THE EDUCATIONAL CASTE SYSTEM

A Survey of Schooling and Polarization

in

Pakistan

By

Tariq Rahman Ph.D

National Distinguished Professor

Quaid-i-Azam University

Islamabad

Pakistan

The Educational Caste System: A Survey of Schooling and Polarization in Pakistan

According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey [PIHS] (2001-2002) the net enrolment rate --- the number of students enrolled in primary schools divided by the total number of children in that age group --- is 42 percent (PIHS). What is even more alarming is that the poorer one is, the less chances there are for him or her to obtain any education at all. The poorest people, described as the 1st quintile in the PIHS, manage to send 27 per cent children to school while the richest, called the 5th quintile, send 56 per cent of them (PIHS 2002-2037)¹

This indicates that the Pakistani educational scene is polarized according to socio-economic class. As one indicator of the cost of schooling is the medium of instruction it may be said that the vernacular-medium schools (Urdu, Sindhi and Pashto-medium) are meant for the working classes and the lower middle classes. The English-medium schools are meant for the middle and upper classes.

Urdu-Medium Schools

The number of all government schools is given as follows in the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2002)

Box-1
Level	Number	Student Strength	Teachers
Primary	169,087	19,921,232	345,457
Middle	19,180	4,278,392	99,098
Secondary	13,108	1,795,444	66,522
Source GOP 2002 : 146

These numbers include Sindhi-medium government schools also. The number of these, however, was 36,750 in 1998. The Pashto-medium primary schools were 10,731 in 1999 (field research). Thus, most of these schools are Urdu-medium ones. These students and teachers both come from the lower-middle class. Most children travel less than 2 kms and very few travel more than 5 kms to their schools. However, girls do have to travel long distances in Balochistan and Sindh which is difficult and unsafe for them (PIHS 2002).

Schools are very dull and stringent places, with doors and windows often painted blue, and with broken glass panes. They are highly regimented with semi-educated teachers forcing their pupils to memorize passages out of badly written, badly printed and extremely dull books. Classrooms are overcrowded with 41 girls and 38 boys per teacher in the primary schools of all provinces except Balochistan. In Balochistan, the most deprived province of all, there are 48 girls per teacher (PIHS 2002).

After ten years of schooling students sit for examinations held by the different Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education. Most of the examination papers are in Urdu (except in Sindh where they are in Sindhi) and English is like a sieve which separates the ‘sheep’ from the ‘goats’.

Influences of Textbooks on Urdu-medium School Students

Most of the 25,995,068 students (GOP 2002: 146), being from Urdu-medium schools, study the textbooks provided by the Textbook Boards of the provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan) which constitute Pakistan. Ethnicity is denied so as to create a Pakistani identity although these centrist policies have been resented by ethnic communities and have resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 but still the textbooks reinforce them (for ethnic politics see Amin 1988; Rahman 1996 and Ahmed 1998). There is also much glorification of war and the military and many anti-Hindu and anti-India remarks and gender bias interspersed throughout the books (for detailed analysis see Aziz 1993; Hoodbhoy and Nayyar 1995; Saigol 1995; and Rahman 2002: 515-524. For a comparison between the history textbooks of India and Pakistan see Kumar 2001).

Militancy and Tolerance Among Urdu-Medium School Students and Teachers

In the recent survey of 230 students and 100 teachers of Urdu-medium schools responses to questions about militancy in Kashmir and giving equal rights to Ahmedis (a sect declared as a non-Muslim minority in 1974 in Pakistan), Pakistani Hindus and Christians and women were tabulated in percentages (Annexure 1).

The questions were meant to find out whether they supported militant policies in Kashmir. There were also questions to find out whether religious minorities should be given the same rights as Muslim citizens of Pakistan. There was also a question about giving equal rights to men and women. The students did not support an open war with India for Kashmir nor was the majority supportive of sending or abetting the crossover of fighters across the line of control to fight with the Indian army (See Annexure 1).

However, the level of tolerance for the religious minorities is not very high, at least for the Ahmedis and the Hindus. However, it is quite high for Christians and very high for women (Annexure 1). The opinions of teachers was similar and is given in Annexure 1.

The opinions of parents have not been obtained through questionnaires but observation suggests that in the lower middle class, which is where the teachers and students of Urdu-medium schools come from, they too express opinions like the teachers.

