani nationalism. Indeed, the use of religious symbolism to sacralize the Pakistan movement, the wars with India and particularly the Kashmir dispute with India has been partly successful though students seem to be aware that an open war with India would be disastrous. Thus teachers, parents and the peer group reinforce chauvinistic views in this socio-economic class in the urban centers of the N.W.F.P, Punjab and to some extent in Karachi.

According to the survey of 230 students and 100 teachers of Urdu-medium schools given in Annexure-2 they are not supportive of open war with India but a slightly larger number supports low intensity war in Kashmir. They are quite intolerant of religious minorities but do approve of men and women having equal rights as in Western countries (see Annexure-2).

Despite the predominance of such views not all children are brainwashed into believing them to the exclusion of other opinions. Similarly, despite the rote-learning forced upon students, not all of them lack analytical skills later in life. And despite English being a formidable barrier---more students fail in it than in other compulsory subjects (see Annexure-4). Some students learn it and enter the highest services in Pakistan and abroad. This speaks highly of the motivation and innate abilities of the successful students but it should be kept in mind that they succeed in spite of the system not because of it.

6. Madrassas

The madrassas are associated with the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan some of whom were students of these institutions (see Rashid 2000). They have also been much in the news for sectarian killings and supporting militancy in Kashmir, They are considered the breeding ground of the Jihadi culture–a term used for Islamic militancy in the English-language press of Pakistan (Singer 2001; Haqqani 2002; Ahmad 2000: 191-192). In India too they have been attacked be the Hindu extremists which accuse them of creating hatred against non-Muslims (Sikand 2003). However, the historical development of the madrassas has not received the attention which it deserves though promising article-length studies exist (a good example is by Zaman 1999).

There is hardly any credible information on the unregistered madrassas. However, those which are registered are controlled by their own central organizations or boards. They determine the syllabi, collect a registration fees and an examination fees. They send examination papers, in Urdu and Arabic, to the madrassas where pupils sit for examinations and declare results. The names of the boards are as follows:-

Box-3
Central Boards of Madrassas in Pakistan
Name	Sub-Sect	Place	Date Established
Wafaq ul Madaris	Deobandi	Multan	1958
Tanzim ul Madaris	Barelvi	Lahore	1960
Wafaq ul Madaris (Shia) Pakistan	Shia	Lahore	1962
Rabta-tul-Madaris-al-Islamia	Jamat-i-Islami	Lahore	1986 (unified syllabus adopted).
Wafq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia	Ahl-i-Hadith	Faislabad	1978
Source: Offices of the respective Boards.

At independence there were 137, or even fewer, madrassas. In April 2002, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, put the figure at 10,000 with 1.7 million students (ICG 2002: 2). They belong to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shias, However, Pakistan being a predominantly Sunni country, the Shia ones are very few. Among the Sunni ones there are three sub-sects: Deobandis, Barelvis and the Ahl-i-Hadith (salafi). Besides these, the revivalist Jamat-e-Islami also has its own madrassas.

The number of madrassas has been increasing during General Zia ul Haq’s rule (1977-1988). During the war by Islamic Afghan groups in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union the United States sent in money, arms and ammunition through Pakistan which is said to have been used to support the madrassas. Later, presumably because religiously inspired and madrassa students infiltrated across the line of control to fight the Indian army in Kashmir, they were supported by the Pakistan army (specifically the Inter Services Intelligence agency). However, both the ISI and the madrassas deny these links (see several issues of Wafaq al Madaris) and therefore, it cannot be ascertained as to how many madrassas have increased by the financial aid provided by foreign donors or the Pakistan army. The increase in the number of registered madrassas is phenomenal: from 2002 in 1988 to 9880 in 2002. The Deobandi madrassas, the ones most closely allied to the Taliban, have gone up from 1779 to over 7000. (for details of increase in provinces see Annexure 5). P.W. Singer gives the figure of 45,000 madrassas but quotes no source for this number (Singer 2001).

The Saudi Arabian organization, Harmain Islamic Foundation, is said to have helped the Ahl-i-Hadith and made them powerful. Indeed, the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, an organization which has been active in fighting in Kashmir, belongs to the Ahl-i-Hadith (Ahmed 2002: 10). In recent years, the Deobandi influence has increased as the Taliban were trained in their seminaries.

6.1 The Sectarian Divide Among the Madrassas

Because of the disintegration of the Mughal empire and colonial rule, Indian Muslims felt threatened, disillusioned and frustrated. Some, like Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareilly (1786-1831), responded militantly but were defeated. Others, like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1808-1898) learnt English, entered the British bureaucracy and became junior partners of the British in the exercise of power. Still others, blaming Muslims themselves for their loss of power, tried to purify Islam in various ways. The Wahabis (also called Al-i-Hadith), the Deobandis, the Barelvis among the Sunnis as well as the Shias created madrassas to preserve and propagate what, in their view, was the correct interpretation of Islam.

6.2. The Curriculum of the Madrassas

Before Mulla Nizam Uddin standardized the curriculum known as the Dars-i-Nazami different teachers taught different books to students.

In Pakistan, however, the Dars-i-Nizami has been modified though the canonical texts are still there. In my view these texts are used as a symbol of continuity and identity. The madrassas saw themselves as preservers of Islamic identity and heritage during the colonial era when secular studies displaced the Islamic texts as well as the classical languages of the Indian Muslims---Arabic and Persian---from their privileged pedestal. Thus the madrassas, despite the desire to reform their courses, do not give up the canonical texts (for a debate on reform see IPS 1987). The greatest critic of the madrassa texts was Maulana Maududi who argued that, being based on memorization of medieval texts, the madrassas were not providing relevant education to the Muslim society (Maududi 1974).

