ALASTAIR LAMB, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute 1947-1948 (1997: Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 373. Price: Rs. 350.
Alastair Lamb is well known for his writings on Kashmir such as his book: Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (1991). In this book he covers much the same ground as in the last book but the sources he uses are far more extensive and uptodate till 1997. Indeed, he has also referred to a very recent work, the undergraduate thesis of Major William Reid entitled Sir Owen Dixon’s Mediation of the Kashmir Dispute 1950 (July 2000). Moreover, in the preface to the latest edition he has mentioned the Kargil episode though this is only in passing and does not affect the arguments he made in the book in 1997.
The book has twelve chapters out of which, after the introductory chapter, the birth of Pakistan sets the opening scene. He tells us that the British had conceded that they would have to deal with two contenders for power---the Congress and the Muslim League. He reveals, on the basis of both already available and some new evidence, that it was V.P. Menon on whom both Wavell and Mountbatten relied for advice. As Menon was close to Patel, a pro-India bias seems to have clouded the judgment of senior British decision-makers on crucial issues relating to the partition of India.
The actual partition was done by Radcliffe and, quite properly, chapter 3 is devoted to it. The author tells us that Radcliffe awarded three out of the four tehsils (sub-districts) of the Muslim majority Gurdaspur district to India. Out of these Batala had 55 percent Muslims and Gurdaspur 52.1 percent (Pathankot, on the other hand, had 61 percent Hindus and Sikhs). In general, Pakistani historians argue that this was done so as to provide access to Kashmir from India. However, Alastair Lamb, who is otherwise well known for being sympathetic to Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir, makes the point that Radcliffe could have been influenced by other factors. The major point is that the Sikhs would not have tolerated Muslims controlling areas east of the river Ravi as that would have exposed Amritsar---The holiest shrine of the Sikhs---to danger from Pakistan. However, Radcliffe did initially give some areas across the Ravi to Pakistan but this was reversed, probably by Mountbatten himself, because rumours of this having happended had made the Sikhs attack a train full of Muslims coming from India to Pakistan.
The chapter on the lapse of paramountcy tells us that, while a number of Indian leaders did try to persuade the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir to join India, the Pakistani leaders were somewhat less active in this regard. However, Jinnah was in touch with the Muslim conference from 1943 onwards though he too was less involved than Nehru who had emotional links with Kashmir---his ancestral homeland. In chapter 5 (on the Poonch Revolt) Lamb tells us that Patel, although not emotionally involved with Kashmir, felt that it was of geopolitical significance for India. His reasons---such as having an access to the ‘Pathan world’---now seem so trivial that it seems surprising how blind decision-makers are to the real long-term interests of their own country. Patel’s blindness had resulted in great harm for India which risks a war and a debilitating arms race because of such dubious calculations. Incidentally, Patel was pragmatic enough to want to compromise later with Pakistan. The Pakistani leaders, unfortunately, did not possess the wisdom to agree to the compromise and since that time no leader of the stature of Patel has come up in India.
Lamb repeats much of the information he had unearthed in his previous book on the accession crisis in Kashmir. He gives details about the revolt of the Muslim ex-servicemen and other disgruntled Muslims in Poonch. He also adds that the Gilgit Scouts, under an English officer named Major Brown, also rebelled and the Major flew the Pakistan flag and brought the Northern Areas into Pakistan. Brown was not mentioned in Pakistani histories while the Indians considered him a tool of Pakistani and imperialist conspirators. However, in August 1993 he was awarded a posthumous Sitara-e-Pakistan. He also gives details of Major Khurshid Anwar’s attack on the Maharaja’s forces which finally brought Azad Kashmir in Pakistani control. All these facts are known and Lamb has merely added details to the known stories. He has also added new details to his major point that the Maharaja did not sign any Instrument of Accession till the morning when Indian troops landed at Srinagar airport. Lamb made this point in his last book and he has made it again even more forcefully with more details. Among other things he has brought in Field Marshal Manekshaw’s evidence recorded on 18 December 1994. Although Manekshaw supports V.P. Menon who said he had got the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja, the author points to a number of points where the witness is not to be relied upon. The most important point, and one not made by Lamb in his 1991 book, is that another witness, P.S. Jha, suggests that there was a ‘conspiracy’ of sorts to ‘deceive’ Nehru. Lamb does not believe in this ‘conspiracy’ but he does point out that the Instrument of Accession was probably suspect even in Indian eyes to merit such obsessive reflections.
Chapter 8 is about the Kashmir War (First phase) and it adds only minor details---such as the role of Major Brown---to our knowledge. Similarly, chapter 8 on the Kashmir case in the U.N.O adds little to what is known but sums up all relevant events admirably. The next chapter, on ‘Operation Stand Down’, is revealing in that it tells us that what had been decided by the British was to make British officers in both India and Pakistan to ‘stand down’ (i.e leave active service) if the two dominions went to war. General Graccy, however, gave the impression to M.A. Jinnah that British officers on the Pakistani side only would stand down. Moreover, in reality the Indian troops used in Kashmir were under the control by a British general in Delhi. In Pakistan too some British officers did get involved in the fighting but after July 1948 the Government of Pakistan pulled them out of Kashmir. The author concludes that it was good that British officers did not get too involved in the fighting as this would have led to antagonism between sections of British society and ill will towards all South Asians in Britain.
After another chapter on the Kashmir case in the U.N.O, Lamb comes to the Kashmir crisis in 1997. His main argument is that Pakistan should not think of dealing with India on the basis of the old Kashmir state. The new basis of interaction should be the rights of the people of Kashmir and the two-nation theory itself. This means that Buddhist Ladakh and Hindu Jammu should not even be claimed by Pakistan. The central question is of the Muslim majority Vale of Kashmir about which there should be some compromise solution with India. However, somewhat surprisingly, Lamb also suggests that Azad Kashmir, like the Vale, should be an autononous region. One would have thought that, since there is no indigenous rising against Pakistan in Azad Kashmir, it is not really a problem area at all. The Vale, however, is a problem area and a solution along Lamb’s lines (or Dixon’s for that matter) might be a possible solution.
Among other things, Lamb sheds light on Mountbatten who has been reviled in Pakistan as the architect of the Kashmir problem. He says, on the basis of evidence, that it was not he but Wavell who had decided that the eastern tehsils of Gurdaspur be awarded to India. This was to be done to appease the Sikhs and not to advance India’s claim to Kashmir. Moreover, although he was pro-Indian in sympathy, yet he did try to settle the Kashmir dispute later. Unfortuantely, Mountbatten was not lucky in this matter and is blamed more than he deserves. This and other such insights, the result of meticulous research, may not go down too well either in India and Pakistan. However, I find this book better researched and more convincing than Lamb’s last book on Kashmir. On the whole Lamb is a scholar of the history of Kashmir whom it is impossible to ignore whether one agrees with him or not.