Despite the predominance of such views not all children are brainwashed into believing them to the exclusion of other opinions. Similarly, despite the rote-learning forced upon students, not all of them lack analytical skills later in life. And despite English being a formidable barrier, some students learn it and enter the highest services in Pakistan and abroad. This speaks highly of the motivation and innate abilities of the successful students but it should be kept in mind that they succeed in spite of the system not because of it.

Madrassas

The madrassas are associated with the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan some of whom were said to be students of these institutions (see Rashid 2000). They have also been much in the news for sectarian killings and supporting militancy in Kashmir, They are considered the breeding ground of the Jihadi culture–a term used for Islamic militancy in the English-language press of Pakistan (Singer 2001; Haqqani 2002; Ahmad 2000: 191-192). However, the historical development of the madrassas has not received the attention which it deserves.

At independence there were 137, or even fewer, madrassas. In April 2002, Dr. Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi, the Minister of Religious Affairs, put the figure at 10,000 with 1.7 million students (ICG 2002: 2). They belong to the major sects of Islam, the Sunnis and the Shias, However, Pakistan being a predominantly Sunni country, the Shia ones are very few. Among the Sunni ones there are three sub-sects: Deobandis, Barelvis and the Ahl-i-Hadith (salafi). Besides these, the revivalist Jamat-e-Islami also has its own madrassas.

The number of madrassas has been increasing during General Zia ul Haq’s rule (1977-1988). The increase in the number of registered madrassas is about 7000 in all making a total of around 10, 000 (for details of increase in provinces see Annexure 2). P.W. Singer gives the figure of 45,000 madrassas but quotes no source for this number (Singer 2001).

Teaching in the Madrassas

Students study from the maulvis (equivalent of priests) sitting around them in a semi-circle on mats. The medium of instruction is Urdu in the Punjab and most areas of Paksitan. However, in the Pashto-speaking areas of the NWFP Pashto is used and Sindhi is used in the interior of Sindh. Examinations, however, are conducted in Urdu or Arabic. That is why the Pakistani clergy is fluent in Urdu and madrassas have spread Urdu all over South Asia.

The Dars-i-Nizami

The primary course of instruction in the madrassas is called the Dars-i-Nizami. This text is mostly theological but also has a large component of Arabic grammar and literature as well as medieval books on mathematics and rhetoric etc. The Dars-i-Nizami was standardized by Mulla Nizamuddin of Sihala and had subjects of utilitarian significance required in 18^th century Indian Muslim society (Robinson 2002: 53). However, now it has come to symbolize the stagnation and ossification of knowledge. It is taught through canonical texts in Arabic which, however, are taught through commentaries (sharh); glosses or marginal notes (hashiya) and supercommentaries (taqarir) also in Arabic. There are commentaries upon commentaries explained by even more commentaries

The Refutation of Other Sects and Sub-Sects

Refutation (Radd in Urdu) has always been part of religious education. However, it is only in recent years that it has been blamed for the unprecedented increase in sectarian violence in Pakistan (Nayyar 1998: 243).

It appears that there was much more acrimonious theological debate among the Shias and Sunnis and among the Sunnis themselves during British rule than is common nowadays. The militancy in sectarian conflict cannot be attributed to the teaching in the madrassas though, of course, the awareness of divergent beliefs does create the potential for negative bias against people of other beliefs. Madrassa teachers deny that they teach sectarian books which are, however, widely available in the market. As they are in Urdu the students can read them without being taught anyway.

The Refutation of Heretical Beliefs

One of the aims of the madrassas, ever since 1057 when Nizam ul Mulk established the famous madrassa at Baghdad, was to counter heresies within the Islamic world and outside influences which could change or dilute Islam. Other religions are refuted in ‘comparative religions’ but there are specific books for heresies within the Islamic world. In Pakistan the ulema unite in refuting the beliefs of the Ahmedis (or Qaidianis) (for their views see Friedmann 1989).