However, though old books like Sarf-e-Meer and Kafiya remain in the course, easier and more modern books are used to supplement them. Arabic, for instance, is taught through modern and much easier books than the canonical works mentioned in the Dars-i-Nizami (for details see Rahman 2002: 106-1-7). The canonical texts are taught in Arabic but, because students do not become really competent in the language, they are either memorized or understood from Urdu translations available in the market.

The Dars-i-Nizami has come to symbolize the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught through canonical texts which, however, are taught through commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes (hashiya) and supercommentaries (taqarir). There are commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries. For the South Asian students, they no longer explain the original text being themselves in Arabic. They have to be learned by heart which makes students use only their memory not their analytical powers. Indeed, the assumption on which the Dars functions is that the past was a golden age in which all that was best has already been written. What remains to the modern age is merely to preserve it. It was this backward-looking nature of core madrassa texts which made Taha Hussain (1889--1973), the famous blind modernist scholar of Egypt, disillusioned with Jamia Azhar in Cairo (Mahmoudi 1998: 20).

What was true of Jamia Azhar in 1902 (when Taha went to that seat of learning) is judged to be true of South Asian madrassas, or at least the Dars-i-Nizami component taught there, even now---and the judges are Arabic-knowing authorities such as Maudoodi and not only Western critics of the madrassas.

6.3 The Refutation of Other Sects and Sub-Sects

Refutation (Radd in Urdu) has always been part of religious education. However, it is only in recent years that it has been blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan. They do, indeed, teach their maslak (interpretation of religion) which is obviously sectarian or sub-sectarian. However, this has been going on for a long time.

Barbara Metcalf describes the munazras (theological debate) between the Christians, Muslims and Arya Samajists (1982: 219-232) in her book. There were also very bitter as the Deobandi-Barelvi munazras of 1928 collected in Futoohat-e-Nomania (Nomani n.d) illustrate. Moreover, the pioneers of the sects and sub-sects did indulge in refuting each other’s beliefs.

As the inculcation of sectarian bias is an offence, no madrassa teacher or administrator confessed to teaching any text refuting the beliefs of other sects. Maulana Mohammad Hussain, Nazim-e-Madrassa Jamiat us-Salfia (Ahl-i-Hadith) (Islamabad) said that comparative religious was taught in the final Almiya (M.A) class and it did contain material refuting heretical beliefs. Moreover, Islam was confirmed as the only true religion, refuting other religions. The library did contain books refuting other sects and sub-sects but they were not prescribed in the syllabus. Maulana Muhammad Ishaq Zafar of the Jamia Rizvia Aiz ul Uloom (Barelvi) in Rawalpindi said that books against other sects were not taught. However, during the interpretation of texts the maslak was passed on to the student. Students of the final year, when questioned specifically about the teaching of the maslak, said that it was taught through questions and answers, interpretation of texts and sometimes some teachers recommended supplementary reading material specifically for the refutation of the doctrines of other sects and sub-sects.

In some cases, as in the Jamia Ashrafia, a famous Deobandi seminary of Lahore, an institution for publication, established in 1993, publishes ‘only those articles and journals which are written by the scholars of Deoband school of thought. (Hussain 1994: 42). Moreover, in writings, sermons, and conversation, the teachers refer to the pioneers of their own maslak so that the views of the sub-sect are internalized and became the primary way of thinking.

However, despite all denials, the printed syllabi of the following sects do have books to refute the beliefs of other sects. The Report on the Religious Seminaries (GOP 1988) lists several books of Deobandi madrassas to refute Shia beliefs including Maulana Mohammad Qasim’s Hadiyat ul Shia which has been reprinted several times and is still in print. There are also several books on the debates between the Barelvis and the Deobandis and even a book refuting Maudoodi’s views (GOP 1988: 73-74) The Barelvis have given only one book Rashidiya under the heading of ‘preparation for debates on controversial issues’ (Ibid, p.76). The Ahl-i-Hadith have given a choice of opting for any two of the following courses: the political system of Islam, the economic system of Islam, Ibn-e-Khaldun'’ Muqaddamah, the history of ideas and comparative religious systems. The Shia courses list no book on this subject.

Recently published courses list no book on maslak for the Deobandis. The Barelvis mention ‘comparative religions’ but no specific books. The Ahl-i-Hadith retain almost the same optional courses as before. The Shia madrassas list books on beliefs which includes comparative religions in which, of courses, Shia beliefs are taught as the only true ones. Polemical pamphlets claiming that there are conspiracies against the Shias are available. Incidentally such pamphlets, warning about alleged Shia deviations from the correct interpretations of the faith are also in circulation among Sunni madrassas and religious organizations.

Moreover, some guidebooks for teachers note that Quranic verses about controversial issues should be taught with great attention and students should memorize them. In one Barelvi book it is specified that teachers must make the students note down interpretations of the ulema of their sub-sect concerning beliefs and controversial issues so that students can use them later --- i.e. as preachers and ulema.

The Jamat-i-Islami syllabus (2002) mentions additional books by Maulana Maudoodi and other intellectuals of the Jamat on a number of subjects including the Hadith. They also teach ‘comparative religions’.

