Sayyid A. S. Pirzada, The Politics of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam
Pakistan 1971-77 (Karachi. Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.325. Price
Rs.
At the time of this writing Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, leader of his own faction of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) is under house arrest. The JUI cadres demonstrate in the streets on every Friday, and sometimes on others days too, to protest the Musharraf government’s decision to support the United States. As the Taliban, whom the U.S. accuses of abetting terrorism, were trained in the Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan, the JUI is a party which should be studied in depth in order to understand the politics of Pakistan. This book provides this understanding by giving a historical account of this party. It must be kept in mind that the party has had several names in the course of its history but this reviewer has chosen the name JUI for convenience.
The author begins with the anti-imperialist response of the Islamic scholars (ulema) to the anti-British events of 1857. However, because of the savage suppression of the dissident ulema, the others bided their time till 1913 when they formed the Anjuman-i-Khuddam-i-Kaaba. The aim of the organization was to protect the holy places of Islam and it was this which developed into the Jamiat-ul- Ulema-i-Hind (JUH) in 1919. The JUH supported the Muslim League and then the Congress in their struggle for Indian self-determination. However, while most of the leading Deobandi ulema did support the Congress, some eminent ones---like Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi and Shabbir Usmani--- did not. Instead, they supported the Muslim League.
When Pakistan was created, the ulema started their struggle to establish an Islamic form of governance, as they interpreted it, in the new country. One of the points they came to agree upon was to get the Ahmedis (Mirzais) declared non-Muslims on several doctrinal grounds. The JUI (then called the Markazi Jamiat Ulema Islam) also joined this campaign and put pressure on the government not only for this change but also to give Pakistan an Islamic constitution. As the Muslim League did not agree with the JUI, the two were opponents. During Ayub Khan’s rule (1958-1969), the ulema kept criticizing Ayub’s secular politics. The JUI however, did not support either Fatima Jinnah or Ayub during the elections of 1965. After the 1965 war, they organized jihad conferences and agitated to get liberal and modernist Islamic scholars (like Dr Fazal ur Rahman) removed from the government. These activities of the JUI fed into the anti-Ayub agitation of the Pakistan Democratic Movement which made Ayub resign in favour of Yahya. During the elections of 1970 the JUI generally favoured the PPP because some ulema, like Mufti Mahmud, felt that Islam favoured improving the lot of the downtrodden which the PPP was talking about. However, this stance was opposed by other ulema and the Jamiat was split into two. In the elections the Mufti Mahmud faction did better, especially in the NWFP and Balochistan, than its rival.
After the creation of Bangladesh, Bhutto formed the government in Pakistan. Now the NAP and JUI entered into a pact to form governments in the NWFP and Balochistan. In the NWFP Mufti Mahmud became the chief minister. This was the first time an alim had political power and a few changes, although at the provincial level, in the direction of Islamization came about. For instance, alcohol was banned in the NWFP; Arabic was made compulsory at some levels and government functionaries were encouraged to use the indigenous shalwar and qamiz rather than western clothes. However, the NAP and JUI had differences and, of course, the PPP was the opponent at the centre. Thus, the ulema did not remain long in power. The Balochistan government was dismissed in 1973 and the Frontier one resigned putting the JUI in opposition till the elections of 1977.
The association with NAP, which believed in ethnic nationalism, cost heavily for the JUI. In August 1973 Maulana Hazarvi dismissed Mufti Mahmud so that now there were another two factions JUIP (Hazarvi) and JUIP (Mufti). Even a third faction, the JUIP (Haqiqi), was set up by Maulana Zahid Qasimi at Karachi. However, the Mufti faction remained forefront in the opposition to Bhutto within the national assembly. Outside the assembly the JUI again played a contributory role in the opposition to Bhutto. Afterwards, the JUI continued to occupy its special niche in Pakistani politics. During the 1997 elections, however, it did not do well. That is why the author concludes that ‘the chances of the realization of the Jamiat’s dream of ushering in an Islamic government are, therefore, minimal’.
The author’s analysis is that the JUI has lost its vote bank because it has compromised on its Islamic principles. Because it has often supported the PPP and joined hands with NAP, it has alienated that real Islamists who used to support it. This does not explain why the Jamat-i-Islami, which has never allied itself either to an ethnic party or a secular one, has never got many votes either. The author does mention in passing that Pakistanis want an authoritarian leader which ‘does afford an opportunity to an 'alim to lead the nation’s destiny’. One wonders where the author got this impression from? Actually Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and a large number of people have been advocating non-democratic, authoritarian rule but what might have been interesting was a survey of people’s opinions without which the author should not have written about the end of democracy in Pakistan. The book has a lot of very useful facts about the JUI which are very welcome. Unfortunately, the author has not been as objective as he should have been. Instead, he shows his partiality for the interpretation of Islam which the JUI favours. Another problem, and this time a serious one, is that the author puts in a large amount of undigested and largely irrelevant material in the book. For instance, the whole chapter on Bhutto’s rigging of the 1977 elections, including senior military officers’ views about it, has little to do with the JUI. It could have been condensed into a paragraph with much more attention given to the JUI. Instead of this irrelevant detail the author should have told us about the role of the JUI, or the ulema in general, during the Afghan and Kashmir military expeditions. He should also have written about the emergence of religious militants (the Jihadi groups) and what changes, if any, are expected in the JUI because of them. He should also have told us exactly what role the JUI, and its seminaries, have played in training the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan. Had he done this in any detail it would have helped us to understand the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan and its future consequences for South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. These are contemporary questions and such is their significance that to ignore them, as the author has done, is a major omission which detracts from the value of the book. However, since any information about the JUI is valuable, the book should be welcomed, albeit with reservations, as a contribution to the literature on the politics of Pakistan and Islam.
Dr. Tariq Rahman