The Refutation of Alien Philosophies

The earliest madrassas refuted Greek philosophy which was seen as an intellectual invasion of the Muslim ideological space. Since the rise of the West, madrassas, and even more than them revivalist movements outside the madrassas, refute Western philosophies. Thus there are books given in the reading lists for Aliya (B.A) of 1988 by the Deobandis refuting capitalism, socialism, capitalism and feudalism. These books are no longer listed but they are in print and in the libraries of the madrassas. The Jamat-i-Islami probably goes to great lengths --- judging from its 2002 syllabus—to make the students aware of Western domination, the exploitative potential of Western political and economic ideas and the disruptive influence of Western liberty and individualism on Muslim societies.

Thus, while it is true that education in the madrassa produces religious, sectarian, sub-sectarian and anti-Western bias, it may not be true to assume that this bias automatically translates into militancy and violence of the type Pakistan has experienced (this point has also been made by Rukhsana Zia 2003 in another context). For that to happen other factors—the arming of religious young men to fight in Afghanistan and Kashmir; the state’s clampdown on free expression of political dissent during Zia ul Haq’s martial law; the appalling poverty of rural, peripheral areas and urban slums etc. etc—must be taken into account.

The government of Pakistan has recently promulgated the Pakistan Madrassa Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini Madaris) Board Ordinance, 2001 (The Gazette of Pakistan, 18 August 2001). The purpose of this is to establish institutions which should be under a board of governors consisting of senior bureaucrats and other functionaries of state institutions so as to keep the curricula under state control. Most educated and liberal Pakistanis advocate the integration ‘of Islam and modern education’ though many are aware that this is problematical and may not be possible (Zia 2003). The madrassas oppose this attempt at limiting their autonomy but the government has established three such institutions (for the opposition see Wafaq ul Madariss 1422 A.H Vol. 2 No. 6).

Madrassas, Poverty and Socioeconomic Class

Madrassas in Pakistan are also financed by voluntary charity provided by the bazaar businessmen and others who believe that they are earning great merit by contributing to them. Indeed the vast majority of them are run on charity (zakat = alms, khairat = charity, atiat = gifts etc).

According to the Jamia Salfia of Faisalabad, the annual expenditure on the seminary, which has about 700 students, is 40,00,000 rupees. Another madrassa, this time a Barelvi one, gave roughly the same figure for the same number of students. This comes to Rs 5,714 per year (or Rs 476 per months) which is an incredibly small amount of money for education, books, board and lodging. As the madrassas generally do not charge a tuition fees---though they do charge a small admission fees which does not exceed Rs 400--- they attract very poor students who would not receive any education otherwise.

According to Singer, the ‘Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania, one of the most popular and influential Madrassahs (it includes most of the Afghani Taliban leadership among its alumni)---has a student body of 1500 boarding students and 1000 day students, from 6 years old upwards. Each year over 15,000 applicants from poor families vie for its 400 open spaces’ (Singer 2001). According to a survey conducted by Mumtaz Ahmad in 1976 ‘more than 80 percent of the madrassa students in Peshawar, Multan, and Gujranwala were found to be sons of small or landless peasants, rural artisans, or village imams of the mosques. The remaining 20 percent came from families of small shopkeepers and rural laborers’ (quoted from Ahmad 2000: 185).

Since the madrassas provide free food, clothes, books, notebooks and even jobs (at least in mosques, schools and other madrassas) they are attractive for poor people. In short the madrassas are performing the role of the welfare state in the country. This being so, their influence on rural people and the poorer sections of the urban proletariat will continue to increase as poverty increases. As they are from poor backgrounds they express their sense of being cheated by society in the idiom of religion. This gives them the self-righteousness to fight against the oppressive and unjust system in the name of Islam.

The Worldview of Madrassa Students

The madrassa students are the most intolerant of all the other student groups in Pakistan. They are also the most supportive of an aggressive foreign policy. They are far more supportive of militant policies in Kashmir and much less tolerant of religious minorities and women than either their counterparts in the ordinary Urdu-medium or the English-medium schools (See Annexure 1).

