Hamid Algar, Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran:
Four Lectures by Hamid Algar (New
York: Islamic Publications International, 2001, pp. 178. Price not indicated.
These lectures were delivered in the summer of 1979, soon after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As such, they may be viewed more as a defence of the new order than an unbiased, disinterested analysis of a historical event.
The first lecture is on ‘Iran and Shi’ ism’. In this Hamid Algar argues that the Islamic Revolution is not an exclusively Shia phenomenon. Indeed, these who brand it as such, want to suggest that the rest of the Islamic world does not need a revolution or cannot experience one. He argues that, in many cases, the Shias rejected accommodation with the dominant powers whereas the Sunnis did not. Moreover, the Shias celebrate martyrdom whereas, though valued in theory by the Sunnis, it was not ritualized by them in an yearly festival. These two theories created a kind of militancy in Shia Islam which was ‘lacking in a large number of the Sunni segments of the Muslim Ummah’ (p. 17).
Based upon this potential militancy the Shia ulema in Iran started evolving the doctrine of resistance to illegitimate political authority even from Savafid times when the very powerful Shah Abbas (1587-1629) was ruling Iran. Indeed, Shah Abbas himself was confronted by Mulla Ahmed Ardabili who told him that he was merely the trustee of the kingdom and not its owner. During the Qajar period the Usulis (those who believed that the ulema could interpret religion in the absence of the Imam) became more powerful than the Akhbaris (who believed that the ulema could only refer to the hadith to arrive at a conclusion and not interpret the Islamic law). This led to the emergence of mujtahids who interpreted and executed the law. These mujtahids began to exercise power outside the religious domain also. For instance, when in 1892 the government gave the monopoly of tobacco cultivation to a British firm, the Iranian public opinion was against this decision. However, it was only when Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the leading mujtahid, gave a decree saying that the consumption of tobacco was unlawful as long as it was handled by the British monopoly, that people boycotted it effectively. Having traced this history of resistance by the ulema to political power, Algar places Ayatullah Rohullah Khomeini’s assumption of power in this historical context.
The second lecture continues where the first one leaves off. It is called ‘Imam Khomeini: the embodiment of a tradition’ and it refers, in a general way, to the role of the ulema in Islam before it comes to Khomeini. In this context the lecturer discusses the development of such centres of Shia learning as Najaf and Qum. He goes on to discuss individual ulema and expresses the opinion that, notwithstanding his religious learning, Ayatullah Burujardi remained silent in the face of secularization in Iran and the royalist coup d’etat of August 1953. In contrast to this kind of apolitical alim he presents Khomeini, whose brief biographical sketch follows, whose primary role was resistance to secular authority. This resistance, he says, was religious because it was informed by religious values. Moreover, the focus of the struggle as far as Khomeini himself was concerned, as well as the idiom he used, was religious. As such his lack of a precise political strategy itself served as a strategy since it provided a moral platform to the struggle against the Shah.
After these two lectures, Hamid Algar turns to the thought of Ali Shari’ati, the ideologue of the Revolution. Shariati’s contribution was that he used the idiom of modern philosophy and sociology, which he had studied in France, to the analysis and interpretation of Islam. This made him appeal to the educated, urban youth who would flock to listen to his lectures in the Husayniya-yi Irshad. Finally this place was closed down in 1973 and Shariati imprisoned. In 1977 he died in exile in England, apparently of a heart attack. The lectures gives a competent summary of Shariati’s major concepts and the interpretation he gives of them. One of his concepts, Safavi Shi’ism and Alavi Shi’ism, is interesting for the whole Muslim world. He says Safavi Shi’ism is merely an establishment doctrine which teaches antagonism towards the Sunnis. However, Alavi Shi’ ism, based on the love of the Caliph Ali, does not. Such views made Shariati open to the charge of being a ‘Crypto Sunni or even a Wahhabi’ (p. 97) but actually he earned the goodwill of the Muslim world by such views. In the end, the lecturer is at pains to emphasize that there is no contradiction between the spirit of the teachings of Shariati and Khomeini and that any attempt to divide Iran with reference to them would fail.
The last lecture is on ‘The Year of the Revolution. Here Hamid Algar takes on the role of a propagandist and defender of the regime. He begins by tracing out the events which led to the Revolution. This series of events is now well known but soon after the Revolution people needed this essential information. One point which Algar makes is that the Revolution was immensely helped by modem technology. Khomeini’s words were taped and sent to Iran through the telephone. In Iran they were put on hundreds of tapes and made available to everybody. This was how the people were inspired to put up such a stiff resistance to the Shah’s regime that it finally came to an end.
He then says the Western powers as well as their regional satellites opposed the Revolution and opines that such a development could also occur in the Sunni Muslim world. Then he turns his attention inwards claiming that the revolutionary fervour Islamized Iranian society. Even the secular opposition ‘was obliged to abandon its positions and to conform unconditionally to the demands advanced by Imam Khomeini’ (p. 141). He ends by saying that the Muslims of the whole world have a lot to learn from the Islamic Revolution of Iran.
Every lecture is followed by a question and answer session but really hard, fundamental questions are not raised. For instance, Hamid Algar’s contention that political parties wore unwelcome in the Islamic political system (p. 152) could lead to the dictatorship of a single party in the name of Islam. This assertion was, however, not subjected to criticism or even discussion. Secondly, the possibility that the Revolutionary government could crack down on all kinds of opposition---as it in fact did later---was not even expressed. Indeed, the very lack of freedom which the Iranian youth are protesting against today were made possible by some of the certainties of the Revolution which Hamid Algar does not examine critically.
On the theoretical plane, Hamid Algar often gives simplistic explanations of complex events. He is right about the tradition of political resistance in Shia Islam but there was also a more modern tradition of resistance, especially lower middle class and proletarian resistance, in Iranian cities the roots of which were economic. This has mostly been ignored by Hamid Algar. The resistance of the secularized Iranian educated youth, whether attracted to Shariati or the Tudeh Party or to any other ideology, also helped to feed the animosity against the Shah. All these different forms of resistance are not given more than a passing reference by Algar who seems to suggest that revolutionary Islam inspired all Iranians in their desire to remove the Shah. Because Algar ignores this aspect of the Revolution, he also does not talk about the internal struggle between the competing forces in Iran after the Revolution.
These omissions and defences make this work somewhat unreliable as pure history. It is, however, useful in order to understand the Islamic Revolutionary mindset of the ideologues and supporters of the Islamic Revolution in Iran soon after it occurred. As this revolution is perhaps the most important event in contemporary Muslim history, this book should be read by all those who want to understand the Muslim world today.