6.4 The Refutation of Heretical Beliefs

One of the aims of the madrassas, ever since 1057 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad, was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influences which could change or dilute Islam. Other religions are refuted in ‘comparative religions’ but there are specific books for heresies within the Islamic world. In Pakistan the ulema unite in refuting the beliefs of the Ahmedis¹ (or Qaidianis) (for these views see Friedmann 1989). The Deoband course for the Aliya (B.A) degree included five books refuting Ahmedi beliefs (GOP 1988: 71). The Barelvis prescribe no specific books. However, the fatawa of the pioneer, Ahmad Raza Khan, are referred to and they refute the ideas of the other sects and sub-sects (Sanyal 1996). The Ahl-i-Hadith note that in ‘comparative religions’ they would refute the Ahmedi beliefs. The Shias too do not prescribe any specific books. The Jamat-i-Islami’s syllabus (2002) prescribes four books for the refutation of ‘Qaidiani religion’. Besides the Ahmedis, other beliefs deemed to be heretical are also refuted. All these books are written in a polemical style and are in Urdu which all madrassa students understand.

6.5 The Refutation of Alien Philosophies

The earliest madrassas refuted Greek philosophy which was seen as an intellectual invasion of the Muslim ideological space. Since the rise of the West, madrassas, and even more than them revivalist movements outside the madrassas, refute Western philosophies. Thus there are books given in the reading lists for Aliya (B.A) of 1988 by the Deobandis refuting capitalism, socialism, capitalism and feudalism. These books are no longer listed but they are in print and in the libraries of the madrassas. The Jamat-i-Islami probably goes to great lengths --- judging from its 2002 syllabus --- to make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies. Besides Maudoodi’s own books an all subjects relating to the modern world, a book on the conflict between Islam and Western ideas (Nadvi n.d) is widely available.

These texts, which may be called Radd-texts, may not be formally taught in most of the madrassas as the ulema claim, but they are being printed which means they are in circulation. They may be given as supplementary reading material or used in the arguments by the teachers which are probably internalized by the students. In any case, being in Urdu rather then Arabic, such texts can be comprehended rather than merely memorized. As such, without formally being given the centrality which the Dars-i-Nizami has, the opinions these texts disseminate --- opinions against other sects, sub-sects, views seen as being heretical by the ulema, Western ideas --- may be the major formative influence on the minds of Madrassa students. Thus, while it is true that education in the madrassa produces religious, sectarian, sub-sectarian and anti-Western bias, it may not be true to assume that this bias automatically translates into militancy and violence of the type Pakistan has experienced. For that to happen other factors ---- the arming of religious young men to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir; the state’s clampdown on free expression of political dissent during Zia ul Haq’s martial law; the appalling poverty of rural, peripheral areas and urban slums etc. etc ---must be taken into account.

As for teaching modern subjects, the Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas have been teaching Pakistan studies, English, Mathematics and General Science a long time (GOP 1988: 85). The Jamat-i-Islami also teachers secular subjects. The larger Deobandi, Barelvi and Shia madrassas too have made arrangements for teaching secular subjects including basic computer skills. However, the teaching is done by teachers approved of by the ulema or some of the ulema themselves. Thus the potential for secularization of these subjects, which is small in any case, is reduced to nothingness.

6.6 Poverty and Socioeconomic Class

Madrassas were supported by land grants and wealthy patrons in medieval India.

Madrassas in Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Some of them are also given financial assistance by foreign governments ---the Saudi government is said to help the Ahl-i-Hadith seminaries and the Iranian government the Shia ones---but there is no proof of this assistance. And even if it does exist, it goes only to a few madrassas whereas the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts etc).

According to the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, the annual expenditure on the seminary, which has about 700 students, is 40,00,000 rupees. Another madrassa, this time a Barelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students. This comes to Rs 5,714 per year (or Rs 476 per months) which is an incredibly small amount of money for education, books, board and lodging. As the madrassas generally do not charge a tuition fees---though they do charge a small admission fees which does not exceed Rs 400--- they attract very poor students who would not receive any education otherwise. According to Fayyaz Hussain, a student who competed his ethnographic research on Jamia Ashrafia of Lahore in 1994, students joined the madrassa for the following reasons:-

Box-4
Causes of Joining Madrassas Given by Students
Economic	48.95 per cent
Social	40.63 per cent
Religious	5.71 per cent
Educational	3.12 per cent
Political	2.09 per cent
Source: Hussain 1994 : 84

The categories have not been explained by the author nor is it known exactly what questions were asked from the students. According to Singer, the ‘Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential Madrassahs (it includes most of the Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni)---has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces’ (Singer 2001). According to a survey conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976 ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The remaining 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural laborers’ (quoted from Ahmad 2000: 185). The present researcher also observed that many students, upon probing, confessed that their parents had admitted them in the madrassas because they could not afford to feed them and educate them in the government schools. Even such students, while making this confession, also insist that they are in the madrassas because of their love for Islam.

In the survey of December 2002 and January 2003, madrassa students and teachers were asked about their income. Many did not reply these questions but those who did suggest that they belong to the working class or poor sections of society as 76.62% of their families have an income of upto Rs. 5000 per month. The teachers of the madrassas also belong to the same socio-economic class as their students since 72.22% have a family income of upto Rs. 5000 per month (see Annexure 1 for details).

Since the madrassas provide free food, clothes, books, notebooks and even jobs (at least in mosques, schools and other madrassas) they are attractive for poor people. In short the madrassas are performing the role of the welfare state in the country. This being so, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases. As they are from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.