What needs explanation is that the madrassas, which were basically conservative institutions before the Afghan-Soviet War of the nineteen eighties, are both ideologically activist and sometimes militant. According to Peter L. Bergen, author of a book on Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda group: ‘nowhere is bin Laden more popular than in Pakistan’s madrassas, religious schools from which the Taliban draw many of its recruits’ (Bergen 2001: 150). Even with the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the madrassas have plenty of zealous young people who can potentially act as crusaders against both Western interests and the moderate regimes, both military and civilian, whom they perceive as the allies of the West (for Central Asian parallels see Ahmed Rashid’s [2002] excellent book on militant Islamic movements in that part of the world). It because of this that, as a consequence of Nine Eleven, General Mushrraf has had to reverse his policy towards the Taliban, Afghanistan and Kashmir. He has banned some religious groups who used to operate in Kashmir and has taken steps to keep the madrassas under control. The religious madrassas (registration and regulation) ordinance 2002 was part of this new policy. However, the madrassas have opposed this ordinance also (see Wafaq ul Madaris Vol. 3 No. 9, 1423 A.H). It seems that the way to reduce the influence of the madrassas on the poorer sections of Pakistani society is to create more schools and give incentives to people to teach their children in state schools rather than the madrassas. As the Madrassas are response to poverty, it is only reduction in poverty which will reduce their attraction and power.

English-Medium Schools

English medium schools are divisible into three categories. (1) Ordinary (2) Elitist (3) Cadet Colleges and Public Schools (see Rahman 2002: Appendix 14). First, the Ordinary English-medium schools. In the survey of 1999-2000 carried out by the present author the ‘Ordinary’ or ‘non-elitist’ schools were classified as those charging a monthly tuition fees between Rs. 50 to Rs. 1499. They cater for ordinary, lower-middle and middle class, people. Some call themselves ‘English medium’ while actually teaching in Urdu because neither teachers nor students are sufficiently competent in that language.

Schools in the second category charged tuition fees ranging from between Rs. 1500 to Rs. 10,000 and more per month. The teachers and students are much more exposed to English in informal settings---home, peer group, cable television, comic books, foreign travel etc--- than their counterparts in other schools. English is used informally by children in schools in upscale residential localities.

Schools in the third category, called cadet colleges and public schools, cater more to the elite of power than that of wealth. In some cases the tuition fees for the wards of the armed forces is generally lower than that of civilians. In most cases the top brass of the army has a presence on the boards.

Patronage of English-Medium Schools

The stated official policy of the government is that public money will be spent on schools which will use Urdu (and Sindhi only in parts of Sindh) as the medium of instruction. It is often stated that private educational institutions are run by private resources and enterprise. However, even during the British period the English-medium schools, called European Schools at that time, cost more (Edn.Ind 1941: 113).

In Pakistan the armed forces and the higher bureaucracy use English for official purposes. Thus they were interested in obtaining young people who were competent in that language. Moreover the elite which aspired for jobs in the modern domains of power: the officer corps of the armed forces; higher bureaucracy; superior judiciary; commerce;

As a result the cadet colleges multiplied. Indeed, the armed forces through the Fauji Foundation (Army), Shaheen Foundation (Air Force) and the Bahria Foundation (Navy) created many more institutions from the nineteen seventies onwards. The Fauji Foundation, for instance runs 88 secondary and 4 higher secondary schools. Beneficiaries, pay much lower fees than civilians. In Rawalpindi, for instance, the following rates of fees prevail: retired army non-commissioned ranks pay Rs. 150; retired officers Rs. 310; serving non-commissioned ranks Rs. 260; serving officers Rs. 450 while civilians pay Rs. 1000 per month for the education of their wards from class 6-10 (information given by the head office of the Fauji Foundation, Rawalpindi). Cadet colleges/public schools receive high fees from parents and, in most cases, are also subsidized the state. The state initially gives them free or cheap land and then provides grants, gifts, donations or annual subsidies.

The average cost to the state for seven cadet colleges for which information was obtained in 2003 comes to Rs. 15,371 per student per year. These subsidies keep changing. In 1998-99 cadet college Razmak was given Rs 11,887,000 while Larkana got 10,000,000 from the government (Expenditure Vol 1 1999: 1084 and Vol 2: 1461-1662)

In contrast to the facilities available in the public schools/cadet colleges the ordinary Urdu-medium (and Sindhi-medium) schools sometimes do not even have benches for pupils to sit on. In short, contrary to its stated policy of spending public funds on giving the same type of schooling to all, the state (and its institutions) actually spend more funds on privileged children for a privileged (English-medium) form of schooling. This perpetuates the socio-economic inequalities which have always existed in Pakistani society.

