Roedad khan (Compiled), The British Papers: Secret and Confidential India-Pakistan-Bangladesh Documents 1958-1969 (Karachi; Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 989. Price. Rs. 995.
In recent years scholars have compiled official records in England and America because both these countries declassify records. Some of these records have a bearing upon the politics and history of Pakistan. Among these are Roedad Khan’s earlier work: The American Papers (1999) and F.S. Aijazuddin’s The White House and Pakistan: Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 (OUP, 2002). Both these books provide us with valuable insights for understanding Pakistan’s murky political history and, especially, how others view us and relate to us.
The book under review, compiled by Roedad Khan, covers documents between 1958-1969 i.e. the Ayub Khan era. The documents are despatches---letters, telegrams, reports etc--sent by British diplomats from Pakistan to Britain. The primary significance of the documents, which will be brought out below, is to understand how democracy was sabotaged in Pakistan.
The first letter (23 August 1958) dates from the time when Iskander Mirza, the President, was about to end democracy in Pakistan. Elections were due to be held and Mirza felt that his power would be curtailed or brought to an end. He told the British High Commissioner, Alexander Symon, that ‘if the election returns showed that a post-electoral Government was likely to be dominated by undesirable elements---he would himself intervene’ (p. 11). Symon did remark that ‘undesirability’ was left undefined but he did not take a stand on principles---the principle of democracy for instance. The British diplomats, curiously enough, were quite sympathetic to Mirza though they were very cautions about the opinions they expressed. As early as on 23 September it was clear that what Mirza had in mind was ‘a personal coup with Army support’ (p. 13) and that he conveyed this to Mr. Macmillan, the British Prime Minister. Contrary to what one would expect from a democratic political culture, the British did not seem to mind the prospect of this subversion of democracy. As there was public dissatisfaction with political instability---created by the same Iskander Mirza---the diplomats rightly surmised that Mirza ‘might expect a good deal of public support’ (p. 15).
Anyway the coup took place on 07 October and was immediately reported by the High Commissioner. It was reported that the President had planned his move in secrecy but also added that the C-in-C, General Ayub Khan, said that if Mirza did not act then he personally would (p. 21). This means that even at this time the army chief felt that he could intervene in political affairs. The British wanted good relations with Pakistan but were not concerned as to who should rule. When Ayub Khan toppled Mirza on 28 October, this too was duly reported and accepted as a fact by London.
The telegrams about Iskander Mirza’s arrest and departure, first to Quetta and then to London, have a dramatic quality about them. Three generals were sent to persuade Mirza to abdicate and they were Azam, Burki and Sheikh. These and other details have been mentioned in other sources (though the names of other military officers have been mentioned too) and need not detain us here. A brief mention may, however, be made of the fact that Mirza was paid his military pension (Rs. 2000 a month) in London and does not seem to be rich---something which would be considered incredible under the present circumstances when Pakistanis in much humbler positions are incredibly rich.
The despatches mention General Yahya Khan, then the chief of the General Staff, ‘as the most able and ambitious of those nearest to Ayub’ as early as on 3rd November 1958. Indeed, the diplomats must have been very competent because their judgments were generally so correct. In one letter (5 November 1958) General Hayaud Din commented that Ayub would not go for drastic land reforms because the most senior officers came ‘from land-owning families’ (p. 91). This, as we have seen, is what happened.
The despatches continue to describe Ayub Khan’s eleven years of rule with great acumen. A despatch of 22 April 1964 says that Pakistan was turning into an oriental princedom. In High Commissioner Morrice James’s words ‘The gilded pomp of the recent Pakistan day investiture which I watched not long ago in Rawalpindi had little about it that could be called republican’ (p. 210). However, it is also predicted that Pakistan will drift towards Muslim, not Western, political patterns. Further, a separate report on East Pakistan says that, since the Ayub regime ‘is essentially a Punjab-Pathan autocracy seasoned with émigrés from U.P,’ it can never be popular in the Eastern wing.
The 1965 war receives much coverage. This sources confirm, like all other sources before them, that Bhutto was the hawk and Ayub the dove in the war (and this reviewer uses the term ‘dove’ as a compliment). Indeed, as the diplomats noted, Ayub seemed to be surprised that India had reacted to Pakistan’s armed excursions into Kashmir by an open attack. It appears that the thinking in Pakistan in 1965, as in 1999 during the Kargil crisis, was that India would not escalate the Kashmir war.
Pakistani conspiracy-theorists believe that Western powers were anti-Pakistan. The facts are otherwise. The American ambassador, for instance, wrote to his government that it was not in American interests that Pakistan’s military capability be destroyed. If this happens, it would create a vacuum which the Chinese might fill in. There are several British documents sharing concerns about the survival of Pakistan. So, while it is true that these countries like all others, are actuated by their self-interest, it is also true that they have not had any special anti-Pakistan bias.
The war had many adverse effects. One was the further alienation of East Pakistan which the diplomats reported in detail. The other one was a newfound resentment against Pakistan in the Indian army. According to a report, whereas the old Indian officers talked affectionately about their Pakistani counterparts, the young ones had no such nostalgic memories. The 1965 war had convinced them that Pakistan could not be trusted as its leadership took high risks and was, therefore, irrational.
The despatches of 1968 report anti-Ayub disturbances all over Pakistan. Then Yahya Khan’s martial law is reported. While nobody can be certain whether Yahya actually forced Ayub out, the reports speculate that Yahya had decided not to support the Ayub regime. Even more meaningfully, it is mentioned that the political situation was actually improving when Ayub resigned.
The last report, of 13 June 1969, says that Yahya may keep the military in power for a long time. But, if he does so, there may be an ‘explosion’ in East Pakistan. As we know, Yahya took the risk of going for elections but did not implement the results of that election. This led to the ‘explosion’ the diplomats had predicted.
On the whole one feels that Pakistan’s leaders, who were all non-elected, non-political figures during this period, did not believe in democracy at all. They had no faith in democratic processes nor did they desire to create a democratic culture in the country. Moreover, Western powers, which do have institutionalized democratic institutions, looked only after their self-interest which meant doing business with whoever happened to be in power. They took no principled stand in favour of democracy despite all the rhetoric to the contrary. This, of course, is what one would expect in a world so cynically obsessed with the pursuit of its selfish self-interest.
What one cannot help praising is the competence, good sense and intelligence of the diplomats who sent these despatches. And, of course, one would be unjust if one does not praise the compiler of these papers who has taken the pains to put them in one volume. The only suggestion I have to offer is that such compilations should also carry a summary in a line or two of all documents. Dr. Zawwar Zaidi in his Jinnah Papers does provide such a summary and it is immensely helpful. Apart from that I wish there were more people doing such important but very arduous tasks as compiling documents without which serious scholarship cannot go on.