6.7 The Worldview of Madrassa Students

The madrassa students are the most intolerant of all the other student groups in Pakistan. They are also the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy. They are also intolerant of religious minorities and do not support equal rights for men and women as in Western countries (see Annexure-2). The teaching of the views of the sub-sect (maslak) necessarily makes them prejudiced against other sects of Islam also. However, sectarian differences have always been there but have not been expressed as violently as they are expressed now in Pakistan.

General Pervez Musharraf’s military government, in an attempt to control religious extremism, made a law to control the madrassas. This law---Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance 2002---has, however, been rejected by most of the madrassas which want no state interference in their affairs (several issues of Wafaq ul Madaris (2002) and unstructured interviews of the ulema). Indeed, according to Singer, 4,350, about one tenth, agreed to be registered and the rest simply ignored the statute’ (Singer 2001). The number of those who did not register is not known.

The madrassas became militant when they were used by the Pakistani state to fight in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and then in Kashmir so as to force India to leave the state. Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir, as discussed by many including Alastair Lamb (1997), has led to conflict with India and the Islamic militants or Jihadis, who have entered the fray since 1989. The United States indirectly, and sometimes directly, helped in creating militancy among the clergy. For instance, special textbooks in Darri (Afghan Persian) and Pashto were written at the University of Nebraska-Omaha with a USAID grant in the 1980s (Stephens and Ottaway 2002: Sec A, p. 1). American arms and money flowed to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Inter services Intelligence as several books indicate (See Cooley 1999). At that time all this was done to defeat the Soviet Union. Later, while Pakistan’s military kept using the militant Islamists in Kashmir, the United States was much alarmed by them---not without reason as the events of Nine Eleven demonstrated later. After this catastrophic incident in which more than three thousand people died in New York, the Americans tried to understand the madrassas better. P.W. Singer, an analyst in the Brookings Institute who has been referred to earlier, wrote that there were 10-15 percent ‘radical’ madrassas which teach anti-American rhetoric, terrorism and even impart military training (Singer 2001). No proof for these claims was offered but they are credible given the fact that madrassa teachers often say that the U.S.A is at war with Islam.

Apart from the madrassas proper, religious parties---such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Harkat-ul-Mujahidin---print militant literature which circulates among the madrassas and other institutions². Although these parties have been banned, their member are said to be dispersed all over Pakistan, especially in the madrassas. The madrassas, then, may be the potential centres of Islamic militancy in Pakistan.

7. English-Medium Schools

The stated official policy of the government is that public money will be spent on schools which will use Urdu (and Sindhi only in parts of Sindh) as the medium of instruction. It is often stated that private educational institutions are run by private resources and enterprise. However, this is only partly true as we shall see below.

7.1 Cadet Colleges/Public Schools

In Pakistan the armed forces and the higher bureaucracy use English for official purposes. Thus they were interested in obtaining young people who were competent in that language. Moreover the elite which aspired for jobs in the modern domains of power: the officer corps of the armed forces; higher bureaucracy; superior judiciary; commerce; media; higher education etc---was very desirous of teaching English to their children. They could either buy it at exorbitant cost at the private elitist schools or they could establish institutions where English would be the medium of instruction but the cost would be lower---at least for their own wards. It was for the latter purpose that General Ayub Khan, as the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army in the nineteen fifties, established ‘a number of cadet colleges and academies’ (Khan 1967: 43). In 1966 the students from less privileged schools protested against these institutions. The government appointed a commission under Justice Hamood Ur Rahman to probe into the causes of the student’s complaints. This commission, called the commission an Student’s Welfare and problems, published a report in which, surprisingly, it agreed that such schools violated the constitutional assurance that ‘all citizens are equal before law (Paragraph 15 under Right No. VI)’ (GOP 1966:18) but defended them as the training schools of the future leaders of the country (GOP 1966: 18).

As a result the cadet colleges multiplied. Indeed, the armed forces through the Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen Foundation (Air Force) and the Bahria Foundation (Navy) created many more institutions from the nineteen seventies onwards. The Fauji Foundation, for instance runs 88 secondary and 4 higher secondary schools. These schools charge a low tuition fees from beneficiaries (retired military personnel) while charging much higher fees from civilians. The rates of tuition fees vary from rural to urban areas and from category to category. Beneficiaries, pay much lower fees than civilians. In Rawalpindi, for instance, the following rates of fees prevail: retired army non-commissioned ranks pay Rs. 150; retired officers Rs. 310; serving non-commissioned ranks Rs. 260; serving officers Rs. 450 while civilians pay Rs. 1000 per month for the education of their wards from class 6-10 (information given by the head office of the Fauji Foundation, Rawalpindi). The Airforce says in its manual on the Air University that ‘the PAF has come to establish over 25 schools and colleges at various Bases with an enrollment of over 43,000 students and almost 2000 teachers’. The Military College Jhelum, a cadet college administered by the army, charges Rs. 400 per month as tuition fees from armed forces beneficiaries and Rs 1000 from civilians. In short, the armed forces have entered the field of English-medium, elitist education and generally provide cheap English-medium schooling to their own dependents.

The cadet colleges are subsidized by the state. According to the information given by some of them the subsidies are as follows:

Box-5
Institution	Donation from Provincial Govt	Number of Students	Yearly cost per student to Govt
Cadet College Kohat	5,819.800	575	10,121
Cadet College Larkana	6,000,000	480	12,500
Cadet College Pitaro	14,344,000	700	20,491
Laurence College	12,000,000	711	16,878
Cadet College Hasanabdal	8,096,000	480	16,867
Source: Information about donations and number of students has been supplied by the offices of the respective institutions.

