Thus, although Jinnah himself never visualized Pakistan as an Islamic state (or even an ideological one), the idea of ‘ideology’ became a part of the Pakistani official discourse soon after the partition. Then, when the objectives resolution was appended to the constitution in 1949, the theoretical foundations of this ideology (Islam) were laid. However, the interpretation of ‘Islam’ was left undefined. The secular elite hoped they could take advantage of this lack of definition of Islam to perpetuate their own rule while using ‘Islam’ to keep the federation from disintegrating along ethnic lines.
During this early period the military was officially apolitical and seemed to accept the concept of civilian supremacy. However, since Pakistan inherited 30 percent of the army of British India with only 17 percent of the revenue, the army was a developed, powerful and organized force while the civilian sector was disorganized and under-funded. Moreover, India did not seem to accept Pakistan initially and Indian troops threatened the new country’s borders and a war occurred in Kashmir in 1947-48. All this led to a feeling of insecurity which made the civilian leadership spend huge amounts of money on the armed forces and made them even stronger and more organized compared to civilian institutions than before. It was in this atmosphere that Ayub Khan, the C-in-C of the army, sought alliances with the United States. But, even at this early period, Ayub Khan and the military ‘put its weight behind the notion of an ideological state’ (p 39). The idea of using Islam, and especially Islamic conquerors, began at this period and not during General Zia ul Haq’s Islamization of the curricula as some naively assume.
Ayub Khan’s military misadventure, the 1965 war with India, was not presented as a military mistake. Instead, the mistake of infiltrating guerrillas into Indian held Kashmir (Operation Gibraltar) was hidden away from the public and was presented as the conflict of Islam and Hinduism. Yahya Khan, known as a womanizer and a drunkard, did not hesitate to use Islam to suppress Bengali nationalism. It was during his rule that General Sher Ali Khan of Pataudi promoted a ‘politico-ideological image’ of the army. Moreover, the Yahya regime supported Islamists in East Pakistan, including vigilante groups (al-Shams and al-Badar) who spied upon and oppressed the nationalist Bengalis in the name of Islamic unity.
Even during the Bhutto years, despite having suffered a defeat in the 1971 war, the military did not cease to increase its power in the state. Nor, indeed, did Bhutto rise above using the Islamists for his ends. The military fed Bhutto with information through its intelligence agencies while Bhutto trained Islamic militants from Afghanistan so as to threaten the Afghan state which had irredentist claims in Pakistan. Partly because of his dependence on intelligence agencies, Bhutto got alienated from the people. Moreover, the training of Afghans created links which later developed into Pakistan’s interest in creating a pliable Afghan government.
These tendencies became very visible and much stronger during Zia ul Haq’s time. Zia ul Haq used Islamization in order to rule Pakistan and the Afghan war to become a major player in international politics. As the United States poured in a lot of money to strengthen the Afghans who were fighting the Soviets, Zia ul Haq’s regime got further empowered. The military and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), through which the money and weapons flowed to Afghanistan, became very powerful players in the field of both domestic and foreign policy. As Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons during the same period, the policy concerning these also became a preserve of the military. Religious groups, which had fought in Afghanistan or at least supported the struggle against communism, invested heavily in the military’s policy about Afghanistan, Kashmir and nuclear weapons. From now on the close partnership between Jihadi groups and the military began (chapter 5).
The civilian interlude (1988-1999) is called ‘Military Rule by other Means’ (chapter 6) by the author. The author’s thesis is that no matter whether Benazier Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif ruled in Islamabad, the real power was always with the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). This thesis is familiar enough. What is less well documented is the way the military weakened the democratic system, maligned politicians, bribed the political rivals of sitting governments and encouraged the religious lobby to undermine the practice of democracy. There is also fresh evidence on the proxy war in Kashmir which was carried on by the military through young males indoctrinated by Jihadi outfits (‘Jihad without Borders’ chapter 7). Haqqani also points out that no civilian leader was free to change either the Kashmir or the Afghan policy and any attempt by them to start a peace process with India was nipped in the bud by the military and the religious forces. General Musharraf, however, could reverse some of these policies because he controlled the military. However, the author is not sure whether the proxy war in Kashmir is finally ended or whether the present pause in it is a temporary stratagem. He does, however, point out that even now the military gives more space to Islamic political parties than secular once in the political areas.
The ‘Conclusion’ urges Pakistan to become a functional rather than an ideological state. He says that most Pakistanis want the state to cater for ‘their social needs, respect and protect their right to observe religion’ and not to let the military dominate the political system or ‘invoke Islam as its sole source of legitimacy’ (p. 311). This idea is expressed by all liberal analysts. Hassan Abbas in the conclusion of his book Pakistan’s Drift Into Extremism (2004) makes similar points. Ahmad Faruqui in Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: the Price of Strategic Myopia (2003) argues for a transfer of funds from defence to development to end the garrison state economy in Pakistan. Stephen p. Cohen in The Idea of Pakistan (2004) warns us that if such transformations do not take place the consequences would be dangerous. This is probably true but the previous policies of the decision-makers of Pakistan have created a trap of public opinion which would make any real reversal of such policies very difficult. That, of course, does not mean that a scholar should not suggest their reversal in the interest of peace.
The book’s strong points are its courage and clarity. Although most of the facts presented are known in their rough outline, nobody I have read has presented them with such force, clarity, erudition and courage. At some places the author uses his personal knowledge or information he had privileged access to, but it is the way this information is used—the arrangement, the overall link with his main thesis, the accessibility—which gives it the force it possesses. With all this well-deserved praise, I have some criticism to offer. I feel that the author gives insufficient attention to the USA’s overall global policy and mentions U.S. interest several times in the last chapter. This is also true about Cohen’s book which, despite its title, is not so much about the idea of Pakistan but what harm will come to the United States (and Pakistan) if certain policies are followed. But, while the 8th and 9th chapters of Cohen’s books were expected from an American scholar whose real subject of interest is the United States and who, therefore, sees Pakistan in relation to this perspective, Haqqani might have had another kind of focus. This is not to say that American involvement in strengthening the military or the mosque is, or should have been, concealed by the author. It is not concealed but it is not given the vibrancy it should have carried nor is it related to global developments. I believe the conclusions in the last chapter should have related more on the consequences for South Asia—the ordinary people of this huge mass of humanity, rather than the states in question (USA or Pakistan). If Pakistan becomes a functional state, the people will derive certain benefits. This is implied, of course, but the author should have concentrated upon it.
Notwithstanding the reservations expressed above—and they are matters of emphases rather than of substance—I believe this is the best book on Pakistan’s politics written in the last five years or so. It is essential reading for anyone who wants to know what is going on in Pakistan.