Students of the cadet colleges come from professional middle class families and are subjected to regimentation in their schools. Many are often given some contact with military officers or the point of view of the armed forces. Thus, they support more aggressive policies than their counterparts from the same class in elitist English-medium schools (Annexure 1). They are also less tolerant of Ahmedis and equal rights for women but the latter is probably because all the students are boys whereas in the elitist English-medium schools there are also girls (Annexure 1). Like the students of elitist English-medium schools, these students are also alienated from the culture and lives of the ordinary people of Pakistan. However, they may be less Westernized than them. Like their elitist English-medium counterparts they too desire to preserve and perpetuate their privileged position by supporting English as the language of the domains of power in the country (see survey 2000 in Rahman 2002: Appendix 14.3).

ELITIST ENGLISH-MEDIUM SCHOOLS

Apart from the schools run by agencies of the state itself ---the federal government, the armed forces, the bureaucracy --- in contravention of the stated policy of providing vernacular-medium education at state expense, there are private schools which deal in selling English at exorbitant prices. Private schools catering to the elite have existed since British times. These schools were not as expensive as those which replaced them from 1985 onwards. The new schools which took their place have campuses spread all over the country though all are not of equal quality. They charge tuition fees of Rs. 1500 and more per month. They prepare students for the British Ordinary and advanced level examinations. Their faculty, especially at the senior levels, is paid better than government school teachers (Rs. 10,000 per month plus). However, there are vast differences in salaries even in the same school and full data on salaries is not released. On the whole women from the middle classes, some of whom are themselves from English-medium schools, are employed as teachers. Some male teachers are also employed.

The teaching methods in these institutions are more humane, modern, innovative and interesting than in the Urdu-medium schools and the madrassas. Books are printed abroad and have pictures and more general knowledge than in found in Textbook Board textbooks. The classics of English, generally in an abridged form, are used to teach English. World history is taught instead of a propagandist form of Pakistan studies. However, the O’ level examination makes the study of Pakistan studies, Islamic studies and Urdu compulsory even for these children. However, these students show aversion to Urdu and pride themselves on not knowing it. This shows the degree of their alienation from their own culture. Hence, it is true to call these students ‘brown Sahibs’ or what is now more appropriate ‘native Yankees’.

However, because of textbooks containing discourses originating in other countries as well as exposure to cable TV, fiction from Western countries and grownups who are exposed to other discourses, children from such schools tend to be more tolerant of the ‘Other’ --- be it religious, the West or India --- and less supportive of militant policies in Kashmir than their counterparts in other schools. This is illustrated both in the survey of the opinion of students in 1999-2000 (in Rahman 2002: Appendix 14) and the survey of 2002-2003 (Annexure 1).

They are neither intolerant of minorities and women nor do they support militant policies. The teachers of these schools, who happen to be mostly women, are also supportive of a peaceful foreign policy but are not as tolerant of religious minorities as their students (See Annexure 1 for details).

Analysis and Conclusion

Although socio-economic class and its relation with education and worldview have been referred to at several places in this article, it is worthwhile to being these related issues together in this section. We have seen that the madrassas, which cater to the poorest and most marginalized people create the most militant and intolerant products. The Urdu-medium schools, which also cater for the poor but give both secular and religious-nationalistic exposure, create students who are also militant and intolerant but much lesser than their madrassa counterparts. The English-medium students, less in the case of the state-dominated cadet colleges and more for the elitist English-medium schools, produce the most tolerant and least militant students at least at the age when they are in school.

Although the elitist children in English-medium schools are the most tolerant group in both the surveys referred to here, these children are alienated from the concerns of other, ordinary, Pakistanis. Indeed, they are disdainful of indigenous culture, indigenous identity, traditional values and even the languages and literature of the country. They seem to have given up on Pakistan and aspire to make their lives abroad. Such children, although apparently tolerant of religious and gender differences, do not seem to be tolerant of class differences. With the degree of contempt they exhibit for local sensitivities, they seem to dwell in a world apart from that inhabited by ordinary Pakistanis --- indeed, they are like the occupying British in India who thrived on native labour and lived geographically near them while in reality they were denizens of an artificially constructed utopia in the cantonments and the civil lines. Moreover, as grown ups, if they join the state as powerful decision-makers, they make the militant and intolerant policies in their institutional or class or political interest which are fanatically followed by others.