It is because of this that, while cadet colleges have excellent boarding and lodging arrangements, spacious playgrounds, well equipped libraries and laboratories and faculty with masters’ degrees, the ordinary Urdu-medium (and Sindhi-medium) schools sometimes do not even have benches for pupils to sit on. In short, contrary to its stated policy of spending public funds on giving the same type of schooling to all, the state (and its institutions) actually spend more funds on privileged children for a privileged (English-medium) form of schooling. This perpetuates the socio-economic inequalities which have always existed in Pakistani society.

In addition to that cadet college are spread over acres of land and have playing fields, swimming pools and, in some cases, horses for riding. They also receive donations from rich former students, visiting dignitaries and students’ parents. In some cases, especially of schools administered by the armed forces, the salaries of officers serving in the schools come from the defence budget. In Military College Jhelum the cadets are given free rations. These too are forms of subsidy which poor children do not receive in the same measure and of the same quality.

The cadet colleges/public schools are quite expensive---though some are affordable for the middle classes---and their tuition fees increases in senior classes. Since most of their students are boarders, there is also a fees for board and lodging. Then there are other incidental expenses as well as the cost of making European clothes---coat, shirt, trousers, boots, socks, caps etc---which make them elitist institutions.

The textbooks of Cadet College are in English but they are mostly from the Textbook Boards. Their teachers, generally from the middle classes, also expose them to anti-India, pro-military ideas. Moreover, as most students are boarders they are not exposed to cable TV as their elitist school counterparts are.

Children in the cadet colleges, because they belong to middle class backgrounds and are subjected to regimentation in their schools, support aggressive policies but are less supportive of Islamization than their counterparts mentioned earlier (i.e. students of Urdu-medium schools). Thus, children of cadet colleges being less exposed to Western sources of information and role models, are more supportive of militant policies and Islamization than elitist English-medium children. They are also less tolerant towards religious minorities but are as alienated from the peoples’ culture and aspirations as other elitist children (see Annexure-2).

7.2 ELITIST ENGLISH-MEDIUM SCHOOLS

Apart from the schools run by agencies of the state itself ---the federal government, the armed forces, the bureaucracy --- in contravention of the stated policy of providing vernacular-medium education at state expense, there are private schools which deal in selling English at exorbitant prices. Private schools catering to the elite have existed since British times. In Pakistan the convents were such types of schools and most Anglicized senior members of the elite are from institutions which went by the name of Jesus and Mary’s Convent (Lahore and Karachi); Saint Anthony’s (Lahore); Burn Hall (Abbottabad); Saint Mary’s (Rawalpindi); St. Joseph’s Convent (Karachi); Presentation Convent (Rawalpindi) and convents in Murree and other places. These schools were not as expensive as those which replaced them from 1985 onwards. The new schools which took their place were Beaconhouse, City School, Froebels, Roots, Grammar (Lahore) and Khaldunia. Most of them have campuses spread all over the country though all are not of equal quality. They charge tuition fees of Rs. 1500 and more per month. They prepare students for the British Ordinary and advanced level examinations. Their faculty, especially at the senior levels, is paid better than government school teachers (Rs. 10,000 per month plus). However, there are vast differences in salaries even in the same school and full data on salaries is not released. On the whole women from the middle classes, some of whom are themselves from English-medium schools, are employed as teachers. Male teachers, however, tend to be from lower socio-economic backgrounds.

The teaching methods in these institutions are more humane, modern, innovative and interesting than in the Urdu-medium schools and the madrassas. Books are printed abroad and have pictures and more general knowledge than in found in Textbook Board textbooks. The classics of English, generally in an abridged form, are used to teach English. World history is taught instead of a propagandist form of Pakistan studies. However, the O’ level examination makes the study of Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu compulsory even for these children.

Because of textbooks containing discourses originating in other countries as well as exposure to cable TV, fiction from Western countries and grownups who are exposed to other discourses, children from such schools tend to be more tolerant of the ‘Other’ --- be it religious, the West or India --- and less supportive of militant policies in Kashmir than their counterparts in other schools (see Annexure-2).

The survey in annexures 1 and 2 is on O.level students of elitist schools of Islamabad and Lahore charging a tuition fees of at least Rs 2,500 per month. Most of them (51.43%) belong to the upper middle class with an income of Rs. 20,001 to 50,000 per month while more than one third (37.15%) are in higher income groups (see Annexure 1 for details).

Besides what the students have written, an indicator of their socio-economic background is the exorbitant tuition fees their parents pay; their dress (Western and expensive); their lifestyle (travelling in cars, eating out, going to concerts, celebrating birthdays with parties and expensive gifts etc), and the houses they live in (modern, expensive, urban).

The teachers of these schools, who happen to be mostly women, are also supportive of a peaceful foreign policy but are not as tolerant of religious minorities as their students (see Annexure-2).

One explanation for this observation --- of teachers being less tolerant than their students---is that the teachers belong to middle-class socio-economic backgrounds whereas the students belong to more affluent and Westernized ones (see Annexure-1).