We have seen the extent of polarization between the students as regards socio-economic class as well as worldview. It must be emphasized that this polarization is reinforced, strengthened and institutionalized by the state which provides different kinds of school systems with vastly differing facilities as we have noted before. One indicator of the difference between the schools is the expenditure per student per year. This has been mentioned in different contexts and is being summarized below.

Box-2
DIFFERENCES IN COSTS OF IN MAJOR TYPES OF SCHOOLS (in Pakistani rupees)
Institution	Average cost per student per year	Payer (s)	Cost to the state
Madrassa	5,714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists + religious organizations	None reported except subsidies on computers, books etc in some madrassas
Urdu-medium School	5500 (only tuition)	State + parents (the parents share of Rs. 150 is being reduced)	5350
Elitist English medium school	96,000---for ‘A’ level & 36,000 for other levels (only tuition)	Parents	None reported except subsidized land in some cantonments.
Cadet Colleges/Public Schools	90,061 (all facilities).	Parents + state (average of 6 cadet colleges + 1 public school	14,171 (average of 5 cadet colleges only)
Course: Data obtained from several institutions.

In short, the state itself subsidizes elitist education more than it does the education of the masses. Moreover, the differences in income of the public are so acute that they are left with no choice as far as schooling is concerned. This means that schooling will continue to express the polarization in socio-economic class in terms of the polarization in worldview which we find so potentially alarming in our society.

These differences in views and dissatisfaction do not augur well for nation-building or cohesion. They have a divisive potential along class lines which will probably be expressed in the nationalistic and religious idiom in any future crisis. Indeed, if the state keeps investing only in defense and on the elite, it will withdraw further and further away from the social sector. This has already occurred and both religious extremists and the ethnic nationalists have tried to fill in the vacant space. If the armies of the unemployed and the marginalized are not to be increased till they become unmanageable, the state should invest on the poor. The best investment will be on education---but education which promotes tolerance and humane values. The way to achieve this will be to create a just and fair education system which can only happen if we have one stream of education and not so many polarized ones.

NOTES

1. The quintiles are calculated in Appendix-C of PIHS (2002). They are as under. This income is in Pakistani rupees per month per capita.

1st Q Rs. 620.45 and below

2nd Q Rs. 620.46 – 769.9

3rd Q Rs. 769.1-947.53

4th Q Rs. 947.54-1254.53

5th Q Rs. 1254.54 and above.

For the purposes of this study the income related to social class is roughly as follows:-

Below Rs. 5000 per month Working class/lower class

5001-10,000 per month Lower middle class

10,001-20,000 per month Middle class

20,001-50,000 per month Upper middle class

50,001-100,000 per month Lower upper class

100,001 and above Upper class

However, there are other indicators of social class such as education, place of living, type of house, clothes, vehicle (s) for use, influence, social class of friends etc which have not been considered for the sake of simplicity.

2. Ahmedis, also called Mirzais and Quaidianis, are the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). They were declared as non-Muslims in Pakistan in 1974. (see Friedmann 1989).

Annexure-1

SURVEY 2003

This survey was conducted between December 2002 and April 2003 with the help of three research assistants Imran Farid, Shahid Gondal and Rao Iqbal. The survey was conducted in Islamabad (myself), Rawalpindi (myself), Peshawar (myself), Karachi (myself), Murree (myself), Mandi Bahauddin (Shahid Gondal), Lahore, Faisalabad and Multan (Imran Farid); Hassanabdal, Bahawalpur Rao Iqbal). It was a stratified, non-random survey because a complete list of all target institutions was not available nor could we venture into the rural areas.

The major stratas are (1) Urdu-medium school, (2) elitist English-medium schools (3) Cadet Colleges/Public Schools and (4) madrassas. There is a further stratification between the students and the teachers of these institutions.

TEACHERS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	18	47	65
Cadet college/public schools	51	Nil	51
Urdu-medium	42	58	100
Madrassas	27	Nil	27
Grand Total			243

STUDENTS
	M (ale)	F (emale)	Total
English-medium	62	52	116
Cadet college/public schools	130	Nil	130
Urdu-medium	123	107	230
Madrassas	142	Nil	142
Grand Total			618

The average age (mean) and mode (the age which occurs most) are as follows: Urdu-medium (mode=16; mean=14.4 years of age); elitist English medium (mode=15; mean=14.1); cadet colleges/ cadet colleges (mode=15; mean=15.5) and madrassas (mode=20; mean= 19).