8. Conclusion

Pakistan’s educational system is stratified according to socio-economic class which is expressed roughly in terms of media of instruction or type of educational institution. The madrassas cater for very poor children mostly from rural and urban working class localities. In India too the madrassas cater for the poor and, therefore, should not be alienated as Yoginder Sikand points out (Sikand 2003). The Urdu-medium schools cater for lower-middle-class and some middle class children while the elitist English-medium schools cater for the upper-medium and upper classes. There are also non-elitist English-medium schools which cater for lower-middle and middle-class children and cadet colleges (Public Schools) which cater for the middle classes, especially professionals and armed forces employees. The cost per student per year in these institutions is by itself an indicator of the economic apartheid which prevails and is supported by the state in the educational system of Pakistan.

Box-6
DIFFERENCES IN COSTS IN MAJOR TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (in Pakistani rupees)
Institution	Average cost per student per year	Payer (s)	Cost to the state
Madrassas	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	None reported except subsidies on computers, books etc in some madrassas
Urdu-medium Schools	2264.5 (only tuition)	State	2264.5
Elitist English medium schools	96,000---for ‘A’ level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet colleges/public schools	90,061 (tuition and all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)
Source: Data obtained from several institutions.

The worldview of the students of these institutions is so different from each other that they seem to live in different worlds. The most acute polarization is between the madrassa students and the students of elitist English-medium schools. The former are deprived but they express their anger---the rage of the dispossessed---in the idiom of religion. This brings them in conflict with the Westernized elite which looks down upon them in contempt although its most powerful members legitimize their hold on the state apparatus in the name of Islam. The state has strengthened the Islamic lobby itself by Islamizing education and sacralizing the Kashmir dispute so that religious and nationalistic emotion has come to be invested in it. Now that the state feels obliged to reverse these policies, it is already facing resistance from the Islamic lobby. This may increase if the madrassa-educated young men are marginalized even further while remaining both poor and armed. The majority of the students, from the Urdu-medium stream, are also alienated both from their madrassa as well as English-medium counterparts. In socio-economic terms they belong roughly to the same class as the madrassa students but their training is different and hence their views are also different. Moreover, not sharing the Westernization and the wealth of the English-medium students, they too are alienated from them and have a vague sense of having been cheated. These differences in views and dissatisfaction do not augur well for nation-building or cohesion. They have a divisive potential along class lines which will probably be expressed in the nationalistic and religious idiom in any future crisis. Indeed, if the state keeps investing only in defense and on the elite, it will withdraw further and further away from the social sector. This has already occurred and both religious extremists and the ethnic nationalists have tried to fill in the vacant space. If the armies of the unemployed and the marginalized are not to be increased till they become unmanageable, the state should invest on the poor. The best investment will be on education---but education which promotes tolerance and humane values. The way to achieve this will be to create a just and fair education system which can only happen if we have one stream of education and not so many polarized ones.

NOTES

1. Ahmedis, also called Mirzais and Quaidianis, are the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). They were declared as non-Muslims in Pakistan in 1974. (see Friedmann 1989).

2. A report on ‘Hate speech entitled Democracy, Freedom, and Peace in Textbooks: campaign against Hate Speech (Islamabad: Liberal Forum of Pakistan, 2003) reports that students are incited to violence against ‘infidels’ and especially ‘Hindus’. Also see Mohammad Shehzad, ‘Church of the Poisoned Mind’, The Friday Times [Lahore] (14-20 February 2003), p.2.

Annexure-1

Monthly Income and Social Mobility of Students and Faculty in Different Educational Institutions in Pakistan

The government of Pakistan gives income in quintiles. These are calculated in Appendix-C of PIHS (2002). The income is in Pakistani rupees per month per capita is as follows:

1st Q Rs. 620.45 and below

2nd Q Rs. 620.46 – 769.9

3rd Q Rs. 769.1-947.53

4th Q Rs. 947.54-1254.53

5th Q Rs. 1254.54 and above.

For this survey, the present author has calculated income in rupees per month and divided it according to socio-economic class. This information has been collected in response to section 1 of the questionnaire which is given in Annexure-2.

Section-1: Monthly Income

The figures below give the monthly income of the families of students and faculty as reported by them in our sample. Those who have not written the income, as well as those those who have, have been tabulated separately. The correspondence with socio-economic class, however rough, is as follows:

Working (lower) class = Upto Rs 5000 per month.

Lower middle class = 5001 – 10,000

Middle class = 10,001-20,000

Upper middle class = 20,001 – 50,000

Lower upper class = 50,001 – 100,000

Middle upper class = Above 100,000

The income is for the whole family and not of the individuals earning it. In most cases income of female has not been written presumably because they are housewives and do not get paid. In case their income is written, the family income is calculated by adding their income to the income of the male earning member’s income.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Students

N = 142

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000- 100,000
Pay father	65 of 142 (47.77%)	59 of 77 (76.62%)	10 of 77 (14.86%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	04 of 77 (5.19%)	Nil
Pay mother	139 of 142 (97.89%)	02 of 3 (66.66%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and Mother	N.A	1 of 3 (33.33%)	01 of 3 (33.33%)	1 of 3 (33.33%)
Analysis: Most madrassa students belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Madrassa Teachers

N = 27

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000
Pay self	09 of 27 (33.33%)	13 of 18 (72.22%)	03 of 18 (16.66%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse	26 of 27 (96.30%)	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	01 of 1 (100%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis: Most madrassa teachers belong to the working classes.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Faculty

N = 65

	Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self	11 of 65 (16.92%)	03 of 54 (5.55%)	22 of 54 (40.74%)	18 of 54 (33.33%)	10 of 54 (15.38%)	01 of 54 (1.85%)	Nil
Pay spouse	55 of 65 (84.62%)	Nil	1 of 10 (10%)	6 of 10 (60%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)	Nil
Husband and wife	N.A	Nil	Nil	3 of 10 (30%)	04 of 10 (40%)	02 of 10 (20%)	01 of 10 (10%)
Analysis: Most teachers have written their own income but not of their spouses. They fall between middle and upper middle class brackets. When husband and wife both earn, the family goes up in income even going into the lower upper class.