This questionnaire has two parts. As Part-1 is to ascertain level of education, income and determine class which are not required here, only Part-2 is being reproduced below.

PART-II

(for both teachers and students)

What should be Pakistan’s priorities?

1. Take Kashmir away from India by an open war?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

2. Take Kashmir away from India by supporting Jihadi groups to fight with the Indian army?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

3. Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (i.e. no open war or sending Jihadi groups across the line of control?).

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

4. Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

5. Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

6. Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs etc?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

7. Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries?

(1) Yes (2) No (3) Don’t Know

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among three Types of Schools Students in Pakistan in Survey 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet Colleges/Public Schools
1.	Open War	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00
		Don’t Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92
		Don’t Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92
		Don’t Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54
5.	Hindus	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54
		Don’t Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85
6.	Christians	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46
		Don’t Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62
7.	Women	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38
		Don’t Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).

Consolidated Data of Opinions Indicating Militancy and Tolerance Among Teachers in three Types of Schools in Pakistan in 2003 (in percentages)

Abbreviated Questions			Madrassas	Urdu-medium	English-medium	Cadet College/ Public Schools
1.	Open War	Yes	70.37	20	26.15	19.61
		No	22.22	70	64.62	68.63
		Don’t Know	7.41	10	9.23	11.76
2.	Jihadi groups	Yes	59.26	19	38.46	39.22
		No	29.63	68	50.77	52.94
		Don’t Know	11.11	13	10.77	7.84
3.	Peaceful means	Yes	29.63	85	60.00	66.66
		No	66.67	10	33.85	18.61
		Don’t Know	3.70	5	6.15	13.73
4.	Ahmedis	Yes	3.70	27	43.07	29.41
		No	96.23	65	36.92	62.75
		Don’t Know	Nil	8	20.00	7.84
5.	Hindus	Yes	14.81	37	61.54	60.78
		No	85.19	58	26.15	35.29
		Don’t Know	Nil	5	12.31	3.92
6.	Christians	Yes	18.52	52	81.54	60.78
		No	77.77	42	10.77	33.33
		Don’t Know	3.70	6	7.69	5.88
7.	Women	Yes	3.70	61	78.46	37.25
		No	96.67	33	13.85	58.82
		Don’t Know	Nil	6	7.69	3.92

NB: Figures for (3) are uninterpretable because some respondents ticked opinion (1) and/or (2) while also ticking (3).

Annexure-2

NUMBER OF MADRASSAS

The Government of Pakistan’s report on the madrassas (GOP 1988) has given the number of madrassas in every province and other parts of Pakistan. The report, along with the increase in recent years, is being reproduced here. However, the numbers in each province is not available in recent sources. Thus the numbers for 2002 are based on many sources and do not give a reliable picture for all provinces.

Area	Others/ Jamat		Deobandi		Barelvi@		Ahl-i-Hadith		Shia		Total
	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002	1988	2002
Punjab	43	Nk	500	1176	548	994	118	Nk	21	202	1320	2372+
NWFP	8	Nk	631	382?	32	51	5	Nk	2	13	678	446+
Sindh	6	Nk	208	687	61	487	6	26	10	48	291	1248
B’tan	31	Nk	278	624	34	25	3	Nk	1	15	347	664+
AK	3	Nk	51	36	20	28	2	Nk	Nil	03	76	140+
Islamabad	3	Nk	51	Nk	20	Nk	Nil	Nk	2	7	76	7+
FANA	3	Nk	60	Nk	2	Nk	27	Nk	11	33	103	33+
Girls Madrassas	Nk	40	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk	Nk
Total of Sects	97	500	1779	7000	717	1585	161	376	47	419	2801	9,880
Source: For 1988 GOP 1988. For other figures the sources are given below.

+ The sign of plus means that the number of madrassas is more but cannot be determined.

x For madrassas in Sindh in 2002, Report by Sindh police quoted in Dawn [Karachi] 16 January 2003

@ For Barelvi Madrassas, except those in Sindh, see Fehrist Madaris-e-Mulhaqa (Lahore: Tanzeem ul Madris, 1996).