Income of the Families of Elitist English School Students

N = 116

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		81 of 116 (69.83%)	Nil	01 of 35 (2.86%)	03 of 35 (8.57%)	18 of 35 (51.43%)	08 of 35 (22.86%)	05 of 35 (14.29%)
Pay mother		101 of 116 (87.07%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	03 of 15 (20%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	08 of 15 (53.33%)	1 of 15 (6.66%)	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	1 of 15 (6.66%)	02 of 15 (13.33%)	Nil	04 of 15 (26.66%)	05 of 15 (33.33%)	03 of 15 (20%)
Analysis:	Most of them have not written their parents’ income. Out of those who have most belong to the upper middle class. More than one third belong to the upper classes

Income of Families of Urdu-medium School Students

N = 230

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		95 of 230 (41.31%)	83 of 135 (61.48%)	36 of 135 (26.66%)	13 of 135 (9.63%)	03 of 135 (2.22%)	Nil	Nil
Pay mother		220 of 230 (95.65%)	8 of 10 (80%)	2 of 10 (20%)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	2 of 10 (20%)	4 of 10 (40%)	4 of 10 (40%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their fathers’ income but not their mothers’ who are probably housewives. Out of those of who have written, most belong to working class families. About a quarter, however, also belong to the lower middle classes. Very few are above that in income.

Income of the Families of the Faculty of Urdu-medium Schools

N = 100

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		6 of 100 (6%)	17 of 94 (18.09%)	62 of 94 (65.96%)	15 of 94 (15.96%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		82 of 100 (82%)	3 of 18 (16.66%)	06 of 18 (33.33%)	07 of 18 (38.89%)	02 of 18 (11.11%)	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	09 of 18 (50%)	09 of 18 (50%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most earners have written their income but not that of their spouse. Most belong to the lower middle class. Out of the few spouses whose income is reported, a fairly large proportion tend to have middle class incomes and a very small minority even higher than that.

Income of the families of Public School and Cadet College Students

N = 130

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001– 20,000	20,001– 50,000	50,000– 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay father		72 of 130 (55.38%)	Nil	5 of 58 (8.62%)	17 of 58 (29.31%)	33 of 58 (56.90%)	3 of 58 (5.17%)	Nil
Pay mother		111 of 130 (85.39%)	2 of 19 (10.53%)	8 of 19 (42.11%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	5 of 19 (26.32%)	Nil	Nil
Father and mother		N.A	Nil	Nil	2 of 19 (10.53%)	11 of 19 (57.89%)	4 of 19 (21.05%)	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their father’s income but not that of their mother. They mostly fall in the upper middle class. Very few of them, however, also fall in the lower upper classes.

Income of the Faculty of Cadet Colleges/Public Schools

N= 51

		Not written	Upto 5,000	5,001-10,000	10,001- 20,000	20,001- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	Above 100,000
Pay self		1 of 51 (1.96%)	1 of 50 (2%)	17 of 50 (34%)	28 of 50 (56%)	4 of 50 (8%)	Nil	Nil
Pay spouse		45 of 51 (88.24%)	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil	Nil
Husband and wife		N.A	Nil	Nil	1 of 6 (16.66%)	5 of 6 (83.33%)	Nil	Nil
Analysis:	Most have written their own income but not their wife’s. They fall mostly in the middle class with families, where husband and wife both earn, falling mostly in the upper middle class.

Section-2: Social Moblity

Social mobility has been measured in the case of teachers. The only indicators which have been taken into account are (a) the medium of instruction of the teachers themselves when they were students(b) the medium of instruction of their children. As English-medium schools are more expensive than Urdu-or Sindhi medium ones, it is assumed that, when people get relatively prosperous, they tend to educate their children in English-medium schools. It should, however, be noted that a large number of non-elitist English-medium schools charging higher tuition fees than government Urdu-medium schools have started functioning in the last twenty years or so. As such the older teachers in this survey could either go to expensive English-medium schools or government Urdu-medium ones. They did not have the option of attending less expensive English-medium schools which their children have.

Own Medium of Instruction When in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges	51	01 of 51 (1.96%)	31 of 50 (62%)	19 of 50 (38%)
English-medium schools	65	18 of 65 (27.69%)	10 of 47 (21.28%)	37 of 47 (78.72%)
Madrassas*	27	02 of 27 (7.41%)	21 of 25 (84%)	0 of 25 (0%)
Urdu-medium schools	100@	02 of 100 (2%)	88 of 98 (89.80%)	06 of 98 (6.12%)

Children’s Medium of Instruction in School

Institution	Number of respondents	Not written	Urdu	English
Cadet colleges	51	21 of 51 (41.18 %)	03 of 30 (10%)	27 of 30 (90%)
English-medium	65	38 of 65 (58.46%)	1 of 27 (3.70%)	26 of 27 (96.30%)
Madrassas	27	12 of 27 (44.44%)	13 of 15 (86.67%)	2 of 15 (13.33%)
Urdu-medium@	100	31 of 100 (31%)	36 of 69 (52.17%)	31 of 69 (44.93%)

@NB: The medium of instruction of 1 child (1.16%) and 3 teachers (3.06%) was Sindhi.