The number of the madrassas given by the Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Shia), Lahore, is 354 which is more than the number which comes from adding the madrassas given in the police report for Sindh. Nk = Not Known. Note: Numbers do not add up because the number of madrassas in the provinces is not given for 2002.

REFERENCES

Section-1

Ahmad, Mumtaz (2000) Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan. In Baxter, Craig and Kennedy, Charles H. (eds) Pakistan 2000 Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Ahmed, Feroz. (1998) Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press

Amin, Tahir. (1988) Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan, Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Aziz, K.K. (1993) The Murder of History in Pakistan, Lahore: Vanguard Press.

Bergen, Peter L. (2001) Holy War Inc: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York : Simon & Schuster Inc.

Census Private. (2001) Census of Private Educational Institutions, 1999-2000 Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics.

Census. (2001) 1998 Census Report of Pakistan, Islamabad: Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, Govt of Pakistan.

Cooley, John .K. (1999) Unholy War: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, London: Pluto Press.

Edn. Ind. (1941) Education in India in, 1938-39 Delhi : Manager of Publications.

Expenditure. (1999-2000) Details of Demands for Grants and Appropriation, 1999-2000 Vols 1 and 2, Islamabad: Govt. of Pakistan, Finance Division.

Friedmann, Yohann. (1989) Prophecy Continuous: Aspects of Ahmadi Religious Thought and Its Medieval Background, Berkeley: University of California Press.

GOP. (1988) Deeni Madaris ki Jame Report [Urdu], Islamabad Islamic Education Research Cell, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan.

GOP. (2002) Economic Survey of Pakistan: 2001-2002 Islamabad: Economic Advisory Wing, Finance Division, Govt. of Pakistan.

Haqqani, Husain. (2002) Islam’s Medieval Outposts, Foreign Affairs, (December), 58-64.

Hoodbhoy, Pervez and Nayyar, A.H. (1985) Rewriting the History of Pakistan. In Khan,

Asghar (ed). (1985) Islam, Politics and the State, London: Zed Press. pp. 164-177.

Hoodbhoy, Pervez (ed) (1998) Education and the State: Fifty Years of Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

ICG. (2002) Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military, Islamabad/Brussels: International Advisory Group Asia Report No. 36, 29 July 2002.

IPS. (1987) Deeni Madaris ka Nizam-e-Taleem [Urdu: The System of Education of the Religious Madrassas], Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies.

Kumar, Krishna. (2001) Prejudice and Pride : School Histories of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan, New Delhi: Penguin Books India.

Myers-Scotton, Carol. (1993) Elite closure as a powerful language strategy: the African case. In International Journal of the Sociology of Language 103: 149-163.

Nayyar, A.H (1998) Madrassa education: frozen in time. In Hoodbhoy 1998: 213-250.

PIHS. (2002) Pakistan Integrated Household Survey Round, 4: 2001:2002 Islamabad. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Government of Pakistan.

PNEP. (1969) Proposals for a New Educational Policy, Islamabad: Ministry of Education and Scientific Research.

Rahman, Tariq. (1996) Language and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Oxford University Press.

-------. (2002) Language, Ideology and Power: Language-Learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Rashid, Ahmed. (2000) Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London: 1. B Taurus.

______ (2002) Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia Lahore: Vanguard.

Robinson, Francis. (2002) The Ulema of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia Lahore: Feroz Sons.

Saigol, Rubina. (1995) Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan Lahore: ASR Publications.

Singer, P.W. (2001) Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not Jihad. Analysis Paper # 14, November 2001. http://www.brookings. edu/views/papers/ singer/20020103.htm

Stephens, Joe and Ottaway, David B. (2002) The ABC’s of Jihad in Afghanistan, The Washington Post, 23 March.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. (1999) Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrassa in British India and Pakistan, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 41, No. 2.

Zia, Rukhsana. (2003) Religion and education in Pakistan: An Overview, Prospects V.l. 33: No. 2 (June).

SECTION-2

Interviews

Many ulema and most students of madrassas did not want their interviews to be recorded by name. Those who allowed their names to be mentioned are listed below.

Hussain, Mohammad. 2002. Interview with the Nazim-e-Daftar of Jamiat us Safia, Islamabad, 13 December.

Zafar, Mohammad Iqbal. 2002. Interview with the Head of Jamia Rizvia Zia ul

Uloom, Satellite Town, Rawalpindi, 26 December.