Analysis: Upward socio-economic mobility has occurred in the lives of all but madrassa teachers.

Annexure-2

SURVEY 2003

Survey of Schools and Madrassas,

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of two research assistants Imran Farid and Shahid Gondal whom I take this opportunity to thank. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available. Moreover, we had to restrict ourselves to urban areas because we neither had the time nor the resources to venture into rural ones. The survey was financially supported by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi, to which I am very grateful.

Institutions were used as clusters but only students of class 10 and equivalent were given questionnaires in Urdu or English. They were told that, since they were not supposed to give their names, they should not hesitate to give their real views. After this the questionnaire was read out and explained. The filled questionnaires were collected at the end of the session.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools (3) Cadet Colleges/Public Schools and (4) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions. Gender-wise breakdown is also available. The following chart helps explain these strata:

TEACHERS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Cadet college/public schools	51	Nil	51
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			243

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Cadet college/public schools	130	Nil	130
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			618

As the views of each strata are taken separately, they do not represent their proportional share in the student population of Pakistan.

The ages of the students are as follows:

Institutions	Mean	Mode	Range
Cadet colleges	15.5	15	12-19
Madrassas	19	20	14-27
English-medium schools	14.1	15	13-18

In the case of the madrassas the range is higher because some of the sanvia class groups had older boys who had joined the seminary late. In the O’level groups both 10^th and 11^th were represented. Urdu-medium schools had only class-10 clusters.

There are two shortcomings: first, the number of madrassa teachers is very less; and secondly, the population of rural areas as well as Baluchistan, the interior of Sindh, Northern Areas could not be represented. The first problem is because madrassa teachers were very reluctant to fill in the questionnaires. The second, as already mentioned, is because of lack of time and resources.

The questionnaires for students and teachers are reproduced here. Please note that part-2 (on opinions) is exactly the same. Only part-1 is different for both.

QUESTIONNAIRE (FACULTY)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of the institution in which you teach with medium of Instruction.

1. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

2. Education: (1) Below B.A (2) B.A (3) M.A (4) M. Phil (5) Ph.D

3. Which subject (s) do you teach?

What is the occupation of your spouse Give his or her rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

What is your average total monthly income (write income from all sources such as tuition, publications, consultancies, rent etc.

What is the medium of instruction of the school in which your children study (or studied)?

What was medium of instruction of the school in which you studied most?

QUESTIONNAIRE (STUDENTS)

DO NOT WRITE YOUR NAME TO ENSURE SECRECY. WRITE THE NAME of your SCHOOL with medium of Instruction.

1. age.

2. Class

3. Sex (1) Male (2) Female

4. What is the occupation of your father? Give his rank, title, occupational status; salary; grade; income from all sources etc?

5. What is the occupation of your mother? Give her rank, title, occupational status, salary, grade, income from all sources etc?

PART-II

(for both faculty and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

Views of School and Madrassa Students and Teachers

Militancy and Tolerance Among Urdu-medium School Students

N= 230(Number abbreviated as No. below)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?	Yes		No		Don’t Know
	No.	%	No	%	No.	%
(1) Take Kashmir away from India by an open war? (abbreviated as open war below	91	39.56	122	53.04	17	7.39
(2) Take Kashmir away form India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the India army? (Jihadi groups)	76	33.04	104	45.22	50	21.74
(3) Supporting Kashmir through peaceful means only? (peaceful means)	174	75.65	42	18.26	14	6.09
(4) Give equal rights to Ahmedis (Ahmedis)	108	46.95	85	36.95	37	16.09
(5) Give equal rights to Hindus (Hindus)	109	47.39	98	42.61	23	10.00
(6) Give equal rights to Christians (Christians)	151	65.65	61	26.52	18	7.83
(7) Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries (women)	173	75.22	40	17.39	17	7.39

Militancy and Tolerance Among Urdu-Medium School Teachers

N= 100(Number= No.)

Abbreviated Questions	Yes		No		Don’t Know
	No.	%	No	%	No.	%
(1) Open War	20	20	70	70	10	10
(2) Jihadi Groups	19	19	68	68	13	13
(3) Peaceful means	85	85	10	10	5	5
(4) Ahmedis	27	27	65	65	8	8
(5) Hindus	37	37	58	58	5	5
(6) Christians	52	52	42	42	6	6
(7) Women	61	61	33	33	6	6

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked options (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).

Militancy and Tolerance Among Elitist English-medium School Students

N= 116 (Number = No.) (M= 62; F= 52)

Abbreviated Questions	Yes		No		Don’t Know
	No.	%	No.	%	No	%
(1) Open War	30	25.86	75	64.66	11	9.48
(2) Jihadi Groups	26	22.41	70	60.34	20	17.24
(3) Peaceful means	84	72.41	22	18.97	10	8.62
(4) Ahmedis	76	65.52	11	9.48	29	25.00
(5) Hindus	91	78.45	16	13.79	09	7.76
(6) Christians	97	83.62	10	8.62	9	7.76
(7) Women	105	90.52	07	6.03	04	3.45

Militancy and Tolerance Among Elitist English-medium School Teachers

N= 65 (Number = No.)(F= 47; M=18)

Abbreviated Questions	Yes		No		Don’t Know
	No.	%	No